Vol. 3, No. 2 Summer 2003

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The Occidental Quarterly (ISSN 1539-3925), a journal of Western thought and opinion, is published by The Charles Martel Society four times annually in the Fall, Winter, Spring, and Summer. Unsolicited manuscripts from contributing authors should be submitted to the editorial department address: P.O. Box 695, Mt. Airy, MD 21771. Style sheets are available upon request. Subscriptions in the U.S. are $40 annually, $78 for two years, and $114 for three years; subscription rates for Canada $45 (first year), $88 (two years), and $129 (three years); European subscription rates: $60 (first year), $118 (two years) $174 (three years). All subscriptions, including additional inquiries or subscription problems, should be mailed to the subscription department: P.O. Box 3462 Augusta, GA 30914. Back issues are $10 per issue.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

THE QUESTION OF JEWISH INFLUENCE

One special, unique aspect of the relation of the West with other civilizations remains to be noted. Through all the intellectual and technical development that has been barely sketched here, through all the turmoil of politics, one alien group lived physically in the midst of the Western peoples but almost aloof from their life, almost untouched by the strains and intellectual problems that beset the West: the Western Jews.

—Lawrence Brown, *The Might of the West*

The lead article in this issue, "Understanding Jewish Influence" by Dr. Kevin MacDonald, professor of psychology at California State University-Long Beach, is the first of a three-part series that analyzes Jewish political, cultural, social, and economic influence and the factors that contribute to the extraordinary Jewish impact on American life. As with Professor MacDonald's other published work, particularly his trilogy on Judaism as an evolutionary group-based survival strategy, the treatment of the subject is meticulously thorough and systematic in its careful study of what is by any honest assessment the most untouchable of current taboos.

The first installment outlines the core traits of Jewish activism and why this combination of group-based characteristics is such a formidable ethnocentric force. Subsequent articles will assess the role of Zionism and neo-conservatism—both subjects of immense topicality in view of their role in forming America's current policy throughout the Middle East—as political movements that consolidate Jewish influence over elite institutions in Western societies.

To thoroughly understand the dynamic of competition and interaction among societal elites one must accurately diagnose the causal relationships that often generate friction and group-based conflict. Despite the shallow rhetoric of his critics—conservatives who claim to be confused about the role of groups in evolutionary psychology—Professor MacDonald advances a compelling assessment of Jewish influence that updates and expands upon his other published work on this provocative area of scholarly research.

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It's time for change

Understanding Jewish Influence I:
Background Traits for Jewish Activism

Kevin MacDonald

Abstract

Beginning in the ancient world, Jewish populations have repeatedly attained a position of power and influence within Western societies. I will discuss Jewish background traits conducive to influence: ethnocentrism, intelligence and wealth, psychological intensity, aggressiveness, with most of the focus on ethnocentrism. I discuss Jewish ethnocentrism in its historical, anthropological, and evolutionary context and in its relation to three critical psychological processes: moral particularism, self-deception, and the powerful Jewish tendency to coalesce into exclusionary, authoritarian groups under conditions of perceived threat.

Jewish populations have always had enormous effects on the societies in which they reside because of several qualities that are central to Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy: First and foremost, Jews are ethnocentric and able to cooperate in highly organized, cohesive, and effective groups. Also important is high intelligence, including the usefulness of intelligence in attaining wealth, prominence in the media, and eminence in the academic world and the legal profession. I will also discuss two other qualities that have received less attention: psychological intensity and aggressiveness.

The four background traits of ethnocentrism, intelligence, psychological intensity, and aggressiveness result in Jews being able to produce formidable, effective groups—groups able to have powerful, transformative effects on the peoples they live among. In the modern world, these traits influence the academic world and the world of mainstream and elite media, thus amplifying Jewish effectiveness compared with traditional societies. However, Jews have repeatedly become an elite and powerful group in societies in which they reside in sufficient numbers. It is remarkable that Jews, usually as a tiny minority, have been central to a long list of historical events. Jews were much on the mind of the Church Fathers in the fourth century during the formative years of Christian dominance in the West. Indeed, I have proposed that the powerful anti-Jewish attitudes and legislation of the fourth-century Church must be understood as a defensive reaction against Jewish economic power and enslavement of non-Jews.[1] Jews who had nominally converted to Christianity but maintained their ethnic ties in

marriage and commerce were the focus of the 250-year Inquisition in Spain, Portugal, and the Spanish colonies in the New World. Fundamentally, the Inquisition should be seen as a defensive reaction to the economic and political domination of these "New Christians."[2]

Jews have also been central to all the important events of the twentieth century. Jews were a necessary component of the Bolshevik revolution that created the Soviet Union, and they remained an elite group in the Soviet Union until at least the post-World War II era. They were an important focus of National Socialism in Germany, and they have been prime movers of the post-1965 cultural and ethnic revolution in the United States, including the encouragement of massive non-white immigration to countries of European origins.[3] In the contemporary world, organized American Jewish lobbying groups and deeply committed Jews in the Bush administration and the media are behind the pro-Israel U.S. foreign policy that is leading to war against virtually the entire Arab world.

How can such a tiny minority have such huge effects on the history of the West? This article is the first of a three-part series on Jewish influence which seeks to answer that question. This first paper in the series provides an introduction to Jewish ethnocentrism and other background traits that influence Jewish success. The second article discusses Zionism as the quintessential example of twentieth-century Jewish ethnocentrism and as an example of a highly influential Jewish intellectual/political movement. A broader aim will be to discuss a generalization about Jewish history: that in the long run the more extreme elements of the Jewish community win out and determine the direction of the entire group. As Jonathan Sacks points out, it is the committed core—made up now especially of highly influential and vigorous Jewish activist organizations in the United States and hypernationalist elements in Israel—that determines the future direction of the community.[4] The third and final article will discuss neoconservatism as a Jewish intellectual and political movement. Although I touched on neoconservatism in my trilogy on Jews,[5] the present influence of this movement on U.S. foreign policy necessitates a much fuller treatment.

The four background traits—discussed in more detail below—are ethnocentrism, intelligence, psychological intensity, and aggressiveness. These traits are seen as underlying Jewish success in producing focused, effective groups able to influence the political process and the wider culture. In the modern world, Jewish influence on politics and culture is channeled through the media and through elite academic institutions into an almost bewildering array of areas—far too many to consider here.

Jews Are Hyperethnocentric

Elsewhere I have argued that Jewish hyperethnocentrism can be traced back to their Middle Eastern origins.[6] Traditional Jewish culture has a number of features identifying Jews with the ancestral cultures of the area. The most important of these is that Jews and other Middle Eastern cultures evolved under circumstances that favored large groups dominated by males.[7] These groups were basically extended families with high levels of endogamy (i.e., marriage within the

kinship group) and consanguineous marriage (i.e., marriage to blood relatives), including the uncle-niece marriage sanctioned in the Old Testament. These features are exactly the opposite of Western European tendencies (See Table 1 on next page).[8]

Whereas Western societies tend toward individualism, the basic Jewish cultural form is collectivism, in which there is a strong sense of group identity and group boundaries. Middle Eastern societies are characterized by anthropologists as "segmentary societies" organized into relatively impermeable, kinship-based groups.[9]

	European Cultural Origins	Jewish Cultural Origins
Evolutionary History	Northern Hunter-Gatherers	Middle Old World Pastoralists (Herders)
Kinship System	Bilateral; Weakly Patricentric	Unilineal; Strongly Patricentric
Family System	Simple Household	Extended Family; Joint Household
Marriage Practices	Exogamous; Monogamous	Endogamous; Consanguineous; Polygynous
Marriage Psychology	Companionate; Based on Mutual Consent and Affection	Utilitarian; Based on Family Strategizing and Control of Kinship Group
Position of Women	Relatively High	Relatively Low
Social Structure	Individualistic; Republican; Democratic	Collectivistic; Authoritarian Charismatic Leaders
Ethnocentrism	Relatively Low	Relatively High; "Hyper-ethnocentrism"
Xenophobia	Relatively Low	Relatively High; "Hyper-xenophobia"
Socialization	Stresses Independence, Self-Reliance	Stresses Ingroup Identification, Obligations to Kinship Group
Intellectual Stance	Reason; Science	Dogmatism; Submission to Ingroup Authority and Charismatic Leaders
Moral Stance	Moral Universalism: Morality Is Independent of Group	Moral Particularism; Ingroup/Outgroup Morality; Is it good for the Jews?

Table 1: Contrasts between European and Jewish Cultural Forms.

Group boundaries are often reinforced through external markers such as hair style or clothing, as Jews have often done throughout their history. Different groups settle in different areas where they retain their homogeneity alongside other homogeneous groups, as illustrated by the following account from Carleton Coon:

> There the ideal was to emphasize not the uniformity of the citizens of a country as a whole but a uniformity within each special segment, and the greatest possible contrast between segments. The members of each ethnic unit feel the need to identify themselves by some configuration of symbols. If by virtue of their history they possess some racial peculiarity, this they will enhance by special haircuts and the like; in any case they will wear distinctive garments and behave in a distinctive fashion.[10]

These societies are by no means blissful paradises of multiculturalism. Between-group conflict often lurks just beneath the surface. For example, in nineteenth-century Turkey, Jews, Christians, and Muslims lived in a sort of superficial harmony, and even inhabited the same areas, "but the slightest spark sufficed to ignite the fuse."[11]

Jews are at the extreme of this Middle Eastern tendency toward hypercollectivism and hyperethnocentrism. I give many examples of Jewish hyperethnocentrism in my trilogy on Judaism and have suggested in several places that Jewish hyperethnocentrism is biologically based.[12] Middle Eastern ethnocentrism and fanaticism has struck a good many people as extreme, including William Hamilton, perhaps the most important evolutionary biologist of the twentieth century. Hamilton writes:

> I am sure I am not the first to have wondered what it is about that part of the world that feeds such diverse and intense senses of rectitude as has created three of the worlds' most persuasive and yet most divisive and mutually incompatible religions. It is hard to discern the root in the place where I usually look for roots of our strong emotions, the part deepest in us, our biology and evolution.[13]

Referring to my first two books on Judaism, Hamilton then notes that "even a recent treatise on this subject, much as I agree with its general theme, seems to me hardly to reach to this point of the discussion." If I failed to go far enough in describing or analyzing Jewish ethnocentrism, it is perhaps because the subject seems almost mind-bogglingly deep, with psychological ramifications everywhere. As a pan-humanist, Hamilton was acutely aware of the ramifications of human ethnocentrism and especially of the Jewish variety. Likening Judaism to the creation of a new human species, Hamilton noted that

> from a humanist point of view, were those "species" the Martian thought to see in the towns and villages a millennium or so ago a good thing? Should we have let their crystals grow; do we retrospectively approve them? As by growth in numbers by land annexation, by the heroizing of a recent mass murderer of Arabs [i.e., Baruch Goldstein, who murdered 29 Arabs, including children, at the Patriarch's Cave in Hebron in 1994), and by the honorific burial accorded to a publishing magnate (Robert Maxwell), who had enriched Israel partly by his

> swindling of his employees, most of them certainly not Jews, some Israelis seem to favour a "racewise" and unrestrained competition, just as did the ancient Israelites and Nazi Germans. In proportion to the size of the country and the degree to which the eyes of the world are watching, the acts themselves that betray this trend of reversion from panhumanism may seem small as yet, but the spirit behind them, to this observer, seems virtually identical to trends that have long predated them both in humans and animals.[14]

A good start for thinking about Jewish ethnocentrism is the work of Israel Shahak, most notably his co-authored *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*.[15] Present-day fundamentalists attempt to re-create the life of Jewish communities before the Enlightenment (i.e., prior to about 1750). During this period the great majority of Jews believed in Cabbala—Jewish mysticism. Influential Jewish scholars like Gershom Scholem ignored the obvious racialist, exclusivist material in the Cabbala by using words like "men," "human beings," and "cosmic" to suggest the Cabbala has a universalist message. The actual text says salvation is only for Jews, while non-Jews have "Satanic souls."[16]

The ethnocentrism apparent in such statements was not only the norm in traditional Jewish society, but remains a powerful current of contemporary Jewish fundamentalism, with important implications for Israeli politics. For example, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, describing the difference between Jews and non-Jews:

> We do not have a case of profound change in which a person is merely on a superior level. Rather we have a case of . . . a totally different species. . . . The body of a Jewish person is of a totally different quality from the body of [members] of all nations of the world . . . The difference of the inner quality [of the body] . . . is so great that the bodies would be considered as completely different species. This is the reason why the Talmud states that there is an halachic difference in attitude about the bodies of non-Jews [as opposed to the bodies of Jews]: "their bodies are in vain". . . . An even greater difference exists in regard to the soul. Two contrary types of soul exist, a non-Jewish soul comes from three satanic spheres, while the Jewish soul stems from holiness.[17]

This claim of Jewish uniqueness echoes Holocaust activist Elie Wiesel's claim that "everything about us is different." Jews are "ontologically" exceptional.[18]

The Gush Emunim and other Jewish fundamentalist sects described by Shahak and Mezvinsky are thus part of a long mainstream Jewish tradition which considers Jews and non-Jews completely different species, with Jews absolutely superior to non-Jews and subject to a radically different moral code. Moral universalism is thus antithetical to the Jewish tradition in which the survival and interests of the Jewish people are the most important ethical goal:

> Many Jews, especially religious Jews today in Israel and their supporters abroad, continue to adhere to traditional Jewish ethics that other Jews would like to ignore or explain away. For example, Rabbi Yitzhak Ginzburg of Joseph's Tomb in Nablus/Shechem, after several of his students were remanded on suspicion of

> murdering a teenage Arab girl: "Jewish blood is not the same as the blood of a goy." Rabbi Ido Elba: "According to the Torah, we are in a situation of pikuah nefesh (saving a life) in time of war, and in such a situation one may kill any Gentile." Rabbi Yisrael Ariel writes in 1982 that "Beirut is part of the Land of Israel. [This is a reference to the boundaries of Israel as stated in the Covenant between God and Abraham in Genesis 15: 18–20 and Joshua 1 3–4] . . . our leaders should have entered Lebanon and Beirut without hesitation, and killed every single one of them. Not a memory should have remained." It is usually yeshiva students who chant "Death to the Arabs" on CNN. The stealing and corruption by religious leaders that has recently been documented in trials in Israel and abroad continues to raise the question of the relationship between Judaism and ethics.[19]

Moral particularism in its most aggressive form can be seen among the ultranationalists, such as the Gush Emunim, who hold that

> Jews are not, and cannot be a normal people. The eternal uniqueness of the Jews is the result of the Covenant made between God and the Jewish people at Mount Sinai . . . . The implication is that the transcendent imperatives for Jews effectively nullify moral laws that bind the behavior of normal nations. Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, one of Gush Emunim's most prolific ideologues, argues that the divine commandments to the Jewish people "transcend the human notions of national rights." He explains that while God requires other nations to abide by abstract codes of justice and righteousness, such laws do not apply to Jews.[20]

As argued in the second paper in this series, it is the most extreme elements within the Jewish community that ultimately give direction to the community as a whole. These fundamentalist and ultranationalist groups are not tiny fringe groups, mere relics of traditional Jewish culture. They are widely respected by the Israeli public and by many Jews in the Diaspora. They have a great deal of influence on the Israeli government, especially the Likud governments and the recent government of national unity headed by Ariel Sharon. The members of Gush Emunim constitute a significant percentage of the elite units of the Israeli army, and, as expected on the hypothesis that they are extremely ethnocentric, they are much more willing to treat the Palestinians in a savage and brutal manner than are other Israeli soldiers. All together, the religious parties represent about 25% of the Israeli electorate[21]—a percentage that is sure to increase because of the high fertility of religious Jews and because intensified troubles with the Palestinians tend to make other Israelis more sympathetic to their cause. Given the fractionated state of Israeli politics and the increasing numbers of the religious groups, it is unlikely that future governments can be formed without their participation. Peace in the Middle East therefore appears unlikely absent the complete capitulation or expulsion of the Palestinians.

A good discussion of Jewish moral particularism can be found in a recent article in *Tikkun*—probably the only remaining liberal Jewish publication. Kim Chernin wonders why so many Jews "have trouble being critical of Israel."[22] She finds several obstacles to criticism of Israel:

> 1. A conviction that Jews are always in danger, always have been, and therefore are in danger now. Which leads to: 2. The insistence that a criticism is an attack and will lead to our destruction. Which is rooted in: 3. The supposition that any negativity towards Jews (or Israel) is a sign of anti-Semitism and will (again, inevitably) lead to our destruction. . . . 6. An even more hidden belief that a sufficient amount of suffering confers the right to violence. . . . 7. The conviction that our beliefs, our ideology (or theology), matter more than the lives of other human beings.

Chernin presents the Jewish psychology of moral particularism:

> We keep a watchful eye out, we read the signs, we detect innuendo, we summon evidence, we become, as we imagine it, the ever-vigilant guardians of our people's survival. Endangered as we imagine ourselves to be; endangered as we insist we are, any negativity, criticism, or reproach, even from one of our own, takes on exaggerated dimensions; we come to perceive such criticism as a life-threatening attack. The path to fear is clear. But our proclivity for this perception is itself one of our unrecognized dangers. Bit by bit, as we gather evidence to establish our perilous position in the world, we are brought to a selective perception of that world. With our attention focused on ourselves as the endangered species, it seems to follow that we ourselves can do no harm. . . . When I lived in Israel I practiced selective perception. I was elated by our little kibbutz on the Lebanese border until I recognized that we were living on land that had belonged to our Arab neighbors. When I didn't ask how we had come to acquire that land, I practiced blindness. . . .

The profound depths of Jewish ethnocentrism are intimately tied up with a sense of historical persecution. Jewish memory is a memory of persecution and impending doom, a memory that justifies any response because ultimately it is Jewish survival that is at stake:

> Wherever we look, we see nothing but impending Jewish destruction. . . . I was walking across the beautiful square in Nuremberg a couple of years ago and stopped to read a public sign. It told this story: During the Middle Ages, the town governing body, wishing to clear space for a square, burned out, burned down, and burned up the Jews who had formerly filled up the space. End of story. After that, I felt very uneasy walking through the square and I eventually stopped doing it. I felt endangered, of course, a woman going about through Germany wearing a star of David. But more than that, I experienced a conspicuous and dreadful self-reproach at being so alive, so happily on vacation, now that I had come to think about the murder of my people hundreds of years before. After reading that plaque I stopped enjoying myself and began to look for other signs and traces of the mistreatment of the former Jewish community. If I had stayed longer in Nuremberg, if I had gone further in this direction, I might soon have come to believe that I, personally, and my people, currently, were threatened by the contemporary Germans eating ice cream in an outdoor cafe in the square. How much more potent this tendency for alarm must be in the Middle East, in the middle of a war zone! . . .

Notice the powerful sense of history here. Jews have a very long historical memory. Events that happened centuries ago color their current perceptions.

This powerful sense of group endangerment and historical grievance is associated with a hyperbolic style of Jewish thought that runs repeatedly through Jewish rhetoric. Chernin's comment that "any negativity, criticism, or reproach, even from one of our own, takes on exaggerated dimensions" is particularly important. In the Jewish mind, all criticism must be suppressed because not to do so would be to risk another Holocaust: "There is no such thing as overreaction to an anti-Semitic incident, no such thing as exaggerating the omnipresent danger. Anyone who scoffed at the idea that there were dangerous portents in American society hadn't learned 'the lesson of the Holocaust.' "[23] Norman Podhoretz, editor of *Commentary*, a premier neoconservative journal published by the American Jewish Committee, provides an example:

> [M]y own view is that what had befallen the Jews of Europe inculcated a subliminal lesson. . . . The lesson was that anti-Semitism, even the relatively harmless genteel variety that enforced quotas against Jewish students or kept their parents from joining fashionable clubs or getting jobs in prestigious Wall Street law firms, could end in mass murder.[24]

This is a "slippery slope" argument with a vengeance. The schema is as follows: Criticism of Jews indicates dislike of Jews; this leads to hostility toward Jews, which leads to Hitler and eventually to mass murder. Therefore all criticism of Jews must be suppressed. With this sort of logic, it is easy to dismiss arguments about Palestinian rights on the West Bank and Gaza because "the survival of Israel" is at stake. Consider, for example, the following advertisement distributed by neoconservative publicist David Horowitz:

> The Middle East struggle is not about right versus right. It is about a fifty-year effort by the Arabs to destroy the Jewish state, and the refusal of the Arab states in general and the Palestinian Arabs in particular to accept Israel's existence. . . . The Middle East conflict is not about Israel's occupation of the territories; it is about the refusal of the Arabs to make peace with Israel, which is an expression of their desire to destroy the Jewish state.[25]

"Survival of Israel" arguments thus trump concerns about allocation of scarce resources like water, the seizure of Palestinian land, collective punishment, torture, and the complete degradation of Palestinian communities into isolated, military-occupied, Bantustan-type enclaves. The logic implies that critics of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza also favor the destruction of Israel and hence the mass murder of millions of Jews.

Similarly, during the debate over selling military hardware to Saudi Arabia in the Carter administration, "the Israeli lobby pulled out all the stops," including circulating books to Congress based on the TV series *The Holocaust*. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the main Jewish lobbying group in Congress, included a note stating, "This chilling account of the extermination of six million Jews underscores Israel's concerns during the current negotiations for security without reliance on outside guarantees."[26] In

other words, selling AWACS reconnaissance planes to Saudi Arabia, a backward kingdom with little military capability, is tantamount to collusion in the extermination of millions of Jews.

Jewish thinking about immigration into the U.S. shows the same logic. Lawrence Auster, a Jewish conservative, describes the logic as follows:

> The liberal notion that "all bigotry is indivisible" [advocated by Norman Podhoretz] implies that all manifestations of ingroup/outgroup feeling are essentially the same—and equally *wrong*. It denies the obvious fact that some outgroups are *more* different from the ingroup, and hence *less* assimilable, and hence *more* legitimately excluded, than other outgroups. It means, for example, that wanting to exclude Muslim immigrants from America is as blameworthy as wanting to exclude Catholics or Jews.
>
> Now when Jews put together the idea that "all social prejudice and exclusion leads potentially to Auschwitz" with the idea that "all bigotry is indivisible," they must reach the conclusion that *any* exclusion of *any* group, no matter how alien it may be to the host society, is a potential Auschwitz.
>
> So there it is. We have identified the core Jewish conviction that makes Jews keep pushing relentlessly for mass immigration, even the mass immigration of their deadliest enemies. In the thought-process of Jews, to keep Jew-hating Muslims out of America would be tantamount to preparing the way to another Jewish Holocaust.[27]

The idea that any sort of exclusionary thinking on the part of Americans—and especially European Americans as a majority group—leads inexorably to a Holocaust for Jews is not the only reason why Jewish organizations still favor mass immigration. I have identified two others as well: the belief that greater diversity makes Jews safer and an intense sense of historical grievance against the traditional peoples and culture of the United States and Europe.[28] These two sentiments also illustrate Jewish moral particularism because they fail to consider the ethnic interests of other peoples in thinking about immigration policy. Recently the "diversity-as-safety" argument was made by Leonard S. Glickman, president and CEO of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, a Jewish group that has advocated open immigration to the United States for over a century. Glickman stated, "The more diverse American society is the safer [Jews] are."[29] At the present time, the HIAS is deeply involved in recruiting refugees from Africa to emigrate to the U.S.

The diversity as safety argument and its linkage to historical grievances against European civilization is implicit in a recent statement of the Simon Wiesenthal Center (SWC) in response to former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's argument that Muslim Turkey has no place in the European Union:

> Ironically, in the fifteenth century, when European monarchs expelled the Jews, it was Moslem Turkey that provided them a welcome. . . . During the Holocaust, when Europe was slaughtering its Jews, it was Turkish consuls who extended protection to fugitives from Vichy France and other Nazi allies. . . . Today's European neo-Nazis and skinheads focus upon Turkish victims while, Mr.

> President, you are reported to be considering the Pope's plea that your Convention emphasize Europe's Christian heritage. [The Center suggested that Giscard's new Constitution] underline the pluralism of a multi-faith and multi-ethnic Europe, in which the participation of Moslem Turkey might bolster the continent's Moslem communities—and, indeed, Turkey itself—against the menaces of extremism, hate and fundamentalism. A European Turkey can only be beneficial for stability in Europe and the Middle East.[30]

Here we see Jewish moral particularism combined with a profound sense of historical grievance—hatred by any other name—against European civilization and a desire for the end of Europe as a Christian civilization with its traditional ethnic base. According to the SWC, the menaces of "extremism, hate and fundamentalism"—prototypically against Jews—can only be repaired by jettisoning the traditional cultural and ethnic basis of European civilization. Events that happened five hundred years ago are still fresh in the minds of Jewish activists—a phenomenon that should give pause to everyone in an age when Israel has control of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems.[31]

Indeed, a recent article on Assyrians in the U.S. shows that many Jews have not forgiven or forgotten events of 2,700 years ago, when the Northern Israelite kingdom was forcibly relocated to the Assyrian capital of Nineveh: "Some Assyrians say Jews are one group of people who seem to be more familiar with them. But because the Hebrew Bible describes Assyrians as cruel and ruthless conquerors, people such as the Rev. William Nissan say he is invariably challenged by Jewish rabbis and scholars about the misdeeds of his ancestors."[32]

The SWC inveighs against hate but fails to confront the issue of hatred as a normative aspect of Judaism. Jewish hatred toward non-Jews emerges as a consistent theme throughout the ages, beginning in the ancient world.[33] The Roman historian Tacitus noted that "Among themselves they are inflexibly honest and ever ready to show compassion, though they regard the rest of mankind with all the hatred of enemies.[34] The eighteenth-century English historian Edward Gibbon was struck by the fanatical hatred of Jews in the ancient world:

> From the reign of Nero to that of Antoninus Pius, the Jews discovered a fierce impatience of the dominion of Rome, which repeatedly broke out in the most furious massacres and insurrections. Humanity is shocked at the recital of the horrid cruelties which they committed in the cities of Egypt, of Cyprus, and of Cyrene, where they dwelt in treacherous friendship with the unsuspecting natives; and we are tempted to applaud the severe retaliation which was exercised by the arms of the legions against a race of fanatics, whose dire and credulous superstition seemed to render them the implacable enemies not only of the Roman government, but of human kind.[35]

The nineteenth-century Spanish historian José Amador de los Rios wrote of the Spanish Jews who assisted the Muslim conquest of Spain that "without any love for the soil where they lived, without any of those affections that ennoble a people, and finally without sentiments of generosity, they aspired only to feed their avarice and to accomplish the ruin of the Goths; taking the opportunity

to manifest their rancor, and boasting of the hatreds that they had hoarded up so many centuries."[36] In 1913, economist Werner Sombart, in his classic *Jews and Modern Capitalism,* summarized Judaism as "a group by themselves and therefore separate and apart—this from the earliest antiquity. All nations were struck by their hatred of others."[37]

A recent article by Meir Y. Soloveichik, aptly titled "The virtue of hate," amplifies this theme of normative Jewish fanatical hatred.[38] "Judaism believes that while forgiveness is often a virtue, hate can be virtuous when one is dealing with the frightfully wicked. Rather than forgive, we can wish ill; rather than hope for repentance, we can instead hope that our enemies experience the wrath of God." Soloveichik notes that the Old Testament is replete with descriptions of horribly violent deaths inflicted on the enemies of the Israelites—the desire not only for revenge but for revenge in the bloodiest, most degrading manner imaginable: "The Hebrew prophets not only hated their enemies, but rather reveled in their suffering, finding in it a fitting justice." In the Book of Esther, after the Jews kill the ten sons of Haman, their persecutor, Esther asks that they be hanged on a gallows.

This normative fanatical hatred in Judaism can be seen by the common use among Orthodox Jews of the phrase *yemach shemo*, meaning, *may his name be erased*. This phrase is used "whenever a great enemy of the Jewish nation, of the past or present, is mentioned. For instance, one might very well say casually, in the course of conversation, 'Thank God, my grandparents left Germany before Hitler, *yemach shemo*, came to power.' Or: 'My parents were murdered by the Nazis, *yemach shemam*.'"[39] Again we see that the powerful consciousness of past suffering leads to present-day intense hatred:

> Another danger inherent in hate is that we may misdirect our odium at institutions in the present because of their past misdeeds. For instance, some of my coreligionists reserve special abhorrence for anything German, even though Germany is currently one of the most pro-Israel countries in Europe. Similarly, after centuries of suffering, many Jews have, in my own experience, continued to despise religious Christians, even though it is secularists and Islamists who threaten them today, and Christians should really be seen as their natural allies. Many Jewish intellectuals and others of influence still take every assertion of the truth of Christianity as an anti-Semitic attack. After the Catholic Church beatified Edith Stein, a Jewish convert to Christianity, some prominent Jews asserted that the Church was attempting to cover up its role in causing the Holocaust. And then there is the historian Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, who essentially has asserted that any attempt by the Catholic Church to maintain that Christianity is the one true faith marks a continuation of the crimes of the Church in the past. Burning hatred, once kindled, is difficult to extinguish.

Soloveichik could also have included Jewish hatred toward the traditional peoples and culture of the United States. This hatred stems from Jewish memory of the immigration law of 1924, which is seen as having resulted in a greater number of Jews dying in the Holocaust because it restricted Jewish

immigration from Eastern Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. Jews are also acutely aware of widespread anti-Jewish attitudes in the U.S. prior to World War II. The hatred continues despite the virtual disappearance of anti-Jewish attitudes in the U.S. after World War II and despite the powerful ties between the United States and Israel.[40]

Given the transparently faulty logic and obvious self-interest involved in arguments made by Jewish activists, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Jews are often engaged in self-deception. In fact, self-deception is a very important component of Jewish moral particularism. I wrote an entire chapter on Jewish self-deception in *Separation and Its Discontents*,[41] but it was nowhere near enough. Again, Kim Chernin:

> Our sense of victimization as a people works in a dangerous and seditious way against our capacity to know, to recognize, to name and to remember. Since we have adopted ourselves as victims we cannot correctly read our own history let alone our present circumstances. Even where the story of our violence is set down in a sacred text that we pore over again and again, we cannot see it. Our self-election as the people most likely to be victimized obscures rather than clarifies our own tradition. I can't count the number of times I read the story of Joshua as a tale of our people coming into their rightful possession of their promised land without stopping to say to myself, "but this is a history of rape, plunder, slaughter, invasion and destruction of other peoples." As such, it bears an uncomfortably close resemblance to the behavior of Israeli settlers and the Israeli army of today, a behavior we also cannot see for what it is. We are tracing the serpentine path of our own psychology. We find it organized around a persuasion of victimization, which leads to a sense of entitlement to enact violence, which brings about an inevitable distortion in the way we perceive both our Jewish identity and the world, and involves us finally in a tricky relationship to language.

Political columnist Joe Sobran—who has suffered professionally for expressing his opinions about Israel—exposes the moral particularism of Norman Podhoretz, one of the chorus of influential Jewish voices who advocate restructuring the entire Middle East in the interests of Israel:

> Podhoretz has *unconsciously* exposed the Manichaean fantasy world of so many of those who are now calling for war with Iraq. The United States and Israel are "good"; the Arab-Muslim states are "evil"; and those opposed to this war represent "moral relativism," ostensibly neutral but virtually on the side of "evil." This is simply deranged. The ability to see evil only in one's enemies isn't "moral clarity." It's the essence of fanaticism. We are now being counseled to fight one kind of fanaticism with another. [My emphasis]

As Sobran notes, the moral particularism is unconscious—an example of self-deception. The world is cut up into two parts, the good and the evil—ingroup-outgroup—as it has been, for Jews, for well over two thousand years. Recently Jared Taylor and David Horowitz got into a discussion which touched on Jewish issues. Taylor writes:

> Mr. Horowitz deplores the idea that "we are all prisoners of identity politics," implying that race and ethnicity are trivial matters we must work to overcome. But if that is so, why does the home page of FrontPageMag carry a perpetual appeal for contributions to "David's Defense of Israel Campaign"? Why Israel rather than, say, Kurdistan or Tibet or Euskadi or Chechnya? Because Mr. Horowitz is Jewish. His commitment to Israel is an expression of precisely the kind of particularist identity he would deny to me and to other racially-conscious whites. He passionately supports a self-consciously Jewish state but calls it "surrendering to the multicultural miasma" when I work to return to a self-consciously white America. He supports an explicitly ethnic identity for Israel but says American must not be allowed to have one…. If he supports a Jewish Israel, he should support a white America.[42]

Taylor is suggesting that Horowitz is self-deceived or inconsistent. It is interesting that Horowitz was acutely aware of his own parents' self-deception. Horowitz's description of his parents shows the strong ethnocentrism that lurked beneath the noisy universalism of Jewish communists in mid-twentieth century America. In his book, *Radical Son*, Horowitz describes the world of his parents who had joined a "shul" (i.e., a synagogue) run by the Communist Party in which Jewish holidays were given a political interpretation. Psychologically these people might as well have been in eighteenth-century Poland, but they were completely unaware of any Jewish identity. Horowitz writes:

> What my parents had done in joining the Communist Party and moving to Sunnyside was to return to the ghetto. There was the same shared private language, the same hermetically sealed universe, the same dual posturing revealing one face to the outer world and another to the tribe. More importantly, there was the same conviction of being marked for persecution and specially ordained, the sense of moral superiority toward the stronger and more numerous *goyim* outside. And there was the same fear of expulsion for heretical thoughts, which was the fear that riveted the chosen to the faith.[43]

Jews recreate Jewish social structure wherever they are, even when they are completely unaware they are doing so. When asked about their Jewish commitments, these communists denied having any.[44] Nor were they consciously aware of having chosen ethnically Jewish spouses, although they all married other Jews. This denial has been useful for Jewish organizations and Jewish intellectual apologists attempting to de-emphasize the role of Jews on the radical left in the twentieth century. For example, a common tactic of the ADL beginning in the Red Scare era of the 1920s right up through the Cold War era was to claim that Jewish radicals were no longer Jews because they had no Jewish religious commitments.[45]

Non-Jews run the risk of failing to truly understand how powerful these Jewish traits of moral particularism and self-deception really are. When confronted with his own rabid support for Israel, Horowitz simply denies that ethnicity has much to do with it; he supports Israel as a matter of principle—his commitment to universalist moral principles—and he highlights the relationship between Israel and the West: "Israel is under attack by the same

enemy that has attacked the United States. Israel is the point of origin for the culture of the West."[46] This ignores the reality that Israel's treatment of the Palestinians is a major part of the reason why the United States was attacked and is hated throughout the Arab world. It also ignores the fact that Western culture and its strong strain of individualism are the antithesis of Judaism, and that Israel's Western veneer overlays the deep structure of Israel as an apartheid, ethnically based state.

It's difficult to argue with people who cannot see or at least won't acknowledge the depths of their own ethnic commitments and continue to act in ways that compromise the ethnic interests of others. People like Horowitz (and his parents) can't see their ethnic commitments even when they are obvious to everyone else. One could perhaps say the same of Charles Krauthammer, William Safire, William Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, and the legion of prominent Jews who collectively dominate the perception of Israel presented by the U.S. media. Not surprisingly, Horowitz pictures the U.S. as a set of universal principles, with no ethnic content. This idea originated with Jewish intellectuals, particularly Horace Kallen, almost a century ago at a time when there was a strong conception that the United States was a European civilization whose characteristics were racially/ethnically based.[47] As we all know, this world and its intellectual infrastructure have vanished, and I have tried to show that the prime force opposing a European racial/ethnic conception of the U.S. was a set of Jewish intellectual and political movements that collectively pathologized any sense of European ethnicity or European ethnic interests.[48]

Given that extreme ethnocentrism continues to pervade all segments of the organized Jewish community, the advocacy of the de-ethnicization of Europeans—a common sentiment in the movements I discuss in *Culture of Critique* (*CofC*)—is best seen as a strategic move against peoples regarded as historical enemies. In Chapter 8 of *CofC*, I call attention to a long list of similar double standards, especially with regard to the policies pursued by Israel versus the policies Jewish organizations have pursued in the U.S. These policies include church-state separation, attitudes toward multiculturalism, and immigration policies favoring the dominant ethnic group. This double standard is fairly pervasive. As noted throughout *CofC*, Jewish advocates addressing Western audiences have promoted policies that satisfy Jewish (particularist) interests in terms of the morally universalist language that is a central feature of Western moral and intellectual discourse; obviously David Horowitz's rationalization of his commitment to Israel is a prime example of this.

A principal theme of *CofC* is that Jewish organizations played a decisive role in opposing the idea that the United States ought to be a European nation. Nevertheless, these organizations have been strong supporters of Israel as a nation of the Jewish people. Consider, for example, a press release of May 28, 1999, by the ADL:

> The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) today lauded the passage of sweeping changes in Germany's immigration law, saying the easing of the nation's once rigorous naturalization requirements "will provide a climate for diversity and acceptance. It is encouraging to see pluralism taking root in a society that, despite its strong democracy, had for decades maintained an unyielding policy of citizenship by blood or descent only," said Abraham H. Foxman, ADL National Director. "The easing of immigration requirements is especially significant in light of Germany's history of the Holocaust and persecution of Jews and other minority groups. The new law will provide a climate for diversity and acceptance in a nation with an onerous legacy of xenophobia, where the concept of 'us versus them' will be replaced by a principle of citizenship for all."[49]

There is no mention of analogous laws in place in Israel restricting immigration to Jews, or of the long-standing policy of rejecting the possibility of repatriation for Palestinian refugees wishing to return to Israel or the occupied territories. The prospective change in the "us versus them" attitude alleged to be characteristic of Germany is applauded, while the "us versus them" attitude characteristic of Israel and Jewish culture throughout history is unmentioned. Recently, the Israeli Ministry of Interior ruled that new immigrants who have converted to Judaism will no longer be able to bring non-Jewish family members into the country. The decision is expected to cut by half the number of eligible immigrants to Israel. Nevertheless, Jewish organizations continue to be strong proponents of multiethnic immigration to the United States while maintaining unquestioning support for Israel. This pervasive double standard was noticed by writer Vincent Sheean in his observations of Zionists in Palestine in 1930: "how idealism goes hand in hand with the most terrific cynicism; . . . how they are Fascists in their own affairs, with regard to Palestine, and internationalists in everything else."[50] The right hand does not know what the left is doing—self-deception writ large.

Jewish ethnocentrism is well founded in the sense that scientific studies supporting the genetic cohesiveness of Jewish groups continue to appear. Most notable of the recent studies is that of Michael Hammer and colleagues.[51] Based on Y-chromosome data, Hammer et al. conclude that 1 in 200 matings within Jewish communities were with non-Jews over a 2000-year period.

Because of their intense ethnocentrism, Jews tend to have great rapport with each other—an important ingredient in producing effective groups. One way to understand this powerful attraction for fellow ethnic group members is J. Philippe Rushton's Genetic Similarity Theory.[52] According to GST, people are attracted to others who are genetically similar to themselves. One of the basic ideas of evolutionary biology is that people are expected to help relatives because they share similar genes. When a father helps a child or an uncle helps a nephew, he is really also helping himself because of their close genetic relationship. (Parents share half their genes with their children; uncles share one-fourth of their genes with nieces and nephews.[53]) GST extends this concept to non-relatives by arguing that people benefit when they favor others who are genetically similar to them even if they are not relatives.

GST has some important implications for understanding cooperation and cohesiveness among Jews. It predicts that people will be friendlier to other people who are genetically more similar to themselves. In the case of Jews and non-Jews, it predicts that Jews would be more likely to make friends and alliances with other Jews, and that there would be high levels of rapport and psychological satisfaction within these relationships.

GST explains the extraordinary rapport and cohesiveness among Jews. Since the vast majority of Jews are closely related genetically, GST predicts that they will be very attracted to other Jews and may even be able to recognize them in the absence of distinctive clothing and hair styles. There is anecdotal evidence for this statement. Theologian Eugene Borowitz writes that Jews seek each other out in social situations and feel "far more at home" after they have discovered who is Jewish.[54] "Most Jews claim to be equipped with an interpersonal friend-or-foe sensing device that enables them to detect the presence of another Jew, despite heavy camouflage." Another Jewish writer comments on the incredible sense of oneness he has with other Jews and his ability to recognize other Jews in public places, a talent some Jews call "J-dar."[55] While dining with his non-Jewish fiancée, he is immediately recognized as Jewish by some other Jews, and there is an immediate "bond of brotherhood" between them that excludes his non-Jewish companion.

Robert Reich, Clinton administration Secretary of Labor, wrote that in his first face-to-face meeting with Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, "We have never met before, but I instantly know him. One look, one phrase, and I know where he grew up, how he grew up, where he got his drive and his sense of humor. He is New York. He is Jewish. He looks like my uncle Louis, his voice is my uncle Sam. I feel we've been together at countless weddings, bar mitzvahs, and funerals. I know his genetic structure. I'm certain that within the last five hundred years—perhaps even more recently—we shared the same ancestor."[56] Reich is almost certainly correct: He and Greenspan do indeed have a recent common ancestor, and this genetic affinity causes them to have an almost supernatural attraction to each other. Or consider Sigmund Freud, who wrote that he found "the attraction of Judaism and of Jews so irresistible, many dark emotional powers, all the mightier the less they let themselves be grasped in words, as well as the clear consciousness of inner identity, the secrecy of the same mental construction."[57]

Any discussion of Judaism has to start and probably end with this incredibly strong bond that Jews have among each other—a bond that is created by their close genetic relationship and by the intensification of the psychological mechanisms underlying group cohesion. This powerful rapport among Jews translates into a heightened ability to cooperate in highly focused groups.

To conclude this section: In general, the contemporary organized Jewish community is characterized by high levels of Jewish identification and ethnocentrism. Jewish activist organizations like the ADL, the American

Jewish Committee, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, and the neoconservative think tanks are not creations of the fundamentalist and Orthodox, but represent the broad Jewish community, including non-religious Jews and Reform Jews. In general, the more actively people are involved in the Jewish community, the more committed they are to preventing intermarriage and retaining Jewish ethnic cohesion. And despite a considerable level of intermarriage among less committed Jews, the leadership of the Jewish community in the U.S. is at present not made up of the offspring of intermarried people to any significant extent.

Jewish ethnocentrism is ultimately simple traditional human ethnocentrism, although it is certainly among the more extreme varieties. But what is so fascinating is the cloak of intellectual support for Jewish ethnocentrism, the complexity and intellectual sophistication of the rationalizations for it—some of which are reviewed in *Separation and Its Discontents*[58] and the rather awesome hypocrisy (or cold-blooded deception) of it, given Jewish opposition to ethnocentrism among Europeans.

II. Jews Are Intelligent (and Wealthy)

The vast majority of U.S. Jews are Ashkenazi Jews. This is a very intelligent group, with an average IQ of approximately 115 and verbal IQ considerably higher.[59] Since verbal IQ is the best predictor of occupational success and upward mobility in contemporary societies,[60] it is not surprising that Jews are an elite group in the United States. Frank Salter has showed that on issues of concern to the Jewish community (Israel, immigration, ethnic policy in general), Jewish groups have four times the influence of European Americans despite representing approximately 2.5% of the population.[61] Recent data indicate that Jewish per capita income in the U.S. is almost double that of non-Jews, a bigger difference than the black-white income gap.[62] Although Jews make up less than 3% of the population, they constitute more than a quarter of the people on the *Forbes* list of the richest four hundred Americans. Jews constitute 45% of the top forty of the Forbes 400 richest Americans. Fully one-third of all American multimillionaires are Jewish. The percentage of Jewish households with income greater than $50,000 is double that of non-Jews; on the other hand, the percentage of Jewish households with income less than $20,000 is half that of non-Jews. Twenty percent of professors at leading universities are Jewish, and 40% of partners in leading New York and Washington, D.C., law firms are Jewish.[63]

In 1996, there were approximately 300 national Jewish organizations in the United States, with a combined budget estimated in the range of $6 billion—a sum greater than the gross national product of half the members of the United Nations.[64] For example, in 2001 the ADL claimed an annual budget of over $50,000,000.[65] There is also a critical mass of very wealthy Jews who are actively involved in funding Jewish causes. Irving Moskowitz funds the settler

movement in Israel and pro-Israeli, neoconservative think tanks in Washington DC, while Charles Bronfman, Ronald Lauder, and the notorious Marc Rich fund Birthright Israel, a program that aims to increase ethnic consciousness among Jews by bringing 20,000 young Jews to Israel every year. George Soros finances liberal immigration policy throughout the Western world and also funds Noel Ignatiev and his "Race Traitor" website dedicated to the abolition of the white race. So far as I know, there are no major sources of funding aimed at increasing ethnic consciousness among Europeans or at promoting European ethnic interests.[66] Certainly the major sources of conservative funding in the U.S., such as the Bradley and Olin Foundations, are not aimed at this sort of thing. Indeed, the Bradley Foundation has been a major source of funding for the largely Jewish neoconservative movement and for pro-Israel think tanks such as the Center for Security Policy.[67]

Paul Findley[68] provides numerous examples of Jews using their financial clout to support political candidates with positions that are to the liking of AIPAC and other pro-Israel activist groups in the U.S. This very large financial support for pro-Israel candidates continues into the present—the most recent examples being the campaigns to unseat Cynthia McKinney and Earl Hilliard from Congress in 2002. Because of their predominantly Jewish funding base,[69] Democratic candidates are particularly vulnerable, but all candidates experience this pressure because Jewish support will be funneled to their opponents if there is any hint of disagreement with the pro-Israel lobby.

Intelligence is also important in providing access to the entire range of influential positions, from the academic world, to the media, to business, politics, and the legal profession. In *CofC* I describe several influential Jewish intellectual movements developed by networks of Jews who were motivated to advance Jewish causes and interests. These movements were the backbone of the intellectual left in the twentieth century, and their influence continues into the present. Collectively, they call into question the fundamental moral, political, and economic foundations of Western society. These movements have been advocated with great intellectual passion and moral fervor and with a very high level of theoretical sophistication. As with the neoconservative movement, discussed in the third article in this series, all of these movements had ready access to prestigious mainstream media sources, at least partly because of the high representation of Jews as owners and producers of mainstream media.[70] All of these movements were strongly represented at prestigious universities, and their work was published by prestigious mainstream academic and commercial publishers.

Intelligence is also evident in Jewish activism. Jewish activism is like a full court press in basketball: intense pressure from every possible angle. But in addition to the intensity, Jewish efforts are very well organized, well funded, and backed up by sophisticated, scholarly intellectual defenses. A good example is the long and ultimately successful attempt to alter U.S. immigration

policy.[71] The main Jewish activist organization influencing immigration policy, the American Jewish Committee, was characterized by "strong leadership, internal cohesion, well-funded programs, sophisticated lobbying techniques, well-chosen non-Jewish allies, and good timing."[72] The most visible Jewish activists, such as Louis Marshall, were intellectually brilliant and enormously energetic and resourceful in their crusades on behalf of immigration and other Jewish causes. When restrictionist arguments appeared in the media, the American Jewish Committee made sophisticated replies based on at least the appearance of scholarly data, and typically couched in universalist terms as benefiting the whole society. Articles favorable to immigration were published in national magazines, and letters to the editor were published in newspapers. Talented lawyers initiated legal proceedings aimed at preventing the deportation of aliens.

The pro-immigration lobby was also very well organized. Immigration opponents, such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and organizations like the Immigration Restriction League were kept under close scrutiny and pressured by lobbyists. Lobbyists in Washington also kept a daily scorecard of voting tendencies as immigration bills wended their way through Congress, and they engaged in intense and successful efforts to convince Presidents Taft and Wilson to veto restrictive immigration legislation. Catholic prelates were recruited to protest the effects of restrictionist legislation on immigration from Italy and Hungary. There were well-organized efforts to minimize the negative perceptions of immigration by distributing Jewish immigrants around the country and by getting Jewish aliens off public support. Highly visible and noisy mass protest meetings were organized.[73]

Intelligence and organization are also apparent in contemporary Jewish lobbying on behalf of Israel. Les Janka, a U.S. Defense Department official, noted that, "On all kinds of foreign policy issues the American people just don't make their voices heard. Jewish groups are the exceptions. They are prepared, superbly briefed. They have their act together. It is hard for bureaucrats not to respond."[74]

Morton A. Klein, national president of the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), is typical of the highly intelligent, competent, and dedicated Jewish activist. The ZOA website states that Klein had a distinguished careers as a biostatistician in academe and in government service in the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. He has received accolades as one of the leading Jewish activists in the U.S., especially by media that are closely associated with Likud policies in Israel. For example, the *Wall Street Journal* called the ZOA "heroic and the most credible advocate for Israel on the American Jewish scene today" and added that we should "snap a salute to those who were right about Oslo and Arafat all along, . . . including Morton Klein who was wise, brave and unflinchingly honest. . . . [W]hen the history of the American Jewish struggle in these years is written, Mr. Klein will emerge as an outsized figure." The

website boasts of Klein's success "against anti-Israel bias" in textbooks, travel guides, universities, churches, and the media, as well as his work on Capitol Hill." Klein has led successful efforts to block the appointment of Joe Zogby, an Arab American, to the State Department and the appointment of Strobe Talbott, Clinton nominee for Deputy Secretary of State. Klein's pro-Israel articles have appeared in a wide range of mainstream and Jewish media: *New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, New Republic, New Yorker, Commentary, Near East Report, Reform Judaism, Moment, Forward, Jerusalem Post, Philadelphia Inquirer, Miami Herald, Chicago Tribune, Ha'aretz* (Jerusalem), *Maariv* (Jerusalem), and the Israeli-Russian paper *Vesti*.

Klein's activism highlights the importance of access to the major media enjoyed by Jewish activists and organizations—a phenomenon that is traceable ultimately to Jewish intelligence. Jews have a very large presence in the media as owners, writers, producers, and editors—far larger than any other identifiable group.[75] In the contemporary world, this presence is especially important with respect to perceptions of Israel. Media coverage of Israel in the U.S. is dominated by a pro-Israel bias, whereas in most of the world the predominant view is that the Palestinians are a dispossessed people under siege.[76] A critical source of support for Israel is the army of professional pundits "who can be counted upon to support Israel reflexively and without qualification."[77] Perhaps the most egregious example of pro-Israel bias resulting from Jewish media control is the Asper family, owners of CanWest, a company that controls over 33% of the English-language newspapers in Canada. CanWest inaugurated an editorial policy in which all editorials had to be approved by the main office. As the Canadian Journalists for Free Expression notes, "the Asper family staunchly supports Israel in its conflicts with Palestinians, and coverage of the Middle East appears to be a particularly sensitive area."[78] CanWest has exercised control over the content of articles related to Israel by editing and spiking articles with pro-Palestinian or anti-Israeli views. Journalists who have failed to adopt CanWest positions have been reprimanded or dismissed.

III. Jews Are Psychologically Intense

I have compared Jewish activism to a full court press—relentlessly intense and covering every possible angle. There is considerable evidence that Jews are higher than average on emotional intensity.[79] Emotionally intense people are prone to intense emotional experience of both positive and negative emotions.[80] Emotionality may be thought of as a behavioral intensifier—an energizer. Individuals high on affect intensity have more complex social networks and more complex lives, including multiple and even conflicting goals. Their goals are intensely sought after.

In the case of Jews, this affects the tone and intensity of their efforts at activism. Among Jews there is a critical mass that is intensely committed to Jewish causes—a sort of 24/7, "pull out all the stops" commitment that produces instant, massive responses on Jewish issues. Jewish activism has a relentless, never-say-die quality. This intensity goes hand in hand with the "slippery slope" style of arguing described above: Jewish activism is an intense response because even the most trivial manifestation of anti-Jewish attitudes or behavior is seen as inevitably leading to mass murder of Jews if allowed to continue.

Besides its ability to direct Jewish money to its preferred candidates, a large part of AIPAC's effectiveness lies in its ability to rapidly mobilize its 60,000 members. "In virtually every congressional district . . . AIPAC has a group of prominent citizens it can mobilize if an individual senator or representative needs stroking."[81] When Senator Charles Percy suggested that Israel negotiate with the PLO and be willing to trade land for peace, he was inundated with 2,200 telegrams and 4,000 letters, 95% against, and mainly from the Jewish community in Chicago.[82] The other side is seldom able to muster a response that competes with the intensity of the Jewish response. When President Eisenhower—the last president to stand up to the pro-Israel lobby—pressured Israel into withdrawing from the Sinai in 1957, almost all the mail opposed his decision. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles complained, "It is impossible to hold the line because we get no support from the Protestant elements in the country. All we get is a battering from the Jews."[83] This pales in comparison to the avalanche of 150,000 letters to President Johnson urging support for Israel when Egypt closed the Strait of Tiran in May 1967. This was just prior to the "Six-Day War," during which the U.S. provided a great deal of military assistance and actively cooperated in the cover-up of the assault on the USS *Liberty*. Jews had learned from their defeat at the hands of Eisenhower and had redoubled their lobbying efforts, creating by all accounts the most effective lobby in Washington.

Pressure on officials in the State and Defense departments is relentless and intense. In the words of one official, "One has to keep in mind the constant character of this pressure. The public affairs staff of the Near East Bureau in the State Department figures it will spend about 75 percent of its time dealing with Jewish groups. Hundreds of such groups get appointments in the executive branch each year."[84]

Psychological intensity is also typical of Israelis. For example, the Israelis are remarkably persistent in their attempts to obtain U.S. military hardware. The following comment illustrates not only the relentless, intense pressure, but also the aggressiveness of Jewish pursuit of their interests: "They would never take no for an answer. They never gave up. These emissaries of a foreign government always had a shopping list of wanted military items, some of them high technology that no other nation possessed, some of it secret devices that gave

the United States an edge over any adversary."[85] Even though small in number, the effects are enormous. "They never seem to sleep, guarding Israel's interests around the clock."[86] Henry Kissinger made the following comment on Israeli negotiating tactics. "In the combination of single-minded persistence and convoluted tactics the Israelis preserve in the interlocutor only those last vestiges of sanity and coherence needed to sign the final document."[87]

IV. Jews Are Aggressive

Being aggressive and "pushy" is part of the stereotype of Jews in Western societies. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of scientific studies on this aspect of Jewish personality. Hans Eysenck, renowned for his research on personality, claims that Jews are indeed rated more aggressive by people who know them well.[88]

Jews have always behaved aggressively toward those they have lived among, and they have been perceived as aggressive by their critics. What strikes the reader of Henry Ford's *The International Jew* (*TIJ*), written in the early 1920s, is its portrayal of Jewish intensity and aggressiveness in asserting their interests.[89] As *TIJ* notes, from Biblical times Jews have endeavored to enslave and dominate other peoples, even in disobedience of divine command, quoting the Old Testament, "And it came to pass, when Israel was strong, that they put the Canaanites to tribute, and did not utterly drive them out." In the Old Testament the relationship between Israel and foreigners is one of domination: For example, "They shall go after thee, in chains they shall come over; And they shall fall down unto thee. They shall make supplication unto thee" (Isa. 45:14); "They shall bow down to thee with their face to the earth, And lick the dust of thy feet" (49:23). Similar sentiments appear in Trito-Isaiah (60:14, 61:5–6), Ezekiel (e.g., 39:10), and Ecclesiasticus (36:9). The apotheosis of Jewish attitudes of conquest can be seen in the Book of Jubilees, where world domination and great reproductive success are promised to the seed of Abraham:

> I am the God who created heaven and earth. I shall increase you, and multiply you exceedingly; and kings shall come from you and shall rule wherever the foot of the sons of man has trodden. I shall give to your seed all the earth which is under heaven, and they shall rule over all the nations according to their desire; and afterwards they shall draw the whole earth to themselves and shall inherit it for ever (Jub. 32:18-19).

Elsewhere I have noted that a major theme of anti-Jewish attitudes throughout the ages has been Jewish economic domination.[90] The following petition from the citizens of the German town of Hirschau opposed allowing Jews to live there because Jews were seen as aggressive competitors who ultimately dominate the people they live among:

> If only a few Jewish families settle here, all small shops, tanneries, hardware stores, and so on, which, as things stand, provide their proprietors with nothing but the scantiest of livelihoods, will in no time at all be superseded and completely crushed by these [Jews] such that at least twelve local families will be reduced to beggary, and our poor relief fund, already in utter extremity, will be fully exhausted within one year. The Jews come into possession in the shortest possible time of all cash money by getting involved in every business; they rapidly become the only possessors of money, and their Christian neighbors become their debtors.[91]

Late nineteenth-century Zionists such as Theodor Herzl were quite aware that a prime source of modern anti-Jewish attitudes was that emancipation had brought Jews into direct economic competition with the non-Jewish middle classes, a competition that Jews typically won. Herzl "insisted that one could not expect a majority to 'let themselves be subjugated' by formerly scorned outsiders whom they had just released from the ghetto."[92] The theme of economic domination has often been combined with the view that Jews are personally aggressive. In the Middle Ages Jews were seen as "pitiless creditors."[93] The philosopher Immanuel Kant stated that Jews were "a *nation* of usurers . . . outwitting the people amongst whom they find shelter. . . . They make the slogan 'let the buyer beware' their highest principle in dealing with us."[94]

In early twentieth-century America, the sociologist Edward A. Ross commented on a greater tendency among Jewish immigrants to maximize their advantage in all transactions, ranging from Jewish students badgering teachers for higher grades to Jewish poor attempting to get more than the usual charitable allotment. "No other immigrants are so noisy, pushing and disdainful of the rights of others as the Hebrews."[95]

> The authorities complain that the East European Hebrews feel no reverence for law as such and are willing to break any ordinance they find in their way. . . . The insurance companies scan a Jewish fire risk more closely than any other. Credit men say the Jewish merchant is often "slippery" and will "fail" in order to get rid of his debts. For lying the immigrant has a very bad reputation. In the North End of Boston "the readiness of the Jews to commit perjury has passed into a proverb."[96]

These characteristics have at times been noted by Jews themselves. In a survey commissioned by the American Jewish Committee's study of the Jews of Baltimore in 1962, "two-thirds of the respondents admitted to believing that other Jews are pushy, hostile, vulgar, materialistic, and the cause of anti-Semitism. And those were only the ones who were willing to admit it."[97]

Jews were unique as an American immigrant group in their hostility toward American Christian culture and in their energetic, aggressive efforts to change that culture.[98] From the perspective of Ford's *TIJ*, the United States had imported around 3,500,000 mainly Yiddish-speaking, intensely Jewish immigrants over the previous forty years. In that very short period, Jews had

had enormous effect on American society, particularly in their attempts to remove expressions of Christianity from public life beginning with an attempt in 1899–1900 to remove the word "Christian" from the Virginia Bill of Rights: "The Jews' determination to wipe out of public life every sign of the predominant Christian character of the U.S. is the only active form of religious intolerance in the country today."[99]

A prototypical example of Jewish aggressiveness toward American culture has been Jewish advocacy of liberal immigration policies which have had a transformative effect on the U.S.:

> In undertaking to sway immigration policy in a liberal direction, Jewish spokespersons and organizations demonstrated a degree of energy unsurpassed by any other interested pressure group. Immigration had constituted a prime object of concern for practically every major Jewish defense and community relations organization. Over the years, their spokespersons had assiduously attended congressional hearings, and the Jewish effort was of the utmost importance in establishing and financing such non-sectarian groups as the National Liberal Immigration League and the Citizens Committee for Displaced Persons.[100]

Jewish aggressiveness and their role in the media, in the creation of culture and information in the social sciences and humanities, and in the political process in the United States contrasts with the role of Overseas Chinese.[101] The Chinese have not formed a hostile cultural elite in Southeast Asian countries motivated by historical grievances against the people and culture of their hosts. For example, despite their economic dominance, the Chinese have not been concerned with restrictions on their citizenship rights, which have been common in Southeast Asia.[102] Whereas the Chinese have reacted rather passively to such restrictions, Jews have reacted to any manifestation of anti-Jewish attitudes or behavior with an all-out effort at eradication. Indeed, we have seen that the mainstream Jewish attitude is that even trivial manifestations of anti-Jewish attitudes and behavior must not be ignored because they can and will lead to mass murder. Not only have the Chinese not attempted to remove public displays of symbols of Indonesian nationalism and religion, they have not seriously attempted to change laws in place since the 1960s mandating that there be no public displays of Chinese culture.[103]

Besides the normal sorts of lobbying typical of the political process in the U.S., perhaps the clearest examples of Jewish aggressiveness are the many examples of intimidation of their opponents—loss of job, death threats, constant harassment, economic losses such as loss of advertising revenue for media businesses, and charges of anti-Semitism—the last being perhaps the greatest sin against the post-World War II political order that can be imagined. When Adlai Stevenson III was running for governor of Illinois, his record in opposition to Israeli settlement policy and his statement that the PLO was a legitimate voice of the Palestinian people resulted in a whisper campaign that he was an anti-Semite. Stevenson commented:

> There is an intimidating, activist minority of American Jews that supports the decisions of the Israeli government, right or wrong. They do so very vocally and very aggressively in ways that intimidate others so that it's their voice—even though it is a minority—that is heard in American politics. But it still is much louder in the United States than in Israel. In other words, you have a much stronger, more vocal dissent in Israel than within the Jewish community in the United States. The prime minister of Israel has far more influence over American foreign policy in the Middle East than over the policies of his own government generally.[104]

A common tactic has been to charge that critics of Israel are anti-Semites. Indeed, George Ball, a perceptive critic of Israel and its U.S. constituency, maintains that the charge of anti-Semitism and guilt over the Holocaust is the Israeli lobby's most effective weapon—outstripping its financial clout.[105] The utility of these psychological weapons in turn derives from the very large Jewish influence on the U.S. media. Historian Peter Novick notes regarding the importance of the Holocaust in contemporary American life:

> We [i.e., Jews] are not just "the people of the book," but the people of the Hollywood film and the television miniseries, of the magazine article and the newspaper column, of the comic book and the academic symposium. When a high level of concern with the Holocaust became widespread in American Jewry, it was, given the important role that Jews play in American media and opinion-making elites, not only natural, but virtually inevitable that it would spread throughout the culture at large.[106]

And, of course, the appeal to the Holocaust is especially compelling for American Jews. When the Mossad wants to recruit U.S. Jews for help in its espionage work, in the words of a CIA agent "the appeal is a simple one: 'When the call went out and no one heeded it, the Holocaust resulted.' "[107]

Charges of anti-Semitism and guilt over the Holocaust are not the only instruments of Jewish aggressiveness on Israeli issues. Jewish groups intimidate their enemies by a variety of means. People who oppose policies on Israel advocated by Jewish activist organizations have been fired from their jobs, harassed with letters, subjected to intrusive surveillance, and threatened with death. Although there is a great deal of self-censorship in the media on Israel as a result of the major role of Jews in the ownership and production of the media, gaps in this armor are aggressively closed. There are "threats to editors and advertising departments, orchestrated boycotts, slanders, campaigns of character assassination, and personal vendettas."[108] Other examples recounted by Findley include pressure on the Federal Communications Commission to stop broadcast licenses, demands for submission to an oversight committee prior to publication, and the stationing of a Jewish activist in the newsroom of the *Washington Post* in order to monitor the process.

The result of all this intense, well-organized aggression is that

> Those who criticize Israeli policy in any sustained way invite painful and relentless retaliation, and even loss of their livelihood by pressure from one or more parts of Israel's lobby. Presidents fear it. Congress does its bidding. Prestigious universities shun academic programs and buckle under its pressure.

> Instead of having their arguments and opinions judged on merit, critics of Israel suddenly find their motivations, their integrity, and basic moral values called into question. No matter how moderate their criticism, they may be characterized as pawns of the oil lobby, apologists for Arabs, or even anti-Semitic.[109]

The following quote from Henry Kissinger sums up the aggressive Israeli attitudes toward U.S. aid:

> Yitzak [Rabin] had many extraordinary qualities, but the gift of human relations was not one of them. If he had been handed the entire "United States Strategic Air Command" as a free gift he would have (a) affected the attitude that at last Israel was getting its due, and (b) found some technical shortcoming in the airplanes that made his accepting them a reluctant concession to us.[110]

But of course by far the most important examples of Israeli aggressiveness have been toward their neighbors in the Middle East. This aggression has been there from the beginning, as Israel has consistently put pressure on border areas with incursions, including the Kibya massacre of 1953 led by Ariel Sharon.[111] The personal aggressiveness of Israeli society has long been a topic of commentators. Israel is known for its arrogance, insolence (chutzpah), coldness, roughness, rudeness, and lack of civility. For example, B. Z. Sobel, an Israeli sociologist at the University of Haifa, found that among the motivations for emigrating from Israel was that "there is indeed an edginess [in Israeli society]; tempers flare, and verbal violence is rampant"[112]

Conclusion

The current situation in the United States is the result of an awesome deployment of Jewish power and influence. One must contemplate the fact that American Jews have managed to maintain unquestioned support for Israel over the last thirty-five years despite Israel's seizing land and engaging in a brutal occupation of the Palestinians in the occupied territories—an occupation that will most likely end with expulsion or complete subjugation, degradation, and apartheid. During this same period Jewish organizations in America have been a principal force—in my view the main force—for erecting a state dedicated to suppressing ethnic identification among Europeans, for encouraging massive multi-ethnic immigration into the U.S., and for erecting a legal system and cultural ideology that is obsessively sensitive to the complaints and interests of ethnic minorities: the culture of the Holocaust.[113]

American Judaism is well organized and lavishly funded. It has achieved a great deal of power, and it has been successful in achieving its interests.[114] One of the great myths often promulgated by Jewish apologists is that Jews have no consensus and therefore cannot wield any real power. Yet there is in fact a great deal of consensus on broad Jewish issues, particularly in the areas of Israel and the welfare of other foreign Jewries, immigration and refugee policy, church-state separation, abortion rights, and civil liberties.[115] Massive changes in public policy on these issues, beginning with the counter-cultural revolution of the

1960s, coincide with the period of increasing Jewish power and influence in the United States. Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find any significant area where public policy conflicts with the attitudes of mainstream Jewish organizations.

Later papers in this series will discuss concrete examples of Jewish activism: The history of Zionism as a radical Jewish movement and the presently influential Jewish neoconservative movement.

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1. MacDonald 1998a, Ch. 3.
2. MacDonald 1998a, Ch. 4.
3. MacDonald 1998b/2002.
4. Sacks 1993, ix–x.
5. MacDonald 1998b/2002, *passim.*
6. MacDonald 1994/2002, Ch. 8; 1998b/2002, Preface.
7. Burton et al. 1996.
8. See MacDonald 1994/2002, Chs. 3 and 8 for a discussion of Jewish tendencies toward polygyny, endogamy, and consanguineous marriage.
9. E.g., Coon 1958, 153; Eickelman 1981, 157–174.
10. Coon 1958, 153.
11. Dumont 1982, 222.
12. MacDonald 1994/2002, Ch. 8; MacDonald 1998a, Ch. 1.
13. Hamilton 2001, p. 273. Hamilton likens Judaism to a speciation event in which there is a role for cultural practices such as food preparation: "the main (but moderate) differences from biological situations being that Judaism had come to use a cultural element of inheritance to replace what genes once had been doing more slowly" (p. 271). He also notes that, "In the world of animals, ants perhaps provide *Homo*'s nearest equivalent for typical broadness of niche. If an unspecialized ant species had a Bible, I'd expect to find in it extremely similar injunctions about food, ant genocide, and so forth, as I find in the actual Bible, and I would have no difficulty to suppose these as serving each ant colony well in its struggle for existence" (p. 271).
14. Hamilton 2001, 271–272.
15. Shahak and Mezvinsky 1999.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
17. In Shahak and Mezvinsky 1999, 59–60.
18. Wiesel 1985, 153.
19. Adelman 1999.
20. Lustick 1987, 123–124.
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30. Simon Wiesenthal Center press release, November 10, 2002: http://www.wiesenthal.com/social/press/pr_item.cfm?itemID=6722
31. Interview with Dutch-Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld, January 30, 2003: "We possess several hundred atomic warheads and rockets and can launch them at targets in all directions, perhaps even at Rome. Most European capitals are targets for our air force.…Our armed forces . . . are not the thirtieth strongest in the world, but rather the second or third. We have the capability to take the world down with us. And I can assure you that that will happen, before Israel goes under." http://www.de.indymedia.org/2003/01/39170.shtml
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33. MacDonald 1998a, Ch. 2.
34. Tacitus 1942, p. 659.
35. Gibbon 1909, Ch. 16, 78.
36. In Walsh 1930, 196.
37. Sombart 1913, 240.
38. Soloveichik 2003. http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0302/articles/soloveichik.html
39. *Ibid*.
40. See MacDonald 1998/2002, Preface.
41. MacDonald 1998a.
42. http://www.amren.com/horowitz_reply.htm
43. Horowitz 1997, 42
44. See MacDonald 1998b/2002, Chap. 3
45. MacDonald 1998a, Ch. 6; 1998/2002, Preface.
46. Horowitz 2002.
47. MacDonald 1998b/2002.
48. *Ibid*.
49. www.adl.org/presrele/dirab%5F41/3396%5F41.asp
50. Boyle 2001.
51. Hammer et al. 2000.
52. See Rushton 1989; 1999.
53. This refers to genes identical because they are inherited from a common ancestor. Uncles and nieces share one-fourth their genes only on average. Because the relationship is mediated though a sibling relationship, the actual percentage can vary. Siblings may be more or less like one another depending on random processes, but on average they share half their genes.
54. Borowitz 1973, 136.
55. *Toronto Globe and Mail*, May 11, 1993.
56. Reich 1997, 79.

57. In Gay 1988, 601.
58. MacDonald 1998a, Chs. 6–8.
59. MacDonald 1994/2002, Ch. 7.
60. Lynn 1992.
61. Salter 2002.
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72. Goldstein 1990, 333.
73. Neuringer 1971.
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81. Massing 2002.
82. Findley 1989.
83. In Findley 1989, 119.
84. In Findley 1989, 164.
85. In Findley 1989, 164.
86. Findley 1989, 328.
87. In Ball and Ball 1993, 70.
88. Eysenck 1962, 262.
89. See MacDonald 2002, Review of *The International Jew*. *The Occidental Quarterly*, V. 2, Nos. 3 & 4, pp. 69, 53.
90. MacDonald 1998a, Ch. 2.
91. In Harris 1994, 254.
92. Kornberg 1993, 183; inner quote from Herzl's diary.
93. Luchaire 1912, 195.
94. In Rose 1992, 7; italics in text.
95. Ross 1914, 150.
96. Ross 1914, 150.

97. Yaffe 1968, 73. Yaffe embeds this comment in a discussion of self-hating Jews — implying that Jews are simply accepting stereotypes that are the fantasies of bigoted non-Jews.
98. See also MacDonald 1994/2002.
99. *The International Jew*, 3/21/1920.
100. Neuringer 1971, 392–393.
101. MacDonald 1998b/2002.
102. Coughlin 1960, 169.
103. See MacDonald 1994/2002, Preface to the First Paperback Edition.
104. In Findley 1989, 92.
105. Findley 1989, 127.
106. Novick 1999, 12.
107. *Newsweek* 9/3/1979.
108. Findley 1989, 296.
109. Findley 1989, 315.
110. In Ball and Ball 1992, 70.
111. See Ball and Ball 1992, 44 and *passim*.
112. Sobel 1986, 153.
113. See MacDonald 1998b/2002, Preface.
114. Goldberg 1996.
115. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

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Universalism, Moral Theory, and Ethnoanarchism:
A Challenge to Contemporary Nationalism

M. Raphael Johnson

One of the more cutting criticisms of nationalism as a social and ethical movement is that it engenders an inequality of moral claims; that is, one's nationalism necessarily comes at the expense of another's, and it inherently demands the limitation of other or "opposing" nationalist claims. Hans Morgenthau's famous "ABC paradox" is a manifestation of this difficulty. His 1957 article, "Paradoxes of Nationalism," asks the question of moral consistency: Nation A invokes the principles of nationalism against nation B, while denying it to C, one of its own minorities. All societies have minorities. However, almost all societies have invoked nationalist principles against outsiders. Therefore, the anti-nationalist would conclude, nationalism is not a consistent theory of politics at all, but a convenient tool to use against outside opponents.

Nationalist theory, in the ethnic and cultural sense, rejects the existence of this paradox. Modern, liberal governments more often than not benefit from having a militant minority to use against nationalist parties, groups, and movements within the society who challenge the "multiethnic" state. Instead of considering the state as the locus of the nation, which is an error, the notion of the ethnos needs to be the central focus if Morgenthau's criticism is to be withstood. The ethnocommunity is the primary variable in politics as well as world history; rejecting the statist model of the nation, the ethnocommunity controls its destiny within whatever territory it finds itself. There is no such thing as the "multiethnic" state, then, and the ethnonation becomes the focus of authority in terms of social life wherever it has settled.

The fallacy of the so-called "paradox" is that Morganthau is speaking of states rather than ethnonations, and his paradox assumes the centrality of the state. A state might invoke its "cultural patrimony" against outsiders, but, for the sake of its own formal power, might deny it at home. Keep in mind, however, that states do not have "cultural patrimonies": only nations do. On the other hand, Morgenthau's criticism fails as an ethical one in that the ethnonation, even in a diaspora's small numbers, should be the centerpiece of

social and political authority, administering the social life of a people who consider themselves members. Of course, such a view radically undercuts state authority, and can exist only when the state is replaced by a cultural idea of the ethnocommunity.

Morgenthau's argument is rather common, and recurs within the literature on nationalist thought and practice. However common and fashionable it may be, the argument is false. Nationalism, far from being essentially exclusivist in relation to other nationalisms, is inherently a *universalist* idea: nationalisms do not, and cannot, come at the expense of other nationalisms unless the others' claims are too expansive and hence illegitimate to begin with. In other words, the ethnos becomes the focus of social authority. Therefore, it is ethnic belonging, not a specific territory or a formalized administration, that assumes the ethical mantle of legitimacy. Members of the ethnos are ruled, then, by the historical experience of the nation as a whole through its traditional institutions—rather than by the formal institutions of the modern state as its "administrative" apparatus. This might be considered a type of ethnonational anarchism, in which the formal and territorially based institutions of the Leviathan are replaced, organically, by the traditional language, institutions, and experience of the ethnos. A citizen, then, belongs to the life of an ethnos, rather than the administration of a state, and is integrated into that ethnos through the guilds and system of internal distribution that the group has developed over the centuries.

In contemporary times, ethnic groups reach well over state lines through language clubs, churches (such as the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad), the institutions of a diaspora (such as relocation and housing services, etc.), and ethnic institutions of various types. Ethnonationalism, as an ethical foundation for civilization's reconstruction, might make use of this foundation to provide those institutions with actual governing power and control over the economies of their communities centering around ethnic membership, though a membership that is culturally based, rather than one based on blood.[1]

Ethnonationalism centers itself on a cultural self-determination that takes its normative force in that the culture forms and nurtures the people under its care, making them truly individuals. Without culture and its institutionalization, individuals become mere embodied egos demanding satisfaction of their impulses; civilization becomes impossible and eventually unravels. Nationalism, then, takes the communal culture of a people (considered as making up the ethnos) as normative in the sense that it not only offers a coherent and civilized moral code (one necessary for properly social behavior within the community), but also contains the imperative (or moral motivation) of an institutionalized tradition; nationalism offers a particularly rich idea of moral psychology. When nationalism is connected to the concept of empire (that is, the subjugation of others for the benefit of the imperial power), it then becomes illegitimate, for it—by definition—interferes with the cultural aspirations of subject peoples.

Thus, within its proper bounds, nationalism, at least of a contemporary kind, demands a radical decentralization of world power and global politics. Politics becomes cultural; it becomes the expression of the ethnocommunity because it is only within the confines of a well-defined cultural community that ideas of "the good" or "rights" make any sense. Such words are culturally bounded. Liberalism, through its long and sordid history, has defined itself as precisely opposite this, claiming that justice is a purely procedural matter, rather than a substantial one, thus rendering culture unimportant and ornamental. This has led to the elimination of communal autonomy under the Leviathan, and, in turn, created the "abstract" notion of a consolidated public policy. Given that liberalism developed in the specifically cultural milieu of Western Europe, the idea is self-refuting as well as corrosive.

Liberalism must define itself in this way, for if the individual (ego) is supreme, culture is normative if and only if one so "chooses" it (itself self-refuting, in that the intellectual power to choose, and any interest in the moral results, derives from one's surrounding moral environment and upbringing). Culture becomes a pleasant ornament, but ultimately not normative for a society (it is usually considered "repressive," for it interferes with the economically profitable gratification of the passions and impulses); liberalism must demand that the individual ego rest upon itself, namely its drives.

Nationalism claims that politics and ethics exist only as part of a cultural patrimony, with its long-established ideas of the "right" and the "good," that has created civilized individuals capable of studying moral philosophy or indeed caring about moral action. Otherwise, justice must begin and end with the demands of the individual ego, unconstrained, with justice never becoming an object to be realized, but resting on certain procedural norms which must be devoid of any cultural or moral foundation, lest justice be considered by liberalism heteronomous.

Far from ethnocommunitarianism being relativistic, it is part of a natural law tradition that posits man as he can in no other way be posited: as the product of a community. Thus, the development of the community, including all the goods it has brought into existence—cultural stability, education, language, material satisfaction, aesthetic experience, etc.—becomes the citizen's by right. It is a Kantian deontology—but one removed from the abstract "individual" possessing, inexplicably, abstract rights somehow "adhering" to his personhood—that renders rights and duties far more stable by way by connecting them with a functioning and living community; a community of language and historical experience that makes political life and words like "right" and "good" intelligible. If the goods promised by the concept of community (rather than any specific community) are vitiated, then the community's legitimacy can be questioned. Therefore, if one of the goods of a community is the protection of human life (a rather uncontroversial claim) and the community, somehow corrupted, begins to make legal the practice of

abortion, thereby destroying its own progeny for personal gain and convenience, that aspect of the community needs to be fought, for it contradicts it own claim to existence. If a community, existing, minimally, to protect life, begins to extinguish itself on the Baalian altar of convenience, then it contradicts itself and is thus rendered immoral.[2]

Immanuel Kant's error was to believe that ethics can be reducible to the most common element in humanity, that is, the concept of willing a law in general, which is the basis of the so-called "categorical imperative," or the moral idea that any act of willing, in order to be called "right," must be amenable to formulation as a "universal law." Such universalism contains nothing of ethical value (as Hegel was later to charge), since it is an ethical void that is soon replaced by the far more vivid and concrete ideas of sensual gratification and egoistic behavior. It rejects the communal parameters which make any kind of choosing even possible. The weakness of Kantianism lies in the fact that the moral infrastructure such that "universalism" might be acceptable and considered "good" is a creation of civilized society.

The preexistence of the cultural structure of the nation, that is, the national community at whatever level, is necessary for the abstractions of the "will," "intellect," or even "natural law" and "right" to make any sense whatsoever. The very utterance of such terms is saturated with historical experience, for without it, the terms would have never come into existence and would not have the moral force they do. In other words, there are no abstract rights. "Rights," as the term is used in modern political discourse (or what passes for it), are abbreviations of long-standing social practices and historical experience that have been reduced to slogans and propositions for the sake of easy communication, as well as less praiseworthy ends. To conclude from this that they are separable from historical experience is an inexcusable nonsequitur.

Thus Kantianism does not stand by itself, but is dependent upon the already existing social norms of eighteenth century Prussia, accepted solely due to the fact that the surrounding society has properly socialized the Prussians to demand some accounting of moral behavior. In other words, to care about right and wrong, and about proper and social behavior in general, is something that arises through the development of communal life and is inseparable from it. This is perennially the problem with moral theory based on abstract grounds. The "abstraction"—whether it be "rights" or "duty"(or some other such "imperative")—never actually exists except as an abbreviation of an already developed sense of moral life that is itself the product of centuries of human behavior, historical experience, and mutual suffering that provide such ideas with their genesis, formulation, institutionalization, and moral force.

It is the nation, the community united by language and historical experience, not the "categorical imperative," that socializes people to be civilized and moral. One can take Kant seriously only after reflecting on the fact that it is the civilized life that makes such questions even meaningful, never mind providing answers.

Before even caring about whether or not one's "will" can be formulated into a "universal law," that is, can be done by everyone without contradiction, one must be civilized already. Kant's ideas serve to place liberalism on a more German and idealistic metaphysical foundation, and find a less "philosophical" formulation in John Stuart Mill, several decades later, in the so-called "harm principle" found in *On Liberty*.[3] For Kant, the notion of "universality" means that the moral worth of an action is dependent upon it being "uiversalized" without contradiction, defined as severe social dislocation. Therefore, a Kantian can say that lying is immoral for, if one was to universalize lying, i.e. imagine everyone lying all the time, then social life would quickly cease, for no one could ever believe what anyone said about anything. Therefore, lying is evil because it is socially self-contradictory.

Without the cultural community, Kant's ethics becomes merely an eccentric hobby, a hobby that is incapable of giving us reasons for taking the idea of the "universal law of willing" seriously; in other words, there is nothing inherent in this ethical universalism and formalism that makes anyone interested in following it in the short term. Nietzsche did it terrible damage precisely for this reason. Once one rejects the moral imperative of cultural community, then there is really no reason why even "social contradiction" is any barrier to one's behaving immorally. All that a neo-Nietzschean needs to say is that, taking a cue from Hegel, the will, the ego comes first, and the life of society is thus its product. From this proposition, logically untenable, it is impossible to avoid its consequent, that all cultural attachments are arbitrary and thus ultimately trivial and ornamental. Its force is then heteronomous and therefore unethical. Putting this differently, one would only listen to Kant or Hegel because there is already an inborn sense of community and emotional attachments to it and its welfare: "inborn" because any moral question, in order to make sense, must be formulated in such a way that it is salient to community life, and can only be salient if it is formulated in the language and basic conceptual apparatus of the ethnic community in question, taking into account their historical experience, sensitivities, weaknesses etc. Such a problem is the eternal difficulty of analytic methods in philosophy. To posit a "moral agent" is to posit an analytic abstraction, not a human being.

Kant's interest in universalism and moral equality derives from strands of thought found within the entire history of Western European moral philosophy. Kant merely took a sliver of thought from his own culture and provided it with its own origin, the naked, abstract will that comes, literally, from nowhere. One might be attracted to it only so far as one is already socialized within an already existing humane morality. Such invariably comes from one's cultural community or the nation. Only later does one theorize.

The development of a nationalist consciousness within a certain people requires only that the cultural norms of a society be normative for its politics within the confines of natural law. This is an alternative formulation of the idea of "self-determination," a normative requirement for any nationalism

whatever, and is the very substance of free action in the terms of international politics. The question remains, then, what does a nationalist do when nationalism rises within the borders of a historic enemy?

This question has long been vexing for nationalists. The answer is that nationalism is justified to the extent it is not inherently expansionist. To the extent a nationalist movement seeks to unite those under its cultural patrimony, it does not nor can it reject the claims of even its enemies to do the same. Furthermore, it is not in the nation's interest to absorb those likely to be hostile to it. Such policies often derive from a ruling class that is alienated from the cultural patrimony of its own people, viewing culture not as a means in itself, but to some further end, such as political power.

An ethnos most certainly is not merely any group of people that develops common interests; nor is it synonymous with the state, but a possible list of a few requirements for a group to qualify as a nation might be listed here as an aid to the present argument:

• A nation must be defined by a common culture, a culture that is normative for an entire way of life, politically and ethically, rather than something specific, such as a social organization structured for a limited purpose. Yankee fans and computer geeks, then, do not form nations, for the simple reason that the nation is necessary for these second-order attachments to make sense, or even to exist.

• A nation is united by a common language, though it is reasonable to claim that dialects and related languages might well coexist (such as Polish and Ukrainian; Spanish and Portuguese; Cantonese and Mandarin, etc.).

• A nation must be an entity of long standing. That is, a nation must have an objective ground in history; it must be the product of a long development. As the distinguished British political scientist Ernest Barker once pointed out, "The nation is a congeries of wills, acting through centuries."[4] Developmentally, a nation is the visible manifestation of the *character* of its people—a natural, organic synthesis that emerges over centuries from common traditions, customs, and folkways.

• A nation must view itself as such, that is, be aware of itself as such; this is the subjective ground of nationalism.

To the extent that any nationalist movement seeks to expand itself beyond these confines, it becomes not a nationalist movement, but an imperial movement, and thus a movement against the core ideas of nationalist theory. When a movement becomes imperial, the nation's neighbors have every right to defend themselves. Beyond this, there is no moral ground for one nation to demand that another not become conscious of itself, or form its own institutions according to its own experience. Thus, nationalism can never of itself be synonymous with imperialism or wars of conquest. Warfare is legitimate only to defend the common cultural patrimony that is the nation, even if part of that patrimony happens to lie across a state border.

The solution to the endless problems of "minority rights," "irredentism," and other such irritants in world politics is the building of the autonomous ethnocommunity, absorbing social, religious, and economic life under its aegis. Self-determination is vitiated by the outworn and incorrigibly violent state apparatus, where bureaucracy inevitably takes interests to itself outside of the cultural patrimony which birthed it, thereby making itself odious to the ethnos. Therefore, the ethnic group expresses its rule through its own individuality, its own historical experience objectified in institutions such as craft guilds, ethnic churches (such as in eastern Orthodoxy), and local assemblies in tune with the tradition of the community in question. From these institutions does a properly representative system of rule come about, for representation is not about the shifting sands of individual self-interest or the demands of the libido, but rather the solid ground of the historical experience of a national history, the ethnos, the actual "individual" of history and politics. The institutions of rule, indigenous to a people, then take control over the aspects of social life impinging its members, objectifying historical experience and, therefore, the structure of maturity and intellect that creates citizens, rather than egos. The empowerment of the ethnos over and above the interests of the state is central to true freedom, identity, belonging, and peace among peoples. It is a true diversity in the Herderian, not the modern, sense.

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End Notes

1. There is no question that a "blood" tie is a tenuous one for European ethnicities. Most European states presently are a mix of peoples, and over the centuries, the peoples themselves have mixed. Therefore, members of each family must decide for themselves which cultural patrimony they identify with. None of this entails a "rejection" of the others, but an understanding that cultural heritage is not an "ornamental" association, and that political allegiance cannot be separated from historical experience and the patterns of thought the ethnos engenders.

2. It needs to be made clear that abortion is evil because it kills babies. As seen from the perspective of national life, however, it is additionally an evil in that it destroys what the community was called into existence to protect, namely its own progeny, who will build upon the capital of historical experience and make additional contributions to their culture and, possibly, the world at large. In other words, the natural law, designed by God (as such objective laws certainly cannot seriously be described as random interaction, which is also a contradiction), implants in mankind the drive for community for its very survival. To then use the resources of that community to destroy that which it protects, namely life, is an absurdity and proves the immorality, decadence, and weakness of whatever community permits it.

3. Stated briefly, the "harm principle" goes like this: The moral agent can act as he wishes, and the authorities are only permitted to interfere with his self-will whenever there is a manifest harm committed. What "harm" means is anyone's guess, and has not satisfactorily been dealt with in the literature. Often, "harm" is reductively defined as "physical damage" to persons or property.

4. Ernest Barker, *National Character and the Factors in Its Formation* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1927), 5.

Democracy Revisited:
The Ancients and the Moderns

Alain de Benoist

"The defenders of every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy," wrote George Orwell.[1] This does not seem to be a recent phenomenon. Guizot remarked in 1849: "So powerful is the sway of the word democracy, that no government and no party dares to live, or thinks it can, without inscribing this word on its banner."[2] This is truer today than ever before. Not everybody is a democrat, but everybody pretends to be one. There is no dictatorship that does not regard itself as a democracy. The former communist countries of Eastern Europe did not merely represent themselves as democratic, as attested by their constitutions;[3] they vaunted themselves as the only real democracies, in contrast to the "formal" democracies of the West.

The near unanimity on democracy as a word, albeit not always a fact, gives the notion of democracy a moral and almost religious content, which, from the very outset, discourages further discussion. Many authors have recognized this problem. Thus, in 1939, T.S. Eliot declared: "When a word acquires a universally sacred character . . . , as has today the word democracy, I begin to wonder, whether, by all it attempts to mean, it still means anything at all."[4] Bertrand de Jouvenel was even more explicit: "The discussion on democracy, the arguments in its favor, or against it, point frequently to a degree of intellectual shallowness, because it is not quite clear what this discussion is all about."[5] Giovanni Sartori added in 1962: "In a somewhat paradoxical vein, democracy could be defined as a high-flown name for something which does not exist."[6] Julien Freund also noted, in a somewhat witty tone:

> To claim to be a democrat means little, because one can be a democrat in a contradictory manner either in the manner of the Americans or the English, or like the East European communists, Congolese, or Cubans. It is perfectly natural that under such circumstances I refuse to be a democrat, because my neighbor might be an adherent of dictatorship while invoking the word democracy.[7]

Thus we can see that the universal propagation of the term democracy does not contribute much to clarifying the meaning of democracy. Undoubtedly, we need to go a step further.

The first idea that needs to be dismissed—an idea still cherished by some—is that democracy is a specific product of the modern era, and that democracy corresponds to a "developed stage" in the history of political regimes.[8] This does not seem to be substantiated by the facts. Democracy is neither more "modern" nor more "evolved" than other forms of governance. Governments with

democratic tendencies have appeared throughout history. We note that the linear perspective used in this type of analysis can be particularly deceiving. The idea of progress, when applied to a political regime, appears devoid of meaning. If one subscribes to this type of linear reasoning, it is easy to advance the argument of the "self-evidence" of democracy, which, according to liberals, arises "spontaneously" in the realm of political affairs just as the market "spontaneously" accords with the logic of demand and supply. Jean Baechler notes:

> If we accept the hypothesis that men, as an animal species(*sic*), aspire spontaneously to a democratic regime which promises them security, prosperity, and liberty, we must then also conclude that, the minute these requirements have been met, the democratic experience automatically emerges, without ever needing the framework of ideas.[9]

What exactly are these "requirements" that produce democracy, in the same manner as fire causes heat? They bear closer examination.

In contrast to the Orient, absolute despotism has always been rare in Europe. Whether in ancient Rome, or in Homer's Iliad, Vedantic India, or among the Hittites, one can observe very early the existence of popular assemblies, both military and civilian. In Indo-European societies kings were usually elected; in fact, all ancient monarchies were first elective monarchies. Tacitus relates that among the Germans chieftains were elected on account of their valor, and kings on account of their noble birth (*reges ex nobilitate duces ex virtute sumunt*). In France, for instance, the crown was long both elective and hereditary. It was only with Pippin the Short that the king was chosen from within the same family, and only after Hugh Capet that the principle of primogeniture was adopted. In Scandinavia, the king was elected by a provincial assembly; that election had then to be confirmed by the other national assemblies.

Among the Germanic peoples the practice of "shielding"—or raising the new king on his soldiers' shields—was widespread.[10] The Holy Roman Emperor was also elected, and the importance of the role of the princely electors in the history of Germany should not be neglected. By and large, it was only with the beginning of the twelfth century in Europe that elective monarchy gradually gave way to hereditary monarchy. Until the French Revolution, kings ruled with the aid of parliaments which possessed considerable executive powers. In almost all European communities it was long the status of freeman that conferred political rights on the citizen. "Citizens" were constituent members of free popular communes, which among other things possessed their own municipal charters, and sovereign rulers were surrounded by councils in the decision-making process. Moreover, the influence of customary law on juridical practice was an index of popular "participation" in defining the laws. In short, it cannot be stated that Europe's old monarchies were devoid of popular legitimacy.

The oldest parliament in the Western world, the althing, the federal assembly of Iceland, whose members gathered yearly in the inspired setting of Thingvellir, emerged as early as 930 A.D. Adam von Bremen wrote in 1076: "They have no king, only the laws." The thing, or local parliament, designated both a location and the assembly where freemen with equal political rights convened at a fixed date in order to legislate and render justice.[11] In Iceland the freeman enjoyed two inalienable privileges: he had a right to bear arms and to a seat in the thing. "The Icelanders," writes Frederick Durand

> created and experienced what one could call by some uncertain yet suggestive analogy a kind of Nordic Hellas, i.e., a community of freemen who participated actively in the affairs of the community. Those communities were surprisingly well cultivated and intellectually productive, and, in addition, were united by bonds based on esteem and respect.[12]

"Scandinavian democracy is very old and one can trace its origins to the Viking era," observes Maurice Gravier.[13] In all of northern Europe this "democratic" tradition was anchored in a very strong communitarian sentiment, a propensity to "live together" (*zusammenleben*), which constantly fostered the primacy of the common interest over that of the individual. Such democracy, typically, included a certain hierarchical structure, which explains why one could describe it as "aristo-democracy." This tradition, based also on the concept of mutual assistance and a sense of common responsibility, remains alive in many countries today, for instance, in Switzerland.

The belief that the people were originally the possessor of power was common throughout the Middle Ages. Whereas the clergy limited itself to the proclamation *omnis potestas a Deo,* other theorists argued that power could emanate from God only through the intercession of the people. The belief of the "power of divine right" should therefore be seen in an indirect form, and not excluding the reality of the people. Thus, Marsilius of Padua did not hesitate to proclaim the concept of popular sovereignty; significantly, he did so in order to defend the supremacy of the emperor (at the time, Ludwig of Bavaria) over the Church. The idea of linking the principle of the people to its leaders was further emphasized in the formula *populus et proceres* (the people and the nobles), which appears frequently in old texts.

Here we should recall the democratic tendencies evident in ancient Rome,[14] the republics of medieval Italy, the French and Flemish communes, the Hanseatic municipalities, and the free Swiss cantons. Let us further note the ancient *boerenvrijheid* ("peasants' freedom") that prevailed in medieval Frisian provinces and whose equivalent could be found along the North Sea, in the Low Lands, in Flanders, Scandinavia, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Finally, it is worth mentioning the existence of important communal movements based on free corporate structures, the function of which was to provide mutual help and to pursue economic and political goals. Sometimes these movements clashed with king and Church, which were supported by the burgeoning

bourgeoisie. At other times, however, communal movements backed the monarchy in its fight against the feudal lords, thus contributing to the rise of the mercantile bourgeoisie.[15]

In reality, most political regimes throughout history can be qualified as mixed ones. "All ancient democracies," writes François Perroux, "were governed by a de facto or de jure aristocracy, unless they were governed by a monarchical principle."[16] According to Aristotle, Solon's constitution was oligarchic in terms of its Areopagus, aristocratic in terms of its magistrates, and democratic in terms of the make-up of its tribunals. It combined the advantages of each type of government. Similarly, Polybius argues that Rome was, in view of the power of its consuls, an elective monarchy; in regard to the powers of the Senate, an aristocracy; and regarding the rights of the people, a democracy. Cicero, in his *De Republica*, advances a similar view. Monarchy need not exclude democracy, as is shown by the example of contemporary constitutional and parliamentary monarchies today. After all, it was the French monarchy in 1789 that convoked the Estates-General. "[D]emocracy, taken in the broad sense, admits of various forms," observed Pope Pius XII, "and can be realized in monarchies as well as in republics."[17]

Let us add that the experience of modern times demonstrates that neither government nor institutions need play a decisive role in shaping social life. Comparable types of government may disguise different types of societies, whereas different governmental forms may mask identical social realities. (Western societies today have an extremely homogeneous structure even though their institutions and constitutions sometimes offer substantial differences.)

So now the task of defining democracy appears even more difficult. The etymological approach has its limits. According to its original meaning, democracy means "the power of the people." Yet this power can be interpreted in different ways. The most reasonable approach, therefore, seems to be the historical approach—an approach that explains "genuine" democracy as first of all the political system of that ancient people that simultaneously invented the word and the fact.

The notion of democracy did not appear at all in modern political thought until the eighteenth century. Even then its mention was sporadic, frequently with a pejorative connotation. Prior to the French Revolution the most "advanced" philosophers had fantasized about mixed regimes combining the advantages of an "enlightened" monarchy and popular representation. Montesquieu acknowledged that a people could have the right to control, but not the right to rule. Not a single revolutionary constitution claimed to have been inspired by "democratic" principles. Robespierre was, indeed, a rare person for that epoch, who toward the end of his reign, explicitly mentioned democracy (which did not however contribute to the strengthening of his popularity in the years to come), a regime that he defined as a representative

form of government, i.e., "a state in which the sovereign people, guided by laws which are of their own making, do for themselves all that they can do well, and by their delegates do all that they cannot do themselves." [18]

It was in the United States that the word democracy first became widespread, notably when the notion of "republic" was contrasted to the notion of "democracy." Its usage became current at the beginning of the nineteenth century, especially with the advent of Jacksonian democracy and the subsequent establishment of the Democratic Party. The word, in turn, crossed the Atlantic again and became firmly implanted in Europe—to the profit of the constitutional debates that filled the first half of the nineteenth century. Tocqueville's book *Democracy in America*, the success of which was considerable, made the term a household word.

Despite numerous citations, inspired by antiquity, that adorned the philosophical and political discourse of the eighteenth century, the genuine legacy drawn from ancient democracy was at that time very weak. The philosophers seemed more enthralled with the example of Sparta than Athens. The debate "Sparta vs. Athens," frequently distorted by bias or ignorance, pitted the partisans of authoritarian egalitarianism against the tenets of moderate liberalism.[19] Rousseau, for instance, who abominated Athens, expressed sentiments that were rigorously pro-Spartiate. In his eyes, Sparta was first and foremost the city of equals (*hómoioi*). By contrast, when Camille Desmoulins thundered against Sparta, it was to denounce its excessive egalitarianism. He attacked the Girondin Brissot, that pro-Lycurgian, "who has rendered his citizens equal just as a tornado renders equal all those who are about to drown." All in all, this type of discourse remained rather shallow. The cult of antiquity was primarily maintained as a metaphor for social regeneration, as exemplified by Saint-Just's words hurled at the Convention: "The world has been empty since the Romans; their memory can replenish it and it can augur liberty."[20]

If we wish now to continue our study of "genuine" democracy, we must once again turn to Greek democracy rather than to those regimes that the contemporary world designates by the word.

The comparison between ancient democracies and modern democracies has frequently turned into an academic exercise.[21] It is generally emphasized that the former were direct democracies, whereas the latter (due to larger areas and populations) are representative democracies. Moreover, we are frequently reminded that slaves were excluded from the Athenian democracy; consequently, the idea emerged that Athens was not so democratic, after all. These two affirmations fall somewhat short of satisfying answers.

Readied by political and social evolution during the sixth century B.C., as well as by reforms made possible by Solon, Athenian democracy entered its founding stage with the reforms of Cleisthenes, who returned from exile in 508 B.C. Firmly established from 460 B.C., it continued to thrive for the next one

hundred and fifty years. Pericles, who succeeded Ephialtes in 461 B.C., gave democracy an extraordinary reputation, which did not at all prevent him from exercising, for more than thirty years, a quasi-royal authority over the city.[22]

For the Greeks democracy was primarily defined[23] by its relationship to two other systems: tyranny and aristocracy. Democracy presupposed three conditions: isonomy (equality before laws); isotimy (equal rights to accede to all public offices); and isegory (liberty of expression). This was direct democracy, known also as "face to face" democracy, since all citizens were allowed to take part in the *ekklesía*, or Assembly. Deliberations were prepared by the *boulé* (Council), although in fact it was the popular assembly that made policy. The popular assembly nominated ambassadors; decided over the issue of war and peace, preparing military expeditions or bringing an end to hostilities; investigated the performance of magistrates; issued decrees; ratified laws; bestowed the rights of citizenship; and deliberated on matters of Athenian security. In short, writes Jacqueline de Romilly, "the people ruled, instead of being ruled by elected individuals." She cites the text of the oath given by the Athenians: "I will kill whoever by word, deed, vote, or hand attempts to destroy democracy.... And should somebody else kill him I will hold him in high esteem before the gods and divine powers, as if he had killed a public enemy."[24]

Democracy in Athens meant first and foremost a community of citizens, that is, a community of people gathered in the *ekklesía*. Citizens were classified according to their membership in a deme—a grouping which had a territorial, social, and administrative significance. The term *démos*, which is of Doric origin, designates those who live in a given territory, with the territory constituting a place of origin and determining civic status.[25] To some extent *démos* and ethnos coincide: democracy could not be conceived in relationship to the individual, but only in the relationship to the polis, that is to say, to the city in its capacity as an organized community. Slaves were excluded from voting not because they were slaves, but because they were not citizens. We seem shocked by this today, yet, after all, which democracy has ever given voting rights to non-citizens?[26]

The notions of citizenship, liberty, or equality of political rights, as well as of popular sovereignty, were intimately interrelated. The most essential element in the notion of citizenship was someone's origin and heritage. Pericles was the "son of Xanthippus from the deme of Cholargus." Beginning in 451 B.C., one had to be born of an Athenian mother and father in order to become a citizen. Defined by his heritage, the citizen (*polítes*) is opposed to *idiótes*, the non-citizen—a designation that quickly took on a pejorative meaning (from the notion of the rootless individual one arrived at the notion of "idiot"). Citizenship as function derived thus from the notion of citizenship as status, which was the exclusive prerogative of birth. To be a citizen meant, in the fullest sense of the word, to have a homeland, that is, to have both a homeland and a history. One is born an Athenian—one does not become one (with rare

exceptions). Furthermore, the Athenian tradition discouraged mixed marriages. Political equality, established by law, flowed from common origins that sanctioned it as well. Only birth conferred individual *politeía*.[27]

Democracy was rooted in the concept of autochthonous citizenship, which intimately linked its exercise to the origins of those who exercised it. The Athenians in the fifth century celebrated themselves as "the autochthonous people of great Athens," and it was within that founding myth that they placed the pivot of their democracy.[28]

In Greek, as well as in Latin, liberty proceeds from someone's origin. Free man **(e)leudheros* (Greek *eleútheros*), is primarily he who belongs to a certain "stock" (cf. in Latin the word *liberi*, "children"). "To be born of a good stock is to be free," writes Emile Benveniste, "this is one and the same."[29] Similarly, in the German language, the kinship between the words *frei*, "free," and *Freund,* "friend," indicates that in the beginning, liberty sanctioned mutual relationship. The Indo-European root **leudh-*, from which derive simultaneously the Latin *liber* and the Greek *eleútheros*, also served to designate "people" in the sense of a national group (cf. Old Slavonic *ljudú,* "people"; German *Leute,* "people," both of which derive from the root evoking the idea of "growth and development").

The original meaning of the word "liberty" does not suggest at all "liberation"—in a sense of emancipation from collectivity. Instead, it implies inheritance—which alone confers liberty. Thus when the Greeks spoke of liberty, they did not have in mind the right to break away from the tutelage of the city or the right to rid themselves of the constraints to which each citizen was bound. Rather, what they had in mind was the right, but also the political capability, guaranteed by law, to participate in the life of the city, to vote in the assembly, to elect magistrates, etc. Liberty did not legitimize secession; instead, it sanctioned its very opposite: the bond which tied the person to his city. This was not liberty-autonomy, but a liberty-participation; it was not meant to reach beyond the community, but was practised solely in the framework of the polis. Liberty meant adherence. The "liberty" of an individual without heritage, i.e. of a deracinated individual, was completely devoid of any meaning.

If we therefore assume that liberty was directly linked to the notion of democracy, then it must be added that liberty meant first and foremost the liberty of the people, from which subsequently the liberty of citizens proceeds. In other words, only the liberty of the people (or of the city) can lay the foundations for the *equality* of political and individual rights, i.e., rights enjoyed by individuals in the capacity of citizens. Liberty presupposes independence as its first condition. Man lives in society, and therefore individual liberty cannot exist without collective liberty. Among the Greeks, individuals were free because (and in so far as) their city was free.

When Aristotle defines man as a "political animal," as a social being, when he asserts that the city precedes the individual and that only within society can the individual achieve his potential (*Politics*, 1253a 19-20), he also suggests that

man should not be detached from his role of citizen, a person living in the framework of an organized community, of a polis, or a *civitas.* Aristotle's views stand in contrast to the concept of modern liberalism, which posits that the individual precedes society, and that man, in the capacity of a self-sufficient individual, is at once something more than just a citizen.[30]

Hence, in a "community of freemen," individual interests must never prevail over common interests. "All constitutions whose objectives are common interest," writes Aristotle, "are in accordance with absolute justice. By contrast, those whose objective is the personal interest of the governors tend to be defective." (*Politics*, 1279a 17sq). In contrast to what one can see, for instance, in Euripides' works, the city in Aeschylus' tragedies is regularly described as a communal entity. "This sense of community," writes Moses I. Finley, "fortified by the state religion, the myths and traditions, was the essential source of success in Athenian democracy."[31]

In Greece, adds Finley, "liberty meant the rule of law and participation in the decision- making process—and not necessarily the enjoyment of inalienable rights."[32] The law is identified with the genius of the city. "To obey the law meant to be devoted with zeal to the will of the community," observes Paul Veyne.[33] As Cicero wrote, only liberty can pave the way for legality: "Legum…servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus" ("We are the servants of the law in order that we can be free," *Oratio pro Cluentio*, 53.)

In his attempt to show that liberty is the fundamental principle of democracy (*Politics*, VII, 1), Aristotle succeeds in de-emphasizing the factor of equality. For the Greeks equality was only one means to democracy, though it could be an important one. Political equality, however, had to emanate from citizenship, i.e., from belonging to a given people. From this it follows that members of the same people (of the same city), irrespective of their differences, shared the desire to be citizens in the same and equal manner. This equality of rights by no means reflects a belief in natural equality. The equal right of all citizens to participate in the assembly does not mean that men are by nature equal (nor that it would be preferable that they were), but rather that they derive from their common heritage a common capacity to exercise the right of suffrage, which is the privilege of citizens. As the appropriate means to this *téchne*, equality remains exterior to man. This process, as much as it represents the logical consequence of common heritage, is also the condition for common participation. In the eyes of the ancient Greeks it was considered natural that all citizens be associated with political life not by virtue of universal and imprescriptible rights of humans as such, but from the fact of common citizenship. In the last analysis, the crucial notion was not equality but citizenship. Greek democracy was that form of government in which each citizen saw his liberty as firmly founded on an equality that conferred on him the right to civic and political liberties.

The study of ancient democracy has elicited divergent views from contemporary authors. For some, Athenian democracy is an admirable example of civic responsibility (Francesco Nitti); for others it evokes the realm of "activist" political parties (Paul Veyne); for yet others, ancient democracy is essentially totalitarian (Giovanni Sartori).[34] In general, everybody seems to concur that the difference between ancient democracy and modern democracy is considerable. Curiously, it is modern democracy that is used as a criterion for the democratic consistency of the former. This type of reasoning sounds rather odd. As we have observed, it was only belatedly that those modern national governments today styled "democracies" came to identify themselves with this word. Consequently, after observers began inquiring into ancient democracy, and realized that it was different from modern democracy, they drew the conclusion that ancient democracy was "less democratic" than modern democracy. But, in reality, should we not proceed from the inverse type of reasoning? It must be reiterated that democracy was born in Athens in the fifth century B.C. Therefore, it is Athenian democracy (regardless of one's judgements for or against it) that should be used as an example of a "genuine" type of democracy. Granted that contemporary democratic regimes differ from Athenian democracy, we must then assume that they differ from democracy of any kind. We can see again where this irks most of our contemporaries. Since nowadays everyone boasts of being a perfect democrat, and given the fact that Greek democracy resembles not at all those before our eyes, it is naturally the Greeks who must bear the brunt of being "less democratic"! We thus arrive at the paradox that Greek democracy, in which the people participated daily in the exercise of power, is disqualified on the grounds that it does not fit into the concept of modern democracy, in which the people, at best, participates only indirectly in political life.

There should be no doubt that ancient democracies and modern democracies are systems entirely distinct from each other. Even the parallels that have been sought between them are fallacious. They have only the name in common, since both have resulted from completely different historical processes.

Wherein does this difference lie? It would be wrong to assume that it is related to either the "direct" or "indirect" nature of the decision-making process. Each of them has a different concept of man and a different concept of the world, as well as a different vision of social bonds. The democracy of antiquity was communitarian and "holist"; modern democracy is primarily individualist. Ancient democracy defined citizenship by a man's origins, and provided him with the opportunity to participate in the life of the city. Modern democracy organizes atomized individuals into citizens viewed through the prism of abstract egalitarianism. Ancient democracy was based on the idea of organic community; modern democracy, heir to Christianity and the philosophy of the Enlightenment, on the individual. In both cases the meaning of the words "city," "people," "nation," and "liberty," are totally changed.

To argue, therefore, within this context, that Greek democracy was a direct democracy only because it encompassed a small number of citizens falls short of a satisfying answer. Direct democracy need not be associated with a limited number of citizens. It is primarily associated with the notion of a relatively homogeneous people that is conscious of what makes it a people. The effective functioning of both Greek and Icelandic democracy was the result of cultural cohesion and a clear sense of shared heritage. The closer the members of a community are to each other, the more likely they are to have common sentiments, identical values, and same way of looking at the world, and the easier it is for them to make collective decisions without needing the help of mediators.

In contrast, having ceased to be places of collectively lived meaning, modern societies require a multitude of intermediaries. The aspirations that surface in this type of democracy spring from contradictory value systems that are no longer reconcilable with unified decisions. Ever since Benjamin Constant (*De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes*, 1819), we have been able to measure to what degree, under the impact of individualist and egalitarian ideologies, the notion of liberty has changed. Therefore, to return to a Greek concept of democracy does not mean nurturing a shallow hope of "face to face" social transparency. Rather, it means reappropriating, as well as adapting to the modern world, the concept of the people and community—concepts that have been eclipsed by two thousand years of egalitarianism, rationalism, and the exaltation of the rootless individual.

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Translated by Tomislav Sunic from the author's book ***Démocratie: Le Problème*** *(Paris: Le Labyrinthe, 1985)*

End Notes

1. George Orwell, *Selected Essays* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957), p. 149.
2. François Guizot, *De la démocratie en France* (Paris: Masson, 1849), p. 9.
3. Georges Burdeau observes that judging by appearances, in terms of their federal organization, the institutions of the Soviet Union are similar to those of the United States, and in terms of its governmental system the Soviet Union is similar to England. *La démocratie* (Paris : Seuil, 1966), p. 141.
4. T.S. Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society* (London: Faber & Faber, 1939).

5. Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Du pouvoir* (Geneva : Cheval ailé, 1945), p. 411.

6. Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1962), p. 3.

7. "Les démocrates ombrageux," *Contrepoint* (December 1976), p. 111.

8. Other authors have held exactly the opposite opinion. For Schleiermacher, democracy is a "primitive" political form in contrast to monarchy, which is thought to correspond to the demands of the modern state.

9. "Le pouvoir des idées en démocratie," *Pouvoir* (May 1983), p. 145.

10. Significantly, it was with the beginning of the inquiry into the origins of the French monarchy that the nobility, under Louis XIV, began to challenge the principles of monarchy.

11. The word "thing," which designated the parliament, derives from the Germanic word that connoted originally "everything that is gathered together." The same word gave birth to the English "thing" (German *Ding*: same meaning). It seems that this word designated the assembly in which public matters, then affairs of a general nature, and finally "things" were discussed.

12. "Les fondements de l'État libre d'Icelande: trois siècles de démocratie médiévale," in *Nouvelle Ecole* 25-26 (Winter 1974-75), pp. 68-73.

13. *Les Scandinaves* (Paris: Lidis [Brepols], 1984), p. 613.

14. Cf. P.M. Martin, *L'idée de royauté, ... Rome. De la Rome royale au consensus républicain* (Clermont-Ferrand: Adosa, 1983).

15. Here "democracy," as in the case of peasants' freedoms as well, already included social demands, although not "class struggle"—a concept ignored by ancient democracy. In the Middle Ages the purpose of such demands was to give voice to those who were excluded from power. But it often happened that "democracy" could be used against the people. In medieval Florence, social strife between the "popolo grosso" and the "popolo minuto" was particularly brisk. On this Francesco Nitti writes: "The reason the working classes of Florence proved lukewarm in defense of their liberty and sympathized instead with the Medicis was because they remained opposed to democracy, which they viewed as a concept of the rich bourgeoisie." Francesco Nitti, *La démocratie,* vol. 1 (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1933), p. 57.

16. This opinion is shared by the majority of students of ancient democracies. Thus, Victor Ehrenberg sees in Greek democracy a "form of enlarged aristocracy." Victor Ehrenberg, *L'état grec* (Paris: Maspéro, 1976), p. 94.

17. Pius XII, 1944 Christmas Message: http://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/P12XMAS.HTM

18. M. Robespierre, "On Political Morality," speech to the Convention, February 5, 1794: http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/413/

19. On this debate, see the essay by Luciano Guerci, "Liberta degli antichi e liberta dei moderni," in *Sparta, Atene e i `philosophes' nella Francia del Setecento* (Naples: Guido, 1979).

20. Camille Desmoulins, speech to the Convention, March 31, 1794. It is significant that contemporary democrats appear to be more inclined to favor Athens. Sparta, in contrast, is denounced for its "war-like spirit." This change in discourse deserves a profound analysis.

21. Cf., for example, the essay by Moses Finley, *Démocratie antique et démocratie moderne* (Paris: Payot, 1976), which is both an erudite study and a pamphlet of great contemporary relevance. The study is prefaced by Pierre Vidal-Naquet, who, among other errors, attributes to Julien Freund (see n. 7, above) positions which are exactly the very opposite of those stated in the preface.

22. To cite Thucydides: "Thanks to his untainted character, the depth of his vision, and boundless disinterestedness, Pericles exerted on Athens an incontestable influence.… Since he owed his prestige only to honest means, he did not have to truckle to popular passions.… In a word, democracy supplied the name; but in reality, it was the government of the first citizen." (*Peloponnesian War* II, 65)

23. One of the best works on this topic is Jacqueline de Romilly's essay *Problèmes de la démocratie grecque* (Paris: Hermann, 1975).

24. Romilly, *Problèmes de la démocratie grecque.*

25. The word "*démos"* is opposed to the word "*laós,*" a term employed in Greece to designate the people, but with the express meaning of "the community of warriors."

26. In France, the right to vote was implemented only in stages. In 1791 the distinction was still made between "active citizens" and "passive citizens." Subsequently, the electorate was expanded to include all qualified citizens able to pay a specified minimum of taxes. Although universal suffrage was proclaimed in 1848, it was limited to males until 1945.

27. On the evolution of that notion, see Jacqueline Bordes, '*Politeia' dans la pensée grecque jusqu'à Aristote* (Paris : Belles Lettres, 1982).

28. Nicole Loraux interprets the Athenian notion of citizenship as a result of the "imaginary belonging to an autochthonous people" (*Les enfants d'Athéna: Idées athéniennes sur la citoyenneté et la divison des sexes* [Paris: Maspéro, 1981]). The myth of Erichthonios (or Erechtheus) explains in fact the autochthonous character and the origins of the masculine democracy, at the same time as it grafts the Athenian ideology of citizenship onto immemorial foundations.

29. Emile Benveniste, *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes,* vol. 1 (Paris : Minuit, 1969), p. 321.

30. On the work of Aristotle and his relationship with the Athenian constitution, see James Day and Mortimer Chambers, *Aristotle, History of Athenian Democracy* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1962).

31. Finley, *Démocratie antique et démocratie moderne,* p. 80.

32. Finley, *Démocratie antique et démocratie moderne*, p. 141.

33. Veyne adds: "Bourgeois liberalism organizes cruising ships in which each passenger must take care of himself as best as he can, the crew being there only to provide for the common goods and services. By contrast, the Greek city was a ship where the passengers made up the crew." Paul Veyne, "Les Grecs ont-ils connu la démocratie?" *Diogène* (October-December 1983, p. 9).

34. For the liberal critique of Greek democracy, see Paul Veyne, "Les Grecs ont-ils connu la démocratie?" and Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (see n. 6 above).

THE GREAT SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY SCAM

MULTICULTURALISM'S SCANDAL-RIDDEN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE

CHRIS BRAND

SUMMARY

The unbridled multiculturalism and multiracialism promoted by contemporary political and cultural elites could hardly be more different from the cultural and racial values of the West of a century ago. Although a number of the West's non-white minorities continue to be vastly overrepresented in the figures for illiteracy, crime, and AIDS, for a public figure to question multiculturalism's costs to society is a career-ending ordeal—as former U.S. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) discovered when he fondly alluded to the days of the old segregated South while reminiscing about Strom Thurmond's insurgent 1948 Dixiecrat presidential candidacy. According to today's cultural and political zeitgeist, racial minorities must be embraced—or at least politely ignored, which therefore puts them above critical scrutiny. (Avoidance of racial identification is a standard practice of the BBC when people from minorities commit strikingly foul crimes—e.g. the black-on-black murder in London of ten-year-old Victoria Climbié by her aunt and boyfriend.)

That this huge change occurred was due largely to the influence of Franz Boas (1858-1942), who galvanized an elite cadre of former students into shaping the intellectual direction of social anthropology. This German-Jewish scholar, a professor at Columbia University, New York, steadily persuaded anthropologists to drop their nineteenth-century belief that there were largely insuperable differences between the major human races—differences that, it had been thought, could not even be decreased by interbreeding. Today, however, the key study of Boas's career, reporting that the head shapes of children born to immigrants after they arrived in the United States differed significantly from those of their siblings born abroad, is under a cloud; and some anthropologists entertain the possibility that Boas falsified his findings. Reanalysis of the available data on the 17,000 subjects Boas studied over ninety years ago finds *no* significant evidence for Boas's key idea that racial characteristics can easily be changed.

These recent problems for modern social anthropology come on the heels of vicious disputes within the "discipline" about whether other anthropological researchers, too, might have painted an unduly rosy picture of human nature in primitive peoples, and of the likelihood of change. These matters are of huge importance because social anthropology has provided a major plank of the environmentalist thinking that currently dominates teaching in the social science

faculties of universities. The universities—while ostensibly venerating "diversity"—have allowed their staffs to become 95 percent liberal-left and about 100 percent politically correct in outlook; but now it seems that the scholarship of the social anthropologists on race is based not merely on wishful thinking, but on fundamental research errors that these academics have long allowed to leave unreplicated and unexamined.

The old saying that "what goes around, comes around" was all too apropos as 2003 opened with the West transfixed by the idea that there is no deep-seated, genetic origin for racial differences—a belief that had been rampant in an earlier period, prior to the early twentieth century. Such was the wisdom of the twentieth century's social anthropologists. According to what students call "social anthropology," there is every reason to expect that the world's different peoples can live in harmony, especially in the West's many multicultural cities, where the value of "diversity" is proclaimed by politicians and media pundits to distract attention from the illiteracy, criminality, out-of-wedlock fertility, anti-white hostility, and AIDS rates of certain of the burgeoning imported ethnic minorities. Backed up by the speech codes and thought police of state-funded political correctness, state-funded multiculturalism is the main form of piety in today's Western world. Contrived by the left after much of its beloved "working class" gladly succumbed to *embourgeoisement* around 1980, political correctness is designed to harvest "minority" votes rather as Prime Minister William Gladstone's last government collected votes from the Catholic Irish. "PC" ensures that even illegal immigrants and asylum seekers whose cases have been rejected can only be publicly criticized at the cost of critics' promotion prospects and even of their ability to be heard publicly at all, for they will be denounced as "racists," a descriptor from which even case-hardened conservatives now shrink. Multiculturalism's intellectual advance guard has even begun proving to itself that races do not actually exist aiming eventually to put *any* public talk of race off-limits. (For a defense of the existence of human races, see J. Philippe Rushton's essay, "Is Race a Valid Taxonomic Construct?" in the Spring 2002 issue of *The Occidental Quarterly*, 17-28, http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol2no1/jpr-taxonomic.html.)

Examples of the new intellectual tyranny? A book by a British psychologist and a Finnish economist that appeared early in 2002 reported empirical estimates of IQ for most nations of the world, showing a strong correlation between national intelligence and national prosperity. Arrestingly, the data showed that not one of the world's ten countries that recorded substantial and steady economic improvement over the previous twenty years was African. This contrasted markedly with sub-Saharan Africa, which provided *all* of the ten countries that had actually been becoming steadily *poorer*. Yet this important book, *IQ and the Wealth of Nations* (Lynn & Vanhanen, 2002), had to be brought out by a mail order publisher and has not been reviewed in a single

prestigious newspaper or magazine (though the academic journal *Heredity* and *The Occidental Quarterly* [see Edward M. Miller's review in the Winter 2002/2003 *TOQ*, 79-83] are rare exceptions).

Even after the horror of 9/11 and clear statements by the Saudi Arabian ambassador to Britain that many Muslims hate the West, even when a police officer was knifed to death in Birmingham, U.K., by a North African rejected asylum seeker, and even when the U.S. and U.K. went to war with Muslim-backed terror, politicians and media pundits insisted on maintaining multicultural piety by not asking for racial profiling at ports or for the detention of unemployed immigrants from such fanatically Muslim countries as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Algeria. Not even the bloody and conspicuous collapse of multicultural Rwanda/Burundi and Yugoslavia has served among intellectuals to cast doubt on their devotion to multicultural idealism. Not even the segregated lives of most whites and blacks in the U.S. made a mark about what people really wanted; nor did the reluctance of blacks and whites to intermarry (whereas whites, Asians, and Hispanics do so fairly readily). There was not a flicker even when a black Harvard sociologist, Orlando Patterson (1998), wrote that whites would need to be legally compelled to live near blacks so as to intermarry and expand the blacks' "social networks" and employment opportunities. Even the U.K.-U.S. coalition against Saddam Hussein kept its discourse entirely "PC" (apart from one slip of the tongue when President Bush called the action a "crusade"). Whatever happened in the real world, evidently, the multiculti illusion had to be maintained: All the races, er… minorities, could be expected to get along just fine.

Times have definitely changed. For example, during the European Enlightenment, great philosophers such as Germany's Immanuel Kant and Scotland's David Hume were quite sure there were major and deep-seated racial differences. In fact, Kant wrote (1764):

> The Negroes of Africa have received from nature no intelligence that rises above the foolish. Hume invites anyone to quote a single example of a Negro who has exhibited talents. He asserts that among the hundred thousands of blacks who have been seduced away from their own countries, although very many of them have been set free, yet not a single one has ever been found that has performed anything great whether in art or science or in any other laudable subject; but among the whites, people constantly rise up from the lowest rabble and acquire esteem through their superior gifts.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the top anatomy professor at the (by then enlightened and experimental) University of Edinburgh declared (Knox, 1850) "Race is everything. Literature, science, art—in a word, civilization, depends on it." But the early twentieth century witnessed the advance of what would become the new religion; and the discovery of the Nazi death camps was enough to convince elite Westerners that their only moral recourse was embracing the doctrine of multiculturalism.

Yet what exactly was the West being asked to accept, and on what grounds? Astonishingly, it turns out that there is a simple and flawed story at the heart of social anthropology—the principal academic route by which multiculturalism made its advance. In particular, the advent of multiculturalism was largely the work of one man who undertook just one major study, between 1908 and 1910 in New York. Surprisingly, this key study was not at all concerned with the intelligence or moral qualities of the different migrant groups flooding into America at that time—a concern that created enough anxiety to yield a U.S. government report that ran to forty volumes. Nor was the study concerned even with brain size ("cranial volume")—already thought to distinguish the different main races of man and to have a significant link to intelligence. No, the factual claims that would culminate some forty years later in serious victories for multiculturalism concerned simply the relative width and length (from front to back) of the human head. Remarkably, this "cephalic index" (CI)—which no one ever showed to be linked to any important human qualities at all—was to provide the way of turning the tide for a century against the scientific racism that had been dominant in anthropology since Darwin's (1859) discoveries.

The Destructive Legacy of Franz Boas

An immigrant to the U.S., Franz Uri Boas (1858-1942), and his students at Columbia University collected physical measurements of some 17,000 adults and children, concentrating especially on immigrants to the U.S. Some 6,000 were of Jewish origin, but Bohemians, Sicilians, and Neapolitans were especially well represented, each group providing about 3,000 testees. Boas had been interested in refuting the suggestion that the brain development of Negroes (as Boas and others then called blacks) became arrested at some unduly early age. However, the finding that Boas eventually produced had nothing to do with that idea. Instead, what Boas claimed to have discovered in his voluminous data was that parent-child similarity in CI was greater for pairs where the child had been born *before* immigration to America took place. By contrast, when a child of immigrants was born in the U.S.—and, more particularly, after ten or so years of the parent being in the U.S.—there was more difference between parent and child. Thus arose what was long to be by far the most important "anti-racist" empirical claim of American anthropologists: apparently the CI index, beloved of physical anthropologists as a possible brain indicator readily taken from live subjects, and certainly showing reliable racial differences, had turned out to be a far from permanent feature—presumably because circumstances like climate or diet or gynecological or swaddling practices made a difference. Hey presto! Here was the first apparent refutation of the claims of Darwin's cousin, Sir Francis Galton, that race mattered. Boas's legacy as "the man who did more than any other to lay the ghost of racism in scientific disciplines" (Gossett, 1997) is due in large part to this landmark work. Whatever the CI starting points of America's gathering

races, the American "melting pot" could be expected to produce change—just as liberal-left optimists about immigration then liked to believe. (Today, no doubt, the very idea of hoping immigrants might change would be denounced as "racist.")

Importantly, Boas was in a good position to carry conviction about his claim. A physicist by training in Germany, Boas, the son of liberal Jewish parents, had turned to anthropology after failing to land an academic job in Berlin (perhaps because of the rising anti-Semitism in Germany, which may have helped give him his facial dueling scars). Boas's notable human, linguistic, and musical gifts and mastery of photography ensured success for his detailed recording work among the Eskimos and "Americans" (today called Native Americans in government circles) and he climbed the greasy pole of academia to land a job at Columbia University in 1899. Though he always had a kindly attitude to people of non-European races, he realistically allowed that there were, in particular, substantial differences in development between the "Americans," Europeans, and Mongoloids (East Asians) on the one hand and the Negroes, "Australians" (i.e. Australian aborigines), and Melanesians on the other. It was only for the "races" of Europe itself (said in those days to be principally Nordic, Alpine, or Mediterranean) that Boas repeatedly asserted general equality—obviously including the Jews.

In both cases, Boas's views were borne out by subsequent twentieth-century psychological research (indeed, Ashkenazi Jews turned out to be positively superior to Europeans on IQ-type tests). Similarly, Boas believed that brain volume was most likely linked to intelligence, as it clearly was to race (with Mongoloids having the largest brains)—a position that became well established by the 1990s as accurate measures of brain volume in live subjects (by magnetic resonance imaging) came on stream. Boas knew there was a delicate problem in linking brain volume to intelligence, since female brains are smaller; but he imagined this sex difference was due to factors other than general intelligence. He was thus entirely vindicated when, in 1998, it became clear that the bigger male brain is indeed due not to the brain's central gray matter that is responsible for general intelligence, but to the white matter which probably underpins spatial orientation abilities (once so necessary for the male hunter). Boas was also right that interbreeding between races did no conspicuous harm to basic human requirements like health or intelligence—countering claims made too enthusiastically by scientific racists of those days (though, of course, interbreeding has never yet yielded a Bach, Handel, Beethoven, or Mozart). Boas was in all these ways a successful scientific speculator—even if his followers in social anthropology would largely renounce science altogether. Boas's major anti-racist thesis was that most race differences are probably caused substantially by oppressive race prejudice. This was invalidated when the West's black colonies failed to make much economic progress after being granted independence; but even so it was a plausible and testable idea, one which is still entrancing today to many social scientists in the West's "universities."

Thus it was that two whole generations of academics became increasingly inclined to accept Franz Boas's anti-racist message, coupled as it was with an assurance that African countries had sometimes reached high levels of civilization (for which Boas—no Africanist — actually had very little evidence). Yet at the center of this attractive-seeming message there turns out to be an enormous and omnivorous black hole.

First to vanish into the hole are Boas's (1910) "findings" on head shape. Last autumn, anthropologists Corey S. Sparks of Pennsylvania State University and Dr. Richard L. Jantz of the University of Tennessee reanalyzed Boas's 1910 data on CI and concluded that the figures simply did not show *any* significant impact of the American environment on immigrant parents and their U.S.-born children (Sparks & Jantz, 2002). Apparently, 99 percent of CI variation occurred within families, and there was at most a 1 percent effect of the new American environment. This might not have mattered too much to a hardcore idealist who could just say that *one day* assimilation would be complete. But that was not how Boas and colleagues had written of matters. Rather, the social anthropologists had claimed there were "enormous" and "quick" effects from immigration. Even Boas's 1 percent effect is of no certain import, for some immigrant groups produced thinner heads in America and others produced children with heads that were broader. Most likely, the 1 percent figure was just chance variation.

Worse, Boas's own graphs clearly show that children born after their parents had lived in the U.S. for *twenty* years did not show greater dissimilarity than the children born after *ten* years. Indeed, contrary to the Boasian thesis, they actually showed *less* difference. Further discussion of Boas's errors is supposed to be forthcoming at the American Anthropological Association, and Boas will doubtless have some defenders; but none will be able to justify how so much was ever made of so little. (In March, the AAA published an article by Gravlee et al. (2003) defending Boas's claims; but this article did not discuss the analysis by Sparks and Jantz and its own defense used data published by Boas in 1928, by which time—as was acknowledged—some 4,000 of the original subjects had mysteriously gone missing. Gravlee et al. say, in what is surely no overstatement: "It would be a worthwhile project for future researchers to explain this discrepancy and locate the missing data." They also report *no* general influence on child CI of time elapsed since parental immigration into the U.S. Defense like this serves only to underline the likelihood that no confidence should ever have been placed by twentieth-century anthropologists and "anti-racists" in Boas's vast but inadequate data set.)

Second into the hole go the reputations of anthropologists for scholarship and critical faculty. How could Boas have got away with what may have been fraud and with what was certainly an egregious departure from all reasonable standards of data analysis? Boas himself certainly had the excuse that he had no training in statistics—he probably never calculated a correlation coefficient

in his life. Yet even so, his use of his data was at least both capricious and reckless, if not actually distortingly selective. Worse, Boas's followers had no excuse for failing to recognize those problems as they talked up their master's ideologically convenient achievement. Any open-minded reader of Boas's many admirers will today conclude that none of them have actually shown the slightest interest in reading their master's empirical work. They loved their master's conclusions but cared little about establishing empirical facts.

Of course, modern science does not depend on scholastic arguments and counterarguments. In science, the blunt way is replication, replication, replication. Yet, in this vital matter, the black hole once again whisks social anthropology away. Boas's claims about head shape malleability had attracted much critical attention from horrified scientific racists, and these critics typically won their arguments in journals of the 1920s—for example, pointing out that immigrants may have been genetically different from their originating populations (as voluntary migrants certainly are in IQ, being typically 10 points higher than the population they leave). Yet by that time the American immigration issue had been settled, with the 1924 law restricting U.S. immigration from non-Nordic populations. Thus there was no ready state money available for replicating Boas's claims about head shape; and the Boasians did not appreciate the importance of using their (many) sources of private funding to repeat the key work on which they relied.

In short, the 52-year-old Boas had frankly found his copious 1910 data contained a few unexpected fluke effects that could be used to suggest possible malleability of "basic" racial features. With his unhelpfully reported data buried nicely away in a gargantuan government tome, Boas could rely on systematic inattention—whether from his own enthusiastic supporters or from his critics (who understandably thought that their own repeated demonstrations—from 1915—of the low IQs of Negroes were of far greater importance than Boas's readily disputed claims about malleability of head shape). Yet this is no proper way to conduct a science, even a social science. By contrast, when, in 1912, the British psychologist Cyril Burt overturned Victorian wisdom by finding males to have the same average general intelligence as females (using the new Binet tests from France), this finding was replicated in countless investigations (and qualified by the observations that males have a wider range of IQs—thus producing more geniuses and more mental defectives—and that adolescent boys only temporarily lag behind adolescent girls in mental development). By contrast, social anthropology steamed ahead campaigning for relativism and multiculturalism (against "essentialism" and "racism") without even the slight empirical commitment that their own master had shown. "Antiracist" piety of today is literally the creation of these sorry non-findings of a century ago.

Nor is even this academic dereliction of duty the whole of the story. Twenty years ago came the first allegations of slipshod work by a top social anthropologist, along with allegations of a preference for ideology over

empiricism. The case actually involved Franz Boas's own star student, Margaret Mead, who had written about Samoa in the 1930s as a happy, model society practising sexual permissiveness. A New Zealand professor, Derek Freeman (1983), put the record straight: Mead's account had depended on just two young girls who subsequently, as ladies in their sixties, told Freeman that their stories of sexual licentiousness before marriage had been merrily made up because that was what the trendy lesbian Margaret Mead had seemed to want to hear. Another blow to social anthropology came in the 1990s, when left-wing anthropologists set out to challenge the evidence of researcher Napoleon Chagnon that some South American tribes were highly aggressive, and probably natively so. A string of accusations that Chagnon had stirred up his tribes' aggression by bringing them weapons and that he had infected them with Western diseases turned out to be wholly false, as adjudicated by the American Anthropology Association; so once more the trade was left facing ideologically unpalatable thoughts.

Today, with the mighty Boas himself under challenge, social anthropology is in a bad way. By providing a home for people who—whether as Jews or lesbians or socialists—had little liking for the West, it had taken a risk that might have been reasonable if scientific methods had been scrupulously employed. Yet, instead of proving anything much at all by any certain method, social anthropology has been left with no major finding and now has little to do but furiously attack its favorite straw man—the idea that there can be any talk of races since some people are, after all, of mixed race. In fact, all modern research shows important differences on scores of variables between the world's three main racial groups, as Boas himself claimed before he moved into radicalized denial in his old age. (He died of a heart attack while giving an anti-Nazi after-dinner speech.) To say there are no races because of occasional overlaps is like saying there are no birds or fish because of the existence of penguins. Anyhow, the world's top classifier of human genetic variation, Luigi Cavalli-Sforza, acknowledges the same main racial groups as do such race-realist psychologists as Arthur Jensen, Philippe Rushton, and myself—though Cavalli-Sforza is careful to avoid the actual term "race," presumably so as to keep research monies flowing his way.

In 1989, sociologists had to face up to the ending of many of their dreams when the supposedly class-abolishing socialist countries of Eastern Europe fell apart (having left their class systems largely intact despite millions of murders of educated and land-owning people). In the main, sociologists then fled from science into existentialism and its empirically uncommitted "postmodern" transmogrification of "constructivism." Likewise, the feminists who had taken over psychology (75 percent of the students are female) had to acknowledge by 2000 that the West was not their oppressor but—by contrast with the rest of the world—their *protector*. Now it is the turn of anthropologists to own up that the West-hating doctrine of multiculturalism, which they nurtured and which

fuelled mass colored immigration, never actually had the academic basis they claimed. Certainly social anthropology's problems have been made perfectly clear in the worldwide failure of multicultural experiments. It is not just that Europe's great empires all came to grief, followed by multicultural Yugoslavia, Rwanda-Burundi, and then Zimbabwe. In 1999, the Council of Europe (a once-liberal outfit that lately strains to lock up anyone talking realistically about race) published figures—though not commenting on them—that showed much lower crime rates for the smaller, monocultural countries of Europe (such as Denmark, Norway, and partitioned Cyprus) than for such multicultural conglomerates as the U.K., the U.S., and the USSR. Before another dollar is spent supporting multicultural ambitions, it is time for anthropologists to apologize and make a fresh start—helped by historians, psychologists, and the statisticians whom social anthropology has always so especially spurned. Failing such reform, the anthropologists' university lecture halls will first ring with tinkling laughter, and next lose altogether their charming complements of rich young Western girls gawping at the sexual tackle of savages while imbibing social anthropology's multicultural piety.

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POWER TRIP

Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt:

Toward a Secular Theocracy

Paul Edward Gottfried
Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2002
$29.95.

xii + 158 pp.

Reviewed by Samuel Francis

Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt is the sequel to Professor Paul Gottfried's earlier volume, *After Liberalism*, published by Princeton University Press in 1999. In both books Professor Gottfried, a prominent paleo-conservative polemicist, intellectual historian, and Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College in Pennsylvania, tries to account for the emergence of "post-liberal" trends in political thought and behavior, especially the rise of such phenomena as "multiculturalism" and what is popularly called "political correctness." The problem underlying his efforts is that such political and cultural views are so self-evidently absurd, based on such transparently false beliefs about history and culture, and so evidently harmful to intellectual freedom and social cohesion, that it is a mystery why anyone believes them at all, let alone why they have become such powerful and all but irresistible trends in academic, intellectual, and political life. Is the acceptance of such views by various key elites in Western society genuine, and to what extent does their acceptance point either to some hidden agenda reflecting the material interests of these elites or to some equally obscure irrational motivation, a collective "death wish" on the part of the leadership sectors of the modern West? This is perhaps the central problem Mr. Gottfried's series seeks to answer. Aside from what I take to be certain flaws in his presentation and argument, both books are well worth reading, and not only

for the large amount of anti-Western foolishness that he documents. They are major contributions to our understanding of what is happening to the Western world and why.

Both books take off from the common assumption that the United States and most of the Western world are now governed by what Gottfried calls the "managerial state," a term and concept that derive from conservative theorist James Burnham in his *The Managerial Revolution* of 1941 and which I to some extent reformulated in various essays, columns, and books in the 1980s. Gottfried's usage of them, however, is quite different from their meaning as defined by either Burnham or me.

In the first place, Burnham was writing under the influence of a Marxism from which he had only recently defected and of the largely Italian school of what are known as "classical elite" theorists, in particular Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, which he had recently discovered. Hence, his theory, as well as the reformulated version that I developed, is framed in terms of elites—relatively small groups within a population that share a common relationship to the instruments of power within a society and a common interest in how those instruments are used and which exclude the majority of the population from access to power. The key concept for Burnham, then, was a "managerial elite," a "managerial class," or a "new class," which was displacing the older elite or ruling class in modern society. He saw this process going on simultaneously in Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and the United States of the New Deal era. The new elite, like the old, dominates the state, the formal apparatus of government, but also extends well beyond the state in its control of the economy (as a corporate elite) and of the culture (the structures of ideological formulation, education, and mass communications). In both the original and the reformulated versions of the theory, the behavior of the managerial elite is largely determined by its consciousness of its power interests and its pursuit of those interests, and its ideology is constructed by a managerial intelligentsia (academics, journalists, think tank verbalists, etc.) to justify its interests.

Gottfried's work, by contrast, owes little to elite theory, and he seldom speaks of a "managerial elite" or "managerial class" at all. Instead, his discussion focuses almost exclusively on the state itself. Large corporations, unions, foundations, mass media, and schools and universities play far less of a role in his model of managerial dominance than in Burnham's or mine, and his concept of what motivates the thinking and behavior of those who control the managerial state is also radically different.

Secondly, and consistent with his abandonment of elite theory, Gottfried's usage of the term "managerial state" itself is quite different from that of the Burnhamite school. In the latter, much as in classical Marxism, the state is largely the "executive committee" of the ruling class—in Marx's case, the capitalist bourgeoisie; in the Burnhamite case, the managerial bureaucracy,

which is closely wedded to the corporate and cultural managers. In the absence of the elite theory concept, however, Gottfried's "managerial state" appears almost spontaneously, merely as the product of liberal ideology combined with political ambition. For Gottfried, the "managerial state" seems to be mainly a synonym for what a Goldwater conservative of the 1960s would have called "big government"—the centralized federal government that regulates the economy, dishes out welfare and special benefits to selected constituencies, and overrides state, local, and private authorities as vaguely defined "mandates" or "social needs" dictate—but neither the interests of the elite that runs the state nor those of sister elites with which it is allied seem to constitute significant driving forces for its behavior and policies. There is therefore little connection between Gottfried's usage of the term "managerial" and the special sense in which Burnham developed the concept of "manager"—specifically, one who holds power through proficiency in modern technical and managerial skills.

Those who hold such skills are able to dominate the state, the economy, and the culture because the structures of these sectors of modern society require technical functions that only specially skilled personnel can provide. The older elites simply lack those skills and eventually lose actual control over the key institutions of modern mass society. As the new, managerial elites take over, society is re-configured to reflect and support their interests as a ruling class—interests radically different from those of the older elites. Generally, the interests of the new managerial elites consist in maintaining and extending the institutions they control and in ensuring that the needs for and rewards of the technical skills they possess are steadily increased, that society become as dependent on them and their functions as possible.

Little of this analysis is apparent in Gottfried's discussion, however, and it is never entirely clear why he is using the term "managerial state" at all or what the relationship between his usage and that of Burnham is. Indeed, the bulk of his second volume is concerned with how and why the "managerial state" evolves into what he now calls the "therapeutic state," which undertakes "therapeutic" functions intended to "cure" the pathologies of bourgeois society—its "racism," "sexism, "homophobia," etc.—and which adopts what is now called generally "multiculturalism" as its dominant ideology. Whereas the old "managerial state" was concerned principally with the public administration of material welfare, the new therapeutic state is concerned mainly with the instillation of "correct" mental and psychological attitudes and behavior.

> Social guilt, antifascist education, and the search for subterranean prejudice are integral to the moral mission of European politicians and intellectuals as much as it is for their American preceptors. The mental cleansing that European sensitizers desire must go so deep that it can never be brought to completion. The road is indeed everything, but on the never-ending road toward the unattainable goal, the prescribed reeducation warrants a draconian control over citizens, who remain susceptible to old ways. (p. 10)

As Gottfried demonstrates, adopting therapeutic functions does not mean that older managerial functions vanish or significantly diminish, despite the claims of neo-conservative champions of "democratic capitalism" that "socialism has died" or the "era of big government is over."

But while it is clear that the therapeutic functions have been added onto the older ones, it is not so clear that the "therapeutic" state is as fundamentally different as Gottfried seems to claim. "Therapy," after all, is merely one kind of technical skill that more recent managers have adopted and applied as an instrument of power and social control. The metaphor of a "sick society" that requires therapy is indeed more recent than the older managerial one centered on the idea of "social engineering," but the concept of "therapy" does not deviate from that of a technically skilled class (even if the skills are largely pseudo-scientific) asserting hegemony over the rest of society. "Therapy," in other words, is merely the current codeword by which the managerial class rationalizes its dominance over other social and political forces and especially its claim to reconstruct the human mind itself through the manipulation of emotions, attitudes, and social relationships. Even though the new therapeutic regime reaches much further into the psychic and social roots of behavior to inculcate submission, it is not essentially different from the Burnhamite concept of managerial totalitarianism. It should be recalled that Orwell based *1984* on Burnham's work, and the consummate achievement of therapeutic managerialism in that novel is the engineering of love for Big Brother, at the expense of all other human affective relationships. Brainwashing masked as "therapy" was thus by no means unknown to the older apostles of managerial domination.

Yet Gottfried's "managerial" or "therapeutic" state by itself seems to be harmless enough; its drive toward tyranny does not, in his view, derive from its own structure or the interests of its controlling elite. If we could somehow take out the ideology, change the minds of those who control the state, and convert them into paleo-conservatives, the state apparatus itself would be neutral. What really animates its drive toward a totalitarian conquest and reconfiguration of society and the human mind itself comes from the ideology that the masters of the managerial state have adopted, a force that is entirely extraneous and largely accidental to the structure by which they exercise power. In Gottfried's view, this ideology derives from and is largely identical to what he calls "Liberal Protestantism."

As Gottfried writes, "A religious worldview gives direction to the managerial state's progress toward a therapeutic regime concerned with the self-esteem of victims. This worldview is liberal Protestantism, understanding that term in the current sense and not in the way it might have been taken in the past" (i.e., not as a movement to adapt Protestant theology to modern scientific and political trends so much as a theologically based ethic demanding recognition of and collective repentance for such "sins" as "racism," "sexism," "homophobia," "anti-Semitism," etc.).

Gottfried is no doubt correct to point to recent expressions of guilt and guilt-mongering among various Protestant theologians in Europe and the United States, but there are two major problems with his use of such maunderings as an adequate explanation for the practices of the managerial state. In the first place, he fails to establish any significant connection between this body of theological thought, on the one hand, and actual members of the managerial elite (or administrators of the managerial state, if you will), on the other. The closest he comes is a brief account of a speech by ex-President Bill Clinton not long after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in which Mr. Clinton spoke of the collective responsibility of the West for atrocities committed against the Moslem world going back to the Crusades. That sort of rhetoric is common enough, of course, and it may in fact derive from what Gottfried means by "liberal Protestantism." But there is little reason to take anything Bill Clinton says very seriously except as an expression of his own personal and political interests, and no reason to think that serious feelings of guilt derived from liberal Protestantism really animate the managerial class as a whole.

In the second place, such expressions are by no means limited to Protestants or to liberal Protestants. As Gottfried acknowledges, the so-called "Christian Right" is not exactly immune from emoting about the "sins" of "racism," and groups like Promise Keepers (before its collapse) specialized in "overcoming guilt" and actually promoted interracial marriage. Gottfried also cites a rhetorical belly crawl over Christian guilt for anti-Semitism by Christian Coalition director Ralph Reed before the Anti-Defamation League in 1995 as illustrating that "the politics of atonement has spilled over to the American Christian Right, the side of the religious spectrum where one might think it would be hardest to find." But such performances do not derive from the kind of liberal Protestant theology of sin and guilt that Gottfried is talking about. They are more likely either a kind of public theater intended to avoid charges of "racism" and "insensitivity," or else reflections of the real guilt experienced by various religious neurotics and oddwads who compose the leadership of the "Christian Right."

For that matter, Pope John Paul II in the last few years has taken up the habit of crawling about on his hands and knees in a protracted apologetic to Protestants (for the Inquisition), Jews (for "The Holocaust"), Moslems (for the Crusades), and even Eastern Orthodox Greeks (for "intolerance"). Whatever the meaning of "liberal Protestantism," guilt is hardly confined to it, but again there seems to be no special linkage between feeling such guilt or acknowledging its legitimacy and the policies of the managerial state. While Gottfried argues, perhaps accurately enough, that Protestantism harbors inherent tendencies toward guilt and repentance for sin and the rejection of social hierarchies and authority in favor of individualism, he also tends to ignore the profoundly conservative and anti-liberal Protestant heritages of the American South, the pre-twentieth century Church of England, Prussian

Lutheranism, and South African Calvinism, among other expressions of Protestantism that fail to suit modern managerial ideological needs. What he seems to have identified is not so much "liberal Protestantism" as "liberalism" itself, which rejects authority and hierarchy explicitly, has succeeded in permeating virtually all Christian sects in the course of the last century, and has evolved into what the late Revilo Oliver dubbed the "succedaneous religion" of the modern West that leads it to racial and cultural suicide. There is no special reason to blame Protestantism for this development and less reason to blame it than other forces.

Searching for such forces that help animate the managerial-therapeutic state's war on Western culture, we should extend our inquiries to other religious and ethnic formations besides those of Protestants. If we are looking for the sources of the collective consciousness of "sins" such as "racism," "sexism," etc. and the systematic, politically enforced reconfiguration of American society, then the Jewish role in promoting racial egalitarianism, promoting feminism and subverting male social roles, instilling collective guilt, promoting mass immigration, and pushing multiculturalism (through Franz Boas and his disciples in anthropology, the civil rights movement, Freudian psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt School, any number of Marxist and New Left movements, Jewish feminist ideologues like Betty Friedan, Gloria Steinem, and Susan Sontag, pro-immigration lobbying by Jewish "public interest" groups and individual political figures, and the major architect of multiculturalism, Horace Kallen, not to mention the largely Jewish "neo-conservatism" of recent years) can hardly be ignored. Gottfried, however, does ignore it almost entirely, though he gives a casual and not very complimentary nod to Kevin MacDonald's work, which he characterizes in a footnote as "methodologically uneven but occasionally illuminating." (p. 42, n. 5; and see also p. 15, n. 21) In short, even if we grant, as Gottfried seems to think, that the managerial elite has no inherent tendency to wage war on traditional Western institutions and values and even if we resort to extraneous forces such as religious and theological movements, there are any number of such forces present in modern society that are at least as plausible as the "liberal Protestantism" Gottfried accuses.

Finally, Gottfried argues that "a transformation of the self-image of the majority population would have had to take place in order for the therapeutic state to have reached its present strength," and it is the "altered religious consciousness that has affected Protestant majorities in the United States and in other Anglophone countries" that has brought about this transformation. Yet he also points out the "catastrophic" (his word) decline in mainline Protestant church membership and attendance and remarks that "More and more of the 58 percent of the American population consisting of churched Protestants are joining Fundamentalist and Evangelical denominations" in

protest of the liberalization of the mainstream churches. In other words, American Protestants, so far from having their religious consciousness altered by liberal Protestantism, are in fact fleeing it.

Moreover, it is not to my perception true that any "transformation of the self-image of the majority population" has taken place at all or that such a transformation is necessary for the dominance of the managerial state, even if the managerial state today is granted the power Gottfried attributes to it. Challenging the possibility of a nationalist, populist political reaction against the managerial regime, Gottfried remarks that "nothing connected to American nationalist politics resonates as strongly as the concern registered in polls about 'fighting discrimination in the workplace.' Not even quotas and affirmative action in education, issues that engage the entire American Right, have aroused a national opposition as noticeable as what is counterpoised on the other side." (pp. 116-17)

The main foundations for these claims that the bulk of the American population now embraces the anti-discrimination policies of the liberal managerial state (as well as mass immigration) are various opinion polls that Gottfried adduces, including one from 2000 showing that 53 percent of the public approves of the federal government "guarding against discrimination in hiring." But opinion polls often show different attitudes at different times, depending on how the questions are asked, and a mere 53 percent approval of what is an essential function of the managerial-therapeutic state is actually somewhat encouraging. Virtually all polls up to 2000 showed solid majorities favoring reduced immigration, but Gottfried uses one from that year that reported only 45 percent of the public favoring reduction as the basis of his claim that "a majority of Americans have become benignly indifferent to or positive about the government's immigration policy." (p. 144) Yet only four pages later he cites a Roper poll of 1996 that showed that 83 percent of the public favored reduced immigration. More recent polls since the 9/11 attacks have shown that a majority again favors reduction. It is likely that most respondents answer such polling questions not after long and deep reflection on and study of public issues but on the basis of vague associations, implanted images, and exposure to mounds of carefully selected information and misinformation about issues like race, affirmative action, and immigration. How reliable any polls on such issues can be for divining what "most" Americans "really" believe is questionable.

Yet in any case, it is not at all clear that Gottfried's assumption that such a transformation of the majority population is necessary for a therapeutic state to function is true. Elites and states function continuously in most societies, imposing policies to which most citizens have not actually consented and do not even understand. The manufacture and manipulation of "consent" by elites skilled in propaganda and public relations is the foundation of what the state does, not what its citizens really support. Indeed, if Gottfried were correct

in his analysis—that a majority of the population, influenced by their religious persuasions, has accepted the legitimacy and necessity of "curing" themselves and their institutions of various repressive pathologies—he would have largely removed most grounds for objecting to what is going on. If most Americans support multiculturalism, why object to it?

Gottfried's reliance on liberal Protestantism as the animating force behind the managerial-therapeutic state's war on traditional culture is one of the two main flaws in his thesis. The other main flaw in his argument is his conviction that the managerial state and those who run it are not driven so much by what he calls "calculation" of self-interest on the part of the elite as by "a Protestant culture of social guilt and of individuals ashamed of their collective past." Such irrational motivations no doubt are always operative in any social or political group, but reaching for irrationalist explanations is never as persuasive as looking for perfectly rational reasons why an entire class thinks and behaves the way it does.

In the case of the managerial class in the Burnhamite analysis, such reasons are not hard to locate. The managerial elite as a whole shares a vested interest in making sure that political, economic, and cultural organizations are dependent on the skills that only the elite possesses. Unlike earlier elites in history, the managerial class does not depend on the transmission of property, power, or status through the family but on skills that cannot be inherited or passed on. Hence, institutions such as large accumulations of private property and the family are relatively unimportant to it. So are the specific identities that multiculturalism combats. As Burnham argued, the reach of managerial power is transnational and supranational; national boundaries, sovereignties, and identities present mainly obstacles to managerial power, and Burnham explicitly predicted the managerial movement away from traditional nation-states and toward supranational organization. For much the same reason, the managerial class is at best indifferent and actually hostile to most other specific identities such as those derived from class, ethnicity and race, religion, region, and gender. Managerial power is heightened by the eradication of such identities and by the triumph of a universalist ideology and ethic that celebrates such abstractions as "humankind."

Movements like "multiculturalism," which ostensibly defends the legitimacy of many different cultural and ethnic identities, would seem to be the opposite of the abstract universalism that the managerial system prefers, but in fact the main social and political function of multiculturalism as it is deployed in schools and government policies today is to undermine white, Christian, male-oriented, bourgeois values and institutions—those, in other words, that remain the principal institutional constraints on managerial reach and power. Despite a good deal of play with such ethnic heritages as those of American Indians, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, etc., the real "cultural" bonds that discipline these different groups are those created and deployed by the managerial regime—through government

bureaucracy, educational manipulation, mass routinization by the economy of managerial capitalism, and disciplining by the mass media. Managerial elites can clearly afford to patronize tribal, often paleolithic, practices such as musical styles, clothing, cuisine, and religious rituals; there is little danger that such folkways will seriously interfere with real managerial control and interests, and the elite neither expects nor desires them to do so. The main use of such diversions is to embarrass and discredit their Western counterparts as repressive, genocidal, boring, and uncreative, not really to elevate primitive and Third World cultural strains into the dominant culture created and controlled by the managerial class. The multiculturalist ideology promoted by the managerial regime is supposed to remain subordinate to and controlled by the "color-blind" universalism and egalitarianism that the regime also sponsors.

Yet Gottfried's analysis, despite the flaws on which I have perhaps dwelled too much, remains a compelling one, and we can agree that even if "liberal Protestantism" is not the major animating force in the managerial regime, it is certainly capable of providing an influential ideological rationale and justification for managerial guilt-mongering, especially in cultural regions where a Protestant heritage remains prevalent. We can agree also that while the "managerial state" is by no means the only structure constructed and deployed for the pursuit of managerial power, it is the major one, and increasingly in both Europe and the United States, cultural and economic control and manipulation of mass society are dependent on the state itself. There are therefore points of congruence between Gottfried's analysis of "managerial" power and that of Burnham.

Gottfried concludes his book with a warning that the multiculturalist and immigration policies of the managerial state may well be undermining its own power and the stability of the system it dominates (this is a major element in his argument that managerial policies reflect irrational motives rather than rational interests). Thus, the managerial state

> will not benefit and may destroy that [managerial] order if the culture shifts in ways that diminish its control. If a certain kind of multiculturalism may have that effect, reasoning leaders will try to prevent it from destabilizing society. This has not happened with immigration: Short-term gain and ideological commitment have both driven the managerial class and its media and academic priesthood toward "empowering" those who live parasitically on multicultural institutions. Hispanic racialists, Third World patriarchs, and Mexican irredentists will likely eat up the present regime, if given the demographic chance. What will then ensue will not be a return to what the managerial state supplanted. At most a precarious truce may be struck, before the advocates of group rights resume their competition for power. (p. 147)

Of course, the managerial class would have a ready answer—that the Balkanizing forces against which Gottfried warns will themselves eventually be assimilated into the managerial stewpot, that managerial techniques of

social control will neutralize any such forces, that Gottfried exaggerates them anyway, and that anyone who mentions such problems is probably a "xenophobe," if not an outright "racist." Nevertheless, Gottfried has an entirely valid and indeed powerful point, that the dynamic of managerial power undermines its own regime. In particular, what he is alluding to in this passage is the emergence of a non-white and indeed anti-white racial consciousness among the immigrant populations and subcultures (though by no means confined to them) that does not yet fit into the managerial superculture and which has emerged in the course of the last century as an entirely independent force, the "rising tide of color," the rebirth of non-white and anti-white racial consciousness on a mass scale.

As noted, it is of course the conceit of the managerial class that eventually the threat of Balkanization that such consciousness and the population streams that carry it will be "assimilated" into the superculture through application of its universalist policy of "color-blindness" and the disciplines of economic reward and that they present no long-term threat. What Gottfried is suggesting is that the emergence of Third World racial consciousness cannot be assimilated, that it is impervious to managerial bribery and manipulation, and that it presents a far more serious threat to the stability and functioning of the managerial regime than the masters of the regime realize or—given their ideology—are able to understand.

"Thinking these leaders govern through calculation disregards the fantasy aspect of their vision," he writes on his last page. Perhaps so, though interest and the greed and lust for power that it engenders can blind ruling classes just as easily as fantasies. While Paul Gottfried has analyzed the irrational and fantasy aspects of managerial power admirably, he fails to dwell sufficiently on the obvious truth that no elite can come to power or remain in power unless its ideology and behavior allow for a considerable amount of accurate calculation of its power interests. The managerial class that has now become the dominant force in American and European societies is at least as calculating as any other in human history, and its power cannot be fully or accurately understood without grasping this truth.

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Good Guys or Bad Guys?

Contemporary Voices of White Nationalism in America

Edited by Carol M. Swain & Russ Nieli
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002
298 pp.

$55.00

Reviewed by Louis Andrews

In July 2002, the Cambridge University Press released Carol M. Swain's book *The New White Nationalism in America: Its Challenge to Integration*. The book is based on a series of interviews of so-called "white nationalists" conducted by her associate, Russ Nieli. The promise was that a book of the interviews themselves would be released within several months, but the release date by Cambridge University Press kept being bumped back a few months at a time. *Contemporary Voices of White Nationalism in America* finally appeared in March 2003. One wonders why there was a delay at all, since the interviews had been completed long before. A quick examination shows that the first 83 pages, fully thirty percent of the book, are actually an introductory essay telling the reader why the interviewees are not only wrong, but dangerous, an obvious effort to reduce the impact of the 192 pages of interviews that follow. This reviewer suspects that the delay in the release date was due to the fine-tuning of this introductory essay to provide as good a foil to the white nationalists as possible. (While the term white nationalist is not perfect and carries a lot of baggage, it is nevertheless the one used to identify those whites concerned about white survival in a pro-integrationist world, so we will use it here.)

This book contains ten interviews, all conducted by phone between November 1999 and May 2000, by Nieli, a lecturer at Princeton and co-editor of the book. As Robert S. Griffin noted in his review of Swain's *The New White Nationalism* in the Fall 2002 issue of *The Occidental Quarterly*, there is no evidence that prior to publication of that book Swain had actually met face to face with any white nationalist figure of regional or national importance. One might say the same of Nieli. Again, one wonders why. The national

conferences held by the first interviewee, Jared Taylor of *American Renaissance*, are open affairs which at least half of those interviewed in *Contemporary Voices* have attended several times or more; three of them have been conference speakers. The issue of race would not have been a deterrent since non-whites have attended all five *American Renaissance (AR)* conferences held to date. Despite their lack of direct personal contact with any of their subjects, Swain and Nieli have no difficulty in spending 83 pages discussing why all of them are not only bad, but dangerous, people.

The ten range from the well known and readily available, such as Jared Taylor, who has appeared on Crossfire, Donahue, Buchanan and Press, and elsewhere on television, to the obscure, such as Lisa Turner or Reno Wolf, with neither of whom this reviewer was familiar.

In noting the differences between what they call "the older white nativist" organizations of prior years and those of the interviewees, the editors make the following remarkable statement:

> What makes some of the newer organizations so dangerous, we believe, is that they address many important issues of race and nationality that are often ignored in polite company, and they do so with a degree of candor and openness not found in more mainstream discourse.

One hardly knows what to say. Addressing issues with candor and openness makes organizations dangerous? A few sentences down the page we learn that it is not the *white nationalists'* "candor and openness" that is the problem, but the lack of candor and openness of the mainstream media that makes them dangerous. Why? Because the mainstream refuses to address these issues with the same degree of honesty, the editors wrongly infer that the result is a closed group or groups of white activists to whom systematic refutation of false information is unavailable. A little attention to detail would have informed the authors that Jared Taylor invited a newspaper publisher hostile to *American Renaissance* to address the 1996 *AR* conference in Louisville, and that participants there and elsewhere have often been critical of one another's ideas on race. In addition, a review of the over 150 issues of *AR* published to date would have revealed *AR*'s readiness to give space to criticism and opposing views on a variety of topics touching on race.

The editors' real problem is that their vision for America and the world is at odds with the more realistic views on race of the interviewees.

> We think it of utmost importance that many of the topics that are now discussed openly only within the province of the racialist right be taken up and seriously addressed by more moderate voices who have not lost faith in the older ideal of an integrated America.

Older ideal? Their "older ideal" is a profoundly new idea, one increasingly doubted or even rejected as possible even by mainstream writers. Benjamin Schwarz, writing in the May 1995 *Atlantic Monthly*, observed, "[T]he struggle to make one nation of America's original two 'black and white' is an enterprise that might never succeed, and that America's founders did not believe was

possible." (So much for the "older ideal.") Tom Wicker, a lifelong integrationist and longtime *New York Times* political columnist, in the mid-1990s wrote a book entitled *Racial Integration: The Tragic Failure,* in which he reviewed the last forty years of race relations in the United States. Wicker noted

> [V]irtually all black leaders of the fifties and sixties and Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Nixon and Carter assumed that if African-Americans were assured the vote and of their right to hold public office, all else would follow. As a journalist I shared that idea; full political citizenship for African-Americans would make a reality of the ideals of economic and social equality.

With overwhelming sadness, Wicker now admits that they were all wrong, that the expected results simply did not come to pass. Racial integration was and is a tragic failure. We are still, as described by Andrew Hacker's memorable title, "two nations, black and white."

Rather amazingly, Swain and Nieli write that the reason the white nationalists "have such little exposure to alternative viewpoints is because of the overall feebleness and self-censorship that continues to dominate discussion about controversial racial issues in America." Are we to believe that the white nationalists are somehow cut off from radio, television, and the print media—all of which are 99.999 percent in support of the editors' integrationist dreams? No, this can hardly be the case. The integrationist arguments are there for everyone; it is only the white nationalists' arguments that are not heard by the mainstream. So the editors have things exactly backwards: It is the egalitarian, integrationist arguments that go untested by the mainstream, not the white nationalist arguments by their proponents.

The editors, to be sure, do acknowledge that, whatever the causes, group differences in abilities do exist.

> America as a cohesive, multiracial, multiethnic society can only endure if group differences…like individual differences, are perceived as a natural and inevitable result of diversity and freedom…. If differential achievement of this kind is allowed to become the basis for intergroup bitterness, hostility, and resentment, or if it gives rise to widespread paranoia and conspiracy thinking among the less-successful groups, then a pluralistic, multiracial, multiethnic society cannot endure. Under such circumstances, the pessimistic conclusions offered by ethnic separatists become inescapable….

As expected, the editors argue that these differences in abilities are probably not genetic, but at least they acknowledge them, as well as the logic of the white nationalists' arguments given the nationalists' view of human nature.

> What we are saying is that important data and evidence is available that is more supportive of an environment-dominant view of black/white racial differences than of any genetic-based theory, and that this evidence is rarely if ever given its due in white nationalist discourse on these matters.

One wonders what planet the editors inhabit. As one who has studied race differences and ethnic conflict for forty years, I cannot recall any such "data and evidence," important or not, from Stephen J. Gould's "reification" to the

"Flynn Effect," that hasn't been considered and thoroughly dissected by race-realists. The editors cannot have read interviewee Michael Levin's *Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean* and make their claim while maintaining a straight face: Levin spends page after page addressing every conceivable piece of "important data and evidence" that the egalitarian integrationist folks have put forward.

The editors then address the supposed widespread anti-Jewish bias of many white nationalists (two of the ten interviewees are Jewish professors). They asked Levin, of the City College of New York:

> You are a Jew, and the views you express on race are most usually expressed by whites who dislike Jews as much as they dislike blacks. Does this make you uncomfortable?
>
> LEVIN: No, no. I get a little impatient with Jews myself. After all, egalitarianism has been mostly an idea associated with Jews in the twentieth century, and if you look at those who attack the current data on race and try to pooh-pooh it and dismiss it, it tends to be almost entirely Jewish.

The editors note that Jews "would virtually dominate what became known in the mid-1970s as the 'neo-conservative' movement" in addition to their widespread support for egalitarian leftist causes, such as immigration, and end their essay with a comment that Jews do not all "speak in a single voice." This is another case of the editors setting up a straw man to demolish, as there is no claim by anyone interviewed that Jews speak in a single voice.

Swain and Nieli group the interviewees into four sections. The sections are designed to move from the "White Rights Advocates"—Jared Taylor, Reno Wolfe, and Michael Levin—to the "White Nationalism and White Separatism" group including Don Black, David Duke, and Michael H. Hart, and then finish with the "White Supremacy and Neo-Nazism" group, containing Matt Hale, Lisa Turner, and the late William Pierce. A section on "White Christianity" includes a single interview, with Dan Gayman. A number of the interviews are of interest and worth reading, and there is a surprising unanimity of views on many topics, considering the wide range of individual beliefs.

The editors give the most space (about 15 percent each) to Jared Taylor and Dan Gayman. Their focus on Taylor is understandable as he is the most influential of those interviewed, but Gayman is a mystery. I suspect that Swain, as a recent convert to evangelical Christianity, found his vision of Anglo-Israelism particularly interesting, even though he is virtually unknown and has little influence outside of his church, the Church of Israel in Schell City, Missouri.

Contemporary Voices begins with the Taylor interview. The editors seem particularly interested in Taylor's monthly periodical *American Renaissance* and its philosophy, mission, and the type of people who write for and read

it. Taylor notes that "the major assumption that underlies the positions that *American Renaissance* takes is that race is important and race matters, and it's folly to try to build a society on the assumption that it can be made not to matter." After telling Nieli that *AR* has a number of black subscribers, Taylor observes:

> When I talk to Americans about racial consciousness and about the legitimacy of racial consciousness, blacks understand this much more readily than whites because they themselves *have* racial consciousness, and they have group interests that they make no bones about expressing and advancing. It's whites for whom the idea of racial consciousness has been turned into something that is, if not irrelevant, then even loathsome. Because blacks understand their own racial interests, they find it much more straightforward to imagine that whites can have racial interests, and I think that gives them an interest in what racially conscious whites may be thinking.

AR readers tend to be male, mostly in their forties, college educated, and to have above-average income. Most are conservative and about half are Christians. The monthly has been published since November 1990, beginning in Menlo Park, California, then migrating eastward until finally settling in Oakton, Virginia, a suburb of Washington, D.C.

Taylor sees multiracialism as inherently flawed, and thus inevitably beset with race problems.

> I think the greatest set of problems having to do with race is simply inherent to multiracialism. There has never been a multiracial society on the face of the earth in which there was not racial friction, and in fact the most stable multiethnic … societies that I can think of have been ones in which there was some kind of quite firm hierarchy of different groups … once that hierarchical relationship disappears, you find them in conflict. This is a fairly reliable pattern that you see around the world.

He argues that society is actually teaching blacks to hate whites since blacks are constantly being told that the reasons for their relative lack of success are rooted in white oppression or white maliciousness. Taylor also emphasizes what he calls "one of the essential rights of an Englishman," the right of the refusal to deal with someone or the freedom of association. Once whites gave that up (in the name of superior morality), it was all downhill.

After Nieli suggests that many people would consider *AR* "a racist publication," Taylor notes that the views on race expressed in *AR* are very much like those of every president until John Kennedy, and thus there is no good word (and certainly not a pejorative one) to describe the views, since they were just a matter of common sense and virtually universally held.

Almost every interviewee was asked about Martin Luther King, Jr., and their responses were remarkably similar in many respects. Taylor suggests that King is "as close to a secular saint" as we have. And in an interesting comparison he notes:

> I don't know if you recall when it was learned that he had plagiarized his Ph.D. thesis and in fact plagiarized quite a few things that he had written. This fact was sedulously kept from the public, and even when the press learned of this,

> American newspapers refused to publish it…. Now contrast that, if you will, with the ill-concealed glee with which the press reported on the DNA analysis that reported that Thomas Jefferson could well have been the father of Sally Hemmings's third son. I think the contrast is astonishing.

In Taylor's opinion, Martin Luther King was a black hero, not a national hero. King did what he did because he was looking out for the interests of blacks, not of whites, and cannot be faulted for that. Whites can and should be faulted, however, for buying into a system that will inevitably result in a nation where whites "lose their majority and their culture."

Concerning social systems in multiracial societies, Taylor is clear about the relationship of justice to such systems.

> Now, I do not defend the hierarchical arrangement that prevailed in the United States before the civil rights movement. I think it was an inevitable consequence of trying to build a society that was multiracial and a society in which this biologically salient fact had to be dealt with. Slavery was unjust, apartheid was unjust, Jim Crow was also unjust, but I think our prevailing situation is likewise unjust.

Nieli points out that many whites supported King, and Taylor responds that this was because they found appeal in a belief that race could be transcended, just as the communists found appeal in the belief that self-interest could be transcended. Yet both attempts at transcendence are contrary to human nature, and nothing but problems will come from attempting either.

The next interview is with Reno Wolfe, who founded the National Association for the Advancement of White People in 1998. It is apparently an Internet-based organization of little current importance. We will skip over that interview, to move to Michael Levin, the last of the "white rights advocates" interviewed.

Levin is the author of *Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean,* published by Praeger in 1997 (not 1998, as Swain and Nieli state). Anyone who has spent time with this book will recognize that Levin, a philosophy professor, is a power to be dealt with on race differences. Levin's central point, which he makes early on, is that

> [T]he reason whites do better than blacks, and all such judgments are comparative, is simply that whites are more intelligent and have certain traits of temperament which conduce to long-run success, and these differences are genetic in origin. These differences are not the fault of whites, they're not something that whites did to blacks, and they are not something for which whites owe blacks compensation.

Michael Levin also argues that whites and blacks differ in their relative levels of fairness and cooperation and that this attribute, like most race differences, is based in biology and related to the climate and conditions under which the separate races developed. Thus there is an essential difference in moral outlook between the two groups, which shows up in social issues such

as illegitimacy. In addressing the claim that he is a "white supremacist," Levin responds that he doesn't believe that whites have a God-given right to rule, but just that, given the race differences, they will. The interview is a good introduction to Levin's thought but doesn't hold a candle to his book.

The next section is about a group Swain and Nieli call "white separatists," and consists of interviews with Don Black, David Duke, and Michael H. Hart. While the interviews with Black and Duke are interesting, the one with Hart is the longest and the only one that actually lays out a specific proposal on how and why separate nations for whites and blacks in the United States should and could be accomplished (see http://LRAINC.COM/swtaboo/taboos/mhhart01.html).

Michael H. Hart is something of a polymath, with advanced degrees in law, astrophysics, and computer science. He has authored several books on a variety of topics, from astronomy to perhaps the most interesting, *The 100: A Ranking of the Most Influential Persons in History*, which has been translated into numerous languages.

Hart's interest in racial matters grew out of both his Jewishness and his being classified as a white American.

> [I]n my earlier years I was frequently discriminated against. Some institutions had quotas against Jews…. But later, when I became older, I was told that in order to make up for the privileges I had in the past there should be a new set of quotas and preferences put in operation against me. Quite naturally, I grew to resent this. In addition … I — and the whole group to which I belonged — was … being attacked as relentlessly racist.

Also, as a scientist, he was appalled by the censorship and self-censorship regarding any discussion of race differences. Hart makes the same point as Levin: that blacks are taught to hate whites by white support of claims of damage.

> This resentment is partially fueled by the message that blacks receive from the mainstream communication media. What the blacks hear from the media is essentially this: "You are inherently equal to whites in ability; however you are visibly much poorer. You have very few positions of power, and very few high-ranking jobs. This has been going on forever. It is completely unfair, and it is the result of white racism…." How can blacks possibly overcome hostility and resentment for past injustices when they are told that these injustices are continuing and are harming them drastically all the time?

Hart sees no way out other than partition. His proposal is unique in that it calls for not only separate white, black, and Hispanic states, but also for an integrationist state for those who continue to adhere to the dream of what has become Wicker's "tragic failure." Hart reasons that maintaining a white state would be impossible with a large number of white integrationists constantly trying to destroy it; thus having the integrationist state serves both the integrationists and the separatists. Better we adopt something like Raymond Cattell's Beyondist vision, in allowing numerous "experiments in living," many of which will fail, rather than running the risk or danger of losing everything because of some universalistic imperative.

Hart notes that a multiracial state damages whites in particular. Taxes are high to support the social problems of non-whites, schools and school standards are poor because of the non-whites who attend, and crime is far higher than it would be in an all-white state.

Michael Hart began as a liberal and notes that today there is far less freedom on campuses than even during the McCarthy era. Our racial tensions are not being reduced, but our liberties have been.

On diversity as a strength, Hart notes, "When newcomers assimilate, it is the *unity* which provides the strength, not the diversity. If they do not assimilate, all that diversity leads to is quotas, preferences, and interracial hostility and violence. And diverse groups most often do not assimilate." Nieli raises the point that some blacks are committed to transcending race, and so integration might work. Hart quashes this with a scene from the movie *Gandhi*.

> India is going to get its independence from England at long last, but the Muslims, led by Ali Jinnah, want a separate Muslim state, and Gandhi confronts him and says, "Why do you want a separate Muslim state?" And Ali Jinnah said, "Moslems will not be treated fairly in a country with a Hindu majority. There is too much resentment, and we will be discriminated against." Gandhi turns to him and says, "Ali Jinnah, you have known me for thirty years. Surely you don't think that I would discriminate against you or anyone else just because you are Moslems." And Ali Jinnah replies, "The world is not made up of Mahatma Gandhis."

Hart maintains that past non-partition strategies to handle multiracial states failed because they have tried to change human nature to fit the needs of government instead of changing government to fit human nature. Thus we should accept the inevitable and plan on partition, as a number of other countries he describes have already done to address ethnic conflict or even just to satisfy ethnic desire.

The last section of three interviews is entitled "White Supremacy and Neo-Nazism." The first two interviews are with Matt Hale, the *pontifex maximus* of the World Church of the Creator (WCOTC), and his associate Lisa Turner. Ben Klassen, who invented the electric can opener, founded the WCOTC in the 1970s and later committed suicide. Hale is now in jail, the WCOTC in disarray, and Turner is no longer associated with it, so we will skip ahead to William Pierce, who is far more interesting and important. The late William Pierce earned a Ph.D. in physics and was a college professor for years. (Robert S. Griffin's *The Fame of a Dead Man's Deeds*, a book-length introduction to the man, was reviewed in the Winter 2002/2003 issue of *The Occidental Quarterly*.) Pierce's transformation from physics professor to racial activist seems to have been the result of two trends of the 1960s that gave him a sense of alarm: first, the open expression of pro-Vietcong sentiment by many on campuses across America, and second, the civil rights revolution, i.e., the drive to integrate blacks into white society. To counter these trends, which he saw as destructive, as well as to get his own writings published, Pierce founded the National Alliance in the early 1970s. Its main goal was short term, education. He recognized that nothing could be accomplished toward his long-term goals of restructuring society without first changing the state of mind of thinking white people about their coming dispossession and eventual extinction.

In order to accomplish his educational goals, Pierce used the National Alliance to develop a monthly magazine, a weekly radio broadcast (today distributed via the Internet in both audio and text form), a publishing and book distribution enterprise, as well as a recent music recording business geared to his largely young clientele. Pierce is also well known as the author of several novels, including *The Turner Diaries*, written under a pseudonym. Whatever one might think of his views, Pierce is clearly a man who dedicated, at great personal cost, much of his time and talent to what he believes in strongly. While he was often accused of advocating violence, that is not really the case. In the interview he condemns violence, not because it is violent, but because it is counterproductive. If circumstances were different, then violent actions might be warranted. While some try to make much of this, it is not really different from the policy that has guided American patriots since the Boston Tea Party.

While the National Alliance is composed largely of the young, Pierce claims that it has about "seven times the percentage of academics…as exist in the general population." When asked about his vision for the future, he makes several points. First, he wants a white European America; second, one with strong nuclear families where mothers raise their own children. He supports immigration, as long as the immigrants are European (the same view our founding fathers held). Leftists will be surprised, but he does not support a segregated society as existed before the civil rights revolution.

> I think segregation is ultimately bad for society. I think we ought to cut our own grass, wash our own dishes, carry out our own garbage, take care of our own kids. I do not approve the separate but unequal societies that we had. I think blacks have to solve their own problems in their own parts of the world. So I certainly do not approve of the civil rights movement or the effect that it has had on our society.

In the summer of 2002, William Pierce discovered that he had terminal cancer and quickly organized an orderly transfer of leadership for the National Alliance. He died in late July 2002. It remains to be seen if the new divided leadership can continue, but after almost a year they seem successful.

Good guys or bad guys? Those interviewed range from brilliant promoters of race-realism and white nationalism to immature flakes whose existence only brings discredit to their movement and support for groups like the Southern Poverty Law Center. Buy the book; read the interviews; and follow your instincts as to who will likely be correct. Cambridge has also released a $20.00 paperback edition, so this might be a good book to buy for your friends and acquaintances whose knowledge of race-realism and white nationalism is derived from the one-sided presentation they find in the media.

Louis Andrews is a businessman and creator of the ***Stalking the Wild Taboo*** *website. He is also web editor/publisher and business manager of* ***The Occidental Quarterly****. Mr. Andrews has written for* ***Right Now!*** *as well as other publications and lives in Augusta, GA.*

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Darwin's Cathedral

Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society

David Sloan Wilson
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2002
$25.00 US

268 pp.

Reviewed by Richard Faussette

The preview on the inside cover of Darwin's Cathedral reads:

> One of the great intellectual battles of modern times is between evolution and religion. Until now, they've been considered completely irreconcilable theories of origin and existence. David Sloan Wilson's *Darwin's Cathedral* takes the radical step of joining the two, in the process proposing an evolutionary theory of religion that shakes both evolutionary biology and social theory at their foundations.
>
> The key, argues Wilson, is to think of society as an organism, an old idea that has received new life based on recent developments in evolutionary biology. If society is an organism can we then think of morality and religion as biologically and culturally evolved adaptations that enable human groups to function as single units rather than mere collections of individuals?
>
> David Sloan Wilson says we can. In his introduction, titled "Church as Organism," Wilson writes,
>
> "The purpose of this book is to treat the organismic concept of religious groups as a serious scientific hypothesis...."[1]

THE VIEW FROM EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY

Reading Wilson's avowed purpose and the claim on the inside front cover of his book that religion and science have been considered "completely irreconcilable theories of origin and existence," I wondered what had happened to make it so. As early as 1876, Herbert Spencer had written, "The social structure adapted for

dealing with surrounding hostile societies is under a centralized regulating system, to which all the parts are completely subject; just as in the individual *organism* the outer organs are completely subject to the chief nervous centre."[2]

Spencer also wrote of the "Ecclesiastical system as social bond":

> Among primitive men, the customs which stand in place of laws, embody the ideas and feelings of past generations; and, religiously conformed to as they are, exhibit the rule of the dead over the living… bodies of laws regarded as supernaturally given by the traditional god of the race, originating in the way shown, habitually tend to restrain the anti-social actions of the individuals towards one another, and to enforce concerted action in the dealings of the society with other societies: in both ways conducing to social cohesion… Ecclesiastical institutions maintain and strengthen social bonds, and so conserve the social aggregate; and they do this in large measure by conserving beliefs, sentiments, and usages which evolved during earlier stages of the society, are shown by its survival to have had an approximate fitness to the requirements, and are likely still to have it in great measure.[3]

As we see in these words of Herbert Spencer, the first great sociologist, and as David Sloan Wilson reminds us, the idea of a society as an organism is an old one. According to Wilson, due to recent advances in evolutionary biology, the idea of society as an organism has received new life, but then why did the idea die in the first place? Wilson gives us a clue by specifying a time frame.

> Evolutionary biologists in the 1960s rejected group selection so strongly that it became *heretical* to think of 'society as an organism'… for humans or any other species… the rejection of group selection was hailed by evolutionary biologists as a major event… the greatest intellectual revolution of the twentieth century.[4]

Perhaps the solution to the demise of group selection does not lie in evolutionary biology at all but in Isaac Newton's third law of motion, which states that for each action there is an equal and opposite reaction. In 1962, V. C. Wynne-Edwards published *Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior*, which stated that reproductive restraint enabled groups of individual organisms to avoid the disastrous population crashes that followed the exhaustion of available resources. The process was called group selection in contrast to individual selection because it assumed a certain degree of altruism on the part of individuals toward a group's survival. Genetic variations that did maximize breeding performance were eliminated by the extinction of the groups in which they arose. Wynne-Edwards' theory was so heavily documented it provoked an intense reaction and an immense amount of work resulting in some very important discoveries. David Lack, an ornithologist, soon persuasively argued that breeding restraint was illusory. W.D. Hamilton's brilliant concept of an individual's inclusive fitness stated that the more genes individuals share, the more likely they are to behave altruistically toward one another. "Hamilton's theory was a powerful idea solving problems of altruism and sterile sub populations that had been around since Darwin's time."[5] In this extraordinarily productive reaction to Wynne-Edwards' challenge; the significance of group selection was lost.

Wilson, however, says "The wholesale rejection of group selection was itself a wrong turn from which the field is only starting to recover."[6] Here he makes a number of significant statements that bode well for the future and bear repeating. He says:

> We must think of religious thought as something that coexists with scientific thought, not as an inferior version of it…. Even massively fictitious beliefs can be adaptive, as long as they motivate behaviors that are adaptive in the real world… Once the reasoning associated with scientific thought loses its status as the only adaptive way to think, other forms of thought associated with religion cease to be objects of scorn and incomprehension and can be studied as potential adaptations in their own right.[7]

Strict Darwinians had championed an age of individualism in a frenzied response to Wynne-Edwards' study of group selection. Natural selection, it seemed, now operated solely at the level of the individual, "…even to the extent of disrupting the cohesiveness of societies."[8] Wilson, in *Darwin's Cathedral*, resurrects the organismic concept of religious groups. He doesn't deny individual selection; he incorporates it. His basic argument is that "Natural selection is a multilevel process that operates among groups in addition to [operating] among individuals within groups."[9]

Concluding the view from evolutionary biology, Wilson expresses his belief that "Future generations will be amazed at the degree to which groups were made to disappear as adaptive units of life in the minds of intellectuals during the second half of the twentieth century."[10]

The View from the Social Sciences

As Wilson begins his analysis of the social sciences, I was not surprised to find him saying that "The demise of functionalism in the social sciences bears an eerie resemblance to the demise of multilevel selection theory in biology."[11]

More than once in the literature, I had found a great social scientist acknowledging an intellectual debt to Emile Durkheim. "Durkheim doubted that something as pervasive and influential as religion could be so dysfunctional. Early humankind lived too close to the edge of survival for such idle theorizing. Beliefs that failed to deliver practical benefits would soon be discarded in favor of more adaptive beliefs."[12] He became the dominant figure in French sociology.

> Durkheim was responsible for the attempt to develop a 'scientific' state-supported system of morality based on collective conscience and *organic solidarity*. Leon Bourgeois, premier of France from 1895 to 1896, regarded Durkheim's work as proof that Marxist class conflict could be avoided. In Durkheim's analysis, class struggle was a temporary pathology, and organic solidarity, not revolution, was the predictable outcome of industrialization.[13]

A criticism of functionalism and one reason for its demise was that its hypotheses were difficult to test. Evans-Pritchard summarized the problem: "Durkheim's thesis is more than just neat; it is brilliant and imaginative… But I am afraid that we must once more say that it is a just-so story."[14]

With Wilson's premise that morality and religion were biologically and culturally evolved adaptations, and despite the difficulty of bringing scientific rigor to the otherwise utilitarian perspective of the functionalists, I intuitively embraced functionalism. Just a bit farther along I encountered with trepidation an alternative to functionalism: rational choice theory. Its chief architect, Rodney Stark, was "so bitingly satirical that he seemed to deny functionalists the capacity for rational thought..."[15] To Stark, "All aspects of religion… [could] be understood on the basis of exchange relations between humans and supernatural beings."[16] To Wilson, Stark's theory ignored "the fundamental problem of social life and the role of religion in its solution."[17] I was perplexed at Stark's demeaning attitude toward functionalism while brandishing a metaphysical economics. In splendid contrast, "Durkheim interpreted religion as an adaptation that enables human groups to function as harmonious and coordinated units,"[18] which Wilson regards as "the central thesis of functionalism in the social sciences as it relates to religion."[19] Stark denied functionalism, but as Wilson points out, "Durkheim never denied cost-benefit religious reasoning."[20]

For Wilson, functionalism has a future. He says, "The worst that can be said about functionalism is that it failed to fulfill itself as a research program during its heyday."[21] But he adds:

> Functionalism wasn't falsified; it merely went out of fashion. Two major developments in intellectual thought may allow functionalism to succeed as a research program in the future, despite its past failures. The first is progress in evolutionary biology, which provides the foundation for functional explanations of all kinds… Advances include not only multilevel selection theory… but also the integration of ecology, evolution and behavior, the mature empirical study of adaptations and modern evolutionary approaches to human behavior. If evolution is the foundation of functionalism, then there is a new foundation upon which to build.
>
> The second major development is the unification of the human social sciences... All sub disciplines of the social sciences need to appreciate that functional explanations must be handled with care, and that group level functional explanations require the greatest care of all.[22]

If human groups "can be rigorously shown to function as adaptive units, that will be a major scientific accomplishment…Group-level adaptation is here to stay in evolutionary biology, and the human social sciences must follow suit to remain true to first principles."[23]

Calvinism – An Argument from Design

Wilson chooses "John Calvin's brand of Christianity as it was instituted in the city of Geneva in the 1530s" in his initial "attempt to understand a single religious community in relation to its environment from an evolutionary perspective."[24]

Agitation for the reform of the Church is almost as old as Christianity itself. Criticism of the Church increased steadily from the 14th to the 16th centuries, but the official hierarchy did little to address legitimate concerns, particularly the

abuses and venality of the clergy. Martin Luther, a professor at a German university, challenged some of the Church's practices and struck a responsive chord, convincing many that the Church needed a thorough reformation that would restore it to its original apostolic purity.

In the wake of Luther's posting of his Ninety-Five Theses on the church door of Wittenberg and the intellectual ferment that followed, John Calvin, a young French theologian and lawyer, wrote a book considered his greatest work, *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*. Calvin passed through the city of Geneva in 1536. Geneva had recently expelled the Roman Catholic Church as part of gaining independence from the Duchy of Savoy. Now politically independent, but still militarily dependent, split into many factions and socially disorganized, Geneva adopted John Calvin's plans for reform. Calvin set out to "unite the fractious city of Geneva into an effective corporate unit,"[25] just as Moses had delivered the Ten Commandments to a patchwork people only recently released from servitude. Calvin wrote a catechism that every inhabitant of Geneva had to study. Since Calvin's catechism represents "what the inhabitants of Geneva actually learned," Wilson says, "it presumably had the greatest impact on their behavior."[26]

Elements of Calvin's catechism of 1538:

1. Obey parents
2. Obey magistrates
3. Obey pastors
4. Abandon self-will
5. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
6. Behave as a single organism
7. Don't harm or kill your neighbor
8. No lewdness and sex only in marriage
9. No theft, either by violence or cunning
10. Don't swear false oaths
11. Don't bear false testimony
12. Pay taxes and perform other civic duties
13. Behave in a civil manner

The Ten Commandments forged a cohesive community, and Calvin's catechism defined the citizen's responsibilities toward the city of Geneva. The citizens were expected to behave in a manner that benefited the group, and their leaders were expected to behave responsibly at each level of the hierarchy. Although Calvin wrote, "Pastors may dare boldly to do all things by God's word" and "may compel all worldly power, glory, wisdom and loftiness to fall down and obey [God's] majesty," he warns, "let them turn aside from this to their own dreams and figments of their own brains, then they are no longer to be considered pastors but rather as pestilential wolves to be driven out."[27] Calvin's church is "designed to control the conduct of the shepherd as effectively

as the conduct of the flock."[28] Wilson points out that social control can be exerted from above through force or managed from within by religious beliefs such as Calvin's catechism that modified the behavior of the citizenry. He points out that internal social controls are more efficient because they are less expensive. One of Wilson's very important observations regards "turning the other cheek," often misunderstood as wanton and reckless forgiving. Calvin's catechism "provides a detailed procedure for punishing transgressions in which forgiveness is highly conditional *upon repentance*."[29]

"In the absence of a strong church or comparable social organization, individuals must maintain their own social order, which leads to a limited amount of cooperation at a small scale but also to feuds and rivalries that are dysfunctional at a larger scale."[30] Religious organizations allow larger groups to coordinate their functions more efficiently and suppress internal discord. Coordination and cohesion are particularly relevant for a group surrounded by competing groups, as in the case of the city of Geneva. The development of greater religious discipline in one group might also be expected to have a catalyzing effect on its competitors. Marvin Harris, the anthropologist, made such an observation regarding the steamroller effect of developing state systems:

> Once the state becomes a functional reality, its components resonate within a single gigantic amplifier. The more powerful the ruling class, the more it can intensify production, increase population, wage war, expand territory, mystify the peasants, and increase its power still further. All neighboring chiefdoms must either rapidly pass across the threshold of state formation, or succumb to the triumphant armies of the new social leviathan.[31]

People intuitively know that religious morality as embodied in Calvin's catechism is vital to the health of society. Ken Ham, the fundamentalist Christian, is lambasted because he espouses Creationism over evolutionary theory, but then Ham is a religious man whose primary concern is not for the physical sciences. He says:

> If Christian leaders have told the next generation that one can accept the world's teachings in geology, biology, astronomy, etc., and use these to (re)interpret God's Word, then the door has been opened for this to happen in *every* area, including morality.[32]

Ham's primary concern is not the age of the earth, but the viability of the Ten Commandments from which Calvin's catechism is drawn. Is he wrong? No. The belief system and social organization that Calvin founded based on Christianity "caused a city of roughly 13,000 souls to function more effectively than it ever did before. Indeed reform minded people from all over Europe flocked to Geneva to learn and export the secrets of its success."[33] Ken Ham champions Biblical morality because it is evolutionarily adaptive, but he doesn't know that. As a Christian fundamentalist he can't get past the religion he embraces to look at the science he rejects, just as a lapsed religionist can't get past the science he embraces to consider the irrational he rejects. Wilson says religious beliefs should be

considered from both rational and adaptive perspectives. If people are inclined to adaptive behaviors by a fear of God and their behaviors are truly adaptive, then the fear of God is adaptive, however irrational that belief may initially appear to an objective observer.

"Evolutionary theories of altruism and cooperation focus almost exclusively on cheating,"[34] and Calvinism had elaborate controls to prevent cheating, as predicted by evolutionary theory. Powerful Genevan families were just as subject to the censures of Calvin's church "as the most humble artisan and the evidence shows that decisions were meted out with impartial justice."[35] In addition, "Calvin's Ecclesiastical ordinances specified a decision-making structure, an educational system, a healthcare system, and a welfare system."[36] The city of Geneva "created the Geneva Academy, which eventually attracted students from throughout Europe. Training was so thorough that it was said that the boys of Geneva talked like Sorbonne doctors."[37]

With all these advantages, Wilson says Calvinism had a dark side, but I won't entertain it here for the following reason. Although Wilson says that "Calvin was not a paragon of virtue," he admits that Calvin's "moral failings occurred in exactly the contexts predicted by multilevel selection theory: social control within groups and conduct toward members of other groups."[38] If one is to achieve the kind of disciplined success of Calvin's Geneva, threats from within and threats from without must be countered as readily as they are encountered. After all, Wilson remarks: "The effect of Calvinism on Geneva was so profound that the city assumed an importance in world affairs out of all proportion to its economic significance… Calvinism caused its community of believers to behave adaptively in the real world, which is all that evolution can be expected to accomplish."[39]

The Secular Utility of Religion – Historical Examples

The Water Temple System of Bali

The first of Wilson's three examples that provide exceptionally clear evidence for what Durkheim called the secular utility of religion is the Water Temple System of Bali.

At the summit of a mountain in Bali is a crater lake from which the waters of Bali are said to emanate. Atop the mountain is a great temple. When it rains and water flows down the mountain a vast network of aqueducts channel the water to individual terraces planted with rice. Throughout this network, smaller temples and shrines are found around which the local inhabitants are organized for the system's maintenance, which consists primarily of orchestrating seasonal agricultural labors. "An aerial view of the rice terraces bears an eerie resemblance to the cells of a beehive or termite colony."[40] Each local group of agriculturalists has its own temple with its own deities and obligations within the larger system of the temple atop the mountain that adaptively relates all the groups to one another.

When Dutch scientists introduced the "green revolution" to Bali with its fast growing and high yielding rice varieties, Balinese farmers were required by law to plant them. This was the "major factor behind the yield and cropped

areas' declines experienced between 1982 and 1985."[41] Scientists were forced to conclude that the "water temple system was *close to optimal* at solving the trade off between water use and pest control."[42] Such hydraulic systems have been studied extensively. Ancient Egypt and the Mesopotamian basin both cradled hydraulic systems. Each developed a strong centralized religious component.

Here we find a now familiar and unfortunate anomaly. Though Wilson lauds the study by J.S. Lansing from which he draws his data on the water temple system of Bali, calling it "a jewel of scientific reasoning and methodology, providing powerful support for the organismic concept," he says that, "in the decade since its publication it has had no impact at all on the general debate over group selection in biology or functionalism in the social sciences."[43]

JUDAISM

"Two facts stand out," Wilson says, "about what the People of Israel, as depicted in the Hebrew Bible, were instructed to do by their religion. First, they were instructed to be fruitful and multiply… second, they were provided with two sets of instructions, one for conduct among themselves and one for conduct among other people."[44]

Wilson omits one salient fact. Biblical Jews were not only instructed to be fruitful and multiply, they were further instructed to marry well and to prize intelligence above all other human traits. Although Abraham abandons infanticide, it is Jacob, the usurper, who genetically weakens Laban's flocks while strengthening his own after he is tricked into marrying dull-eyed Leah. To accommodate quality birthing Wilson's second fact becomes his third fact and with all three facts, the steadfastly maintained genetic and cultural isolation of Judaism is comprehensible. Judaism is Wilson's first and only example of a religion with both a cultural *and* a biological component, a tribal religion with a reproductive strategy of quantity and quality birthing eminently open to evolutionary analysis.

Wilson goes on to make a statement that I will quote in full because it requires clarification:

> The fact that Jewish populations around the world are genetically more similar to each other than to the populations among which they reside therefore demonstrates an extraordinary degree of isolation achieved by cultural mechanisms. Especially interesting is the fact that Judaism opposed the biological interests of the most powerful members of the community men by restricting their ability to import women from elsewhere. The genetic data shows that these constraints were largely successful.[45]

Wilson is not denying that Jewish communities import and export women from elsewhere, but the exchanged women are specifically Jewish women. The men are only restricted from importing *non*-Jewish women. This is the tradition established by Abraham in Genesis when he finds Canaanite women morally

unsuitable and sends Eliezer to find the right bride for Isaac among the members of his family and the house of his father. In the Middle Ages, Jewish matchmakers or "shadkhan"

> Traveled from city to city in an intricate network of cross pollination, telling the father of a young man that a perfectly suited young lady had been discovered two hundred miles away… Jewish law recognized this aspect of the shadkhan's function and stipulated that he was to be paid a higher fee when the bride and groom [came] from widely separated communities. In this way he literally interrelated whole communities and provinces.[46]

There was also an additional consideration:

> From the days of the Talmud and for centuries thereafter, it was the headmasters of the Higher Torah Academies who were customarily asked to recommend eligible students for marriage. The reason is obvious. In addition to possessing the necessary moral qualifications, these rabbis were also intimately acquainted both with the elite young scholars who were considered the prize grooms and the leading families of the community who supported the communal institutions.[47]

"Matchmaking" elite young scholars with the daughters of the wealthiest entrepreneurs over many generations produced superior offspring. Prohibiting the importation of non-Jewish concubines into Jewish communities ensured that all of the community's resources went only to the offspring of those carefully arranged unions. In this way, superior lines were preserved and lavishly nurtured. Jewish men were prevented from importing non-Jewish women from surrounding populations because these non-Jewish women had not been carefully bred for generations. Though a Jewish man's short-term biological interests were opposed, due to the religious restrictions, his community's long-term evolutionary interests were served.

Wilson then enters Judaism's world of group interactions. He's working his way through a minefield, and it is at this point we might imagine Wilson perched precariously on one leg directly above a mine. He admits that Judaism gives religious Jewish communities an advantage in any endeavor that requires coordinated action, but to avoid the mine, he must abandon science for apologetics. He says that "anti-Semitism" is fueled by the accusation that Jews collaborate to deprive non-Jews of their resources. He goes on to say that Jewish conspiracy theories reach outrageous proportions that include blatant falsehoods.

Though earlier in his view from the social sciences, he stated that the integration of ecology with other recent developments in the study of human behavior would allow functionalism to succeed as a research program in the future, here he doesn't consider the fact that niche theory in ecology predicts that a peripatetic group religiously committed to a reproductive strategy of quantity and quality birthing is necessarily expansionist and covetous of the elite niches of any host civilization with

which it interacts. A host's God-given and quite natural predilection for the survival of its genetic identity, and not the moral failure of its ethos, is the true source of "anti-Semitism."

Wilson is resurrecting the organismic concept of religious groups, but in this particular instance, his case is woefully understated. Though he has cited the evolutionary psychologist Kevin MacDonald four times, he gives no indication that MacDonald in three volumes has brilliantly elucidated the evolutionary strategy of Judaism. Unfortunately, just as the organismic concept of religious groups, functionalism, and Lansing's work on the temple system of Bali have all suffered from the demise of group selection; MacDonald's prodigious effort has not received the public accolades it so richly deserves. Suffice it to say that this American professor, in true American style, has leveled the playing field by providing equal opportunity strategizing for all. A former tribal possession is rendered comprehensible and accessible to all the peoples of the world. Do you remember Wilson's prediction? If human groups "can be rigorously shown to function as adaptive units, that will be a major scientific accomplishment…."[48]

It has already been done.

The Early Christian Church

Wilson says Christianity can be studied with the same analytical tools as Judaism He rightly recognizes that the "central fact and interpretation of Christ's death makes altruism the defining feature of being Christian,"[49] solidifying Christian communities.

Christianity for the most part maintains the Levitical sexual prohibitions of Judaism. Consequently, part of the rise of Christianity, as Wilson suggests, can be attributed to reproductive success, pure and simple. He says Christianity stands alongside Calvinism, the water system of Bali, and Judaism as a functionally adaptive religion, but I am compelled to add: with a religiously disciplined cultural component and a biological component of quantity *and* quality birthing, Judaism stands head and shoulders above the rest as the most functionally adaptive religious system of all.

The Secular Utility of Religion

The Modern Literature

"If religious groups function as adaptive units… Then members of religious groups should prosper more than isolated individuals or members of less adaptively organized groups."[50]

Wilson, scanning the current literature, does indeed find that church groups provide a host of services for their practitioners and that the strictest religious groups, while imposing a greater financial burden on their practitioners, provide benefits that more than offset their costs. He finds, not surprisingly, that religious researchers themselves are not very good at defining those real tangible benefits religionists enjoy, but spend more time demonstrating the fuzzy intangibles that religious groups provide, such as the satisfaction to be enjoyed from impressive group rituals and communal prayer, items impossible to measure in an

adaptationist fashion. "In proximate terms the individual joins groups only because of the warm feeling of fellowship while in ultimate terms it joins groups only because survival is enhanced."[51]

So he yearns for religion to be studied the way evolutionary biologists study the rest of life: with their primary focus on the units that are adapted to survive and reproduce in their environments; but he chooses not to pick up the thread he's established on Judaism, the most functionally adaptive religious system of all, or introduce Zoroastrianism, another ethnic and religiously based reproductive strategy he doesn't mention.

Forgiveness As a Complex Adaptation

In Wilson's examination of forgiveness he provides some very simple "rules" of behavior successively discussed as Tit-for-Tat, Contrite Tit-for-Tat and Generous Tit-for-Tat. These fundamental interactions are illuminating and show how altruistic behavior might have developed increasing complexity for strategizing between groups.

One remark he makes caught my eye immediately. He says, "Most possible cultures are not adaptive, and we should hope for our own sakes that a process exists for winnowing among the many possibilities, leaving a subset that are at least somewhat well adapted to their environments."[52] In that remark, I saw cultural relativism relegated to the trash heap where it belongs. For specific environments, some cultures *are* more adaptive than others.

I was perplexed by Wilson's statement that "It is entirely possible that the New Testament has predisposed Christians to hate Jews long, long after it ceased to be adaptive,"[53] but he is now safely past the minefield through which we found him working his way in his discussion of Judaism's group interactions. He says "Christianity and virtually all other religions fall short when judged by the loftiest standard of universal brotherhood,"[54] ignoring what I believe to be a crucial distinction between a religion and its religionists. Earlier he suggested without qualification that tribal Judaism had abandoned its warrior culture. Now we are to believe that universal Christianity has gained the warrior culture Judaism left behind.

Unifying Systems

As "religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations,"[55] and the "key issues on the international agenda involve differences among civilizations,"[56] a coherent worldview must necessarily include an understanding of religion.

Darwin's Cathedral is therefore an important and timely book because it argues persuasively the practical efficacy of religious beliefs and practices. Wilson's historical examples demonstrate the adaptive nature of religion and provide an essential perspective on the role of religion in human affairs, well worth reading for any rationally bound religionist in danger of "losing the faith."

At the very beginning of the book, Wilson asks, "If society is an organism can we then think of morality and religion as biologically and culturally evolved adaptations that enable human groups to function as single units rather than mere collections of individuals?"

The answer I draw from *Darwin's Cathedral* is an unqualified, "Yes. We can."

Richard Faussette, a graduate of CUNY (BA Psychology/ Anthropology), is a freelance writer and the author of two essays: ***Natural Selection and the Nature of God****, 1998 and* ***True Religion – The Darwinian Interpretation of Biblical Symbols****, 2002.*

End Notes

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2.Herbert Spencer, *On Social Evolution: Selected Writings,* J.D.Y. Peel, editor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972) p. 156.

3.Ibid., pp. 221-222.

4.Wilson, *Darwin's Cathedral*, p. 6.

5.Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, *Sex, Evolution and Behavior,* second edition (Boston: PWS Publishers, 1983) p. 24.

6.Wilson, *Darwin's Cathedral*, p. 12.

7.*Ibid.,* pages 41-43.

8.*Ibid*., p. 11.

9.*Ibid*., p. 43.

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12.*Ibid*., p. 53.

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19.*Ibid*., p. 54.

20.*Ibid*., p. 82.

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25.*Ibid*., p. 90.

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28.*Ibid*., p. 95.
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31.Harris, *Cultural Materialism,* pages 102-103.
32.Ken Ham, *A Young Earth – It's not the Issue!* (AiG-USA Newsletter) January 1998.
33.Wilson, *Darwin's Cathedral*, p. 90.
34.*Ibid*., p. 109.
35.*Ibid*., p. 109.
36.*Ibid*., p. 110.
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40.*Ibid*., p. 127.
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47.*Ibid*., p. 5.
48.Wilson, *Darwin's Cathedral*, p. 84.
49.*Ibid*., p. 155.
50.*Ibid*., p. 162.
51.*Ibid*., p. 170.
52.*Ibid*., p. 204.
53.*Ibid*., p. 216
54.*Ibid*., p. 217
55.Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) p. 47
56.*Ibid*., p. 29

Ever Heard of Herbert Marcuse? How About Theodore Adorno?

(You are not alone ...)

Their names may not be well-known today, but these men led a small group of Marxists who formed the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, Germany shortly after World War I. Although still obscure to this day, the Frankfurt School has profoundly changed the culture and politics of America for generations. Every radical Leftist movement, from feminism to gay rights, was spawned by the Frankfurt School. (In support of his Red comrades in Vietnam, Marcuse himself coined the phrase "Make Love Not War.")

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PREPARING FOR WORLD WAR III

Avant-Guerre: Chronique d'un cataclysme annoncé (Pre-War: Account of an Impending Cataclysm)

Guillaume Faye
Paris: L' Æncre, 2002
24 Euros

382pp.

Reviewed by Michael O'Meara

Readers of *The Occidental Quarterly* may be unfamiliar with the work of Guillaume Faye, but his ideas are increasingly those of Europe's nationalist vanguard.

An early associate of Alain de Benoist and one of the architects of the European New Right, the young Faye left politics in the late 1980s to pursue a career in media. In 1998 he returned, instantly re-establishing himself as *the* intellectual force on the nationalist right.

He has since published five books, each of which has had a major impact on the struggle against multiculturalism, Third World immigration, and globalization.[1] Unlike Benoist and other New Right theoreticians, whose defense of the European ethnos is waged almost exclusively on the cultural terrain, and unlike Le Pen's National Front, which favors the assimilation rather than the forced repatriation of non-Europeans, Faye claims that race is not only primary to cultural identity, but that race and culture are, at root, inseparable. For this reason he argues that the struggle to preserve Europe's cultural patrimony is no less a struggle to defend its genetic heritage and the ethnic integrity of its *Lebensraum*.[2]

His latest work—*Avant-Guerre: Chronique d'un cataclysme annoncé* (Pre-War: Account of an Impending Cataclysm)—is reminiscent of Spengler's *Hour of Decision*. Like Spengler, Faye looks at the storm clouds on the horizon and predicts that within ten years a coming era of world-altering tempests will descend on the white race, determining if it is to have a future or not.

In his view, these cataclysms will be neither ideological nor economic in character, but (à la Huntington) racial and civilizational, involving clashing continental blocs and warring ethnoracial groups. They are thus likely to engender unprecedented violence and destruction, forcibly shaking white people from the stupor that is leading them toward extinction. Although whites are presently unprepared to fight such wars and alienated from all that is distinct to their race and heritage, the struggles of the twenty-first century, he believes, will give Europeans on both sides of the Atlantic a final chance to throw off the forces that have denatured and debilitated then over the last half century.

Europe And America

Like most "nationalists" who fight in Europe's name, Faye is extremely critical of the American government and the role it has played in repressing the worldwide forces of white solidarity. But unlike many on the anti-American right, Faye does not believe the U.S. is Europe's principal enemy, even if its Judeo-liberal New Class has been responsible for eroding European autonomy and demonizing its culture. An enemy, he contends, does more than corrupt and intimidate, it threatens one's biological existence. Taking his cue from Carl Schmidt, he thinks it is more accurate to characterize the U.S. as Europe's "adversary"—an adversary that needs to be opposed if Europeans are ever to re-assert the Faustian project distinct to their ethos—but nevertheless one with whom a life-and-death struggle is not at all inevitable.

The real enemy threatening the white homelands comes, he claims, from the Third World. Accordingly, the terror attack of "9/11" suggests one form his predicted cataclysm will take. But while Islam is Europe's principal enemy, it is not, paradoxically, America's. Based on the work of General Gallois, Alexandre Del Valle, and a new generation of European geopoliticists, Faye argues that Islam has long served the U.S. in furthering the hegemonic ambitions of its global village, specifically in dividing Europe and weakening Russia. That its recruitment and arming of Islamic fanatics to fight in Afghanistan and Chechnya and in Bosnia and Kosovo at last boomeranged ought not to detract from the fact that for a quarter century the U.S. systematically incited Islamic insurgencies for the sake of its strategic aims.

In Faye's view, America's principal Third World enemy, and thus the power it will face in World War III, comes not from the Middle East (even if militant Islam continues to target it), but from a rapidly developing and technologically armed China bent on contesting its dominance in the Pacific. In this potential Sino-American conflict, Faye believes the future lies entirely on the Chinese side. Unlike the Middle Kingdom, the U.S.'s disparate mix of race and cultures has left it without a coherent heritage and thus a destining project worth dying for. This makes it not a nation in the European sense, but simply

une symbiose étatico-entrepreneuriale. Because such an entity is likely to fly apart if challenged by a determined enemy, in the great cataclysms to come it will be Europe (and Russia), not the U.S., that will stand at the center of the struggle to defend the white West from a hostile non-white world.

ISLAM

While America's future holds out the prospect of an interstate war with China, Faye believes Europe faces an intrastate war with the forces of an insurgent Islam—a war, to repeat, that will resemble 9/11 more than the conventional military engagement the U.S. can expect in the Pacific.

In the four decades since 1962, when Africa broached Europe's southern frontier, the continent, especially France and Belgium, has been inundated by successive waves of Third World immigrants. The amplitude of this immigration, involving masses not individuals, is such that not a few demographers contend that it is more accurately described as "colonization." Due to disproportional birthrates, the unrelenting influx of non-white, unassimilable, and largely Muslim immigrants has already begun to "de-Europeanize" Europe. For example, virtually everywhere they have settled in France they have succeeded in "ethnically cleansing" former neighborhoods, establishing not ghettos, but conquered territories, from which future conquests are being prepared. With their seven to eight million inhabitants, these territories have become, in effect, hostile African/Middle Eastern encampments within an increasingly besieged France.[3]

This immigration is creating an extremely volatile situation, for Europe lacks the massive police apparatus and vast geographical expanses that have kept ethnoracial tensions "manageable" in the U.S. Typically, in urban areas, where neighborhoods have been lost to Islamic civilization, Europeans have come to experience not only escalating levels of violence and insecurity, but the loss of their laws and institutions. There are now more than 1,400 *zones de non-droit* in France (including eleven towns), and in nearly a hundred of these, republican jurisdiction has been supplanted by the *shari`a* (Islamic law).[4]

Within such zones, whose deteriorating conditions politically correct public officials persist in describing in socioeconomic rather than biocultural terms, it is nearly impossible for a Frenchman to reside in the public housing estates (HLM) built for the French working class, to find a café serving wine or ham, or for his wife to dress or behave in public as a European woman. In contrast to the Little Italies and Germantowns arising in many American cities in the last century, these non-European enclaves have not the slightest intention of assimilating into the *dar-al-Harb* (the "impious" non-Islamic world, which Muslims view as the "world of war"), and have, in fact, begun to assert their autonomy vis-à-vis it. In recent years, hardly a week passes without a newspaper report of a riot or bloody incident provoked by clashes between police and Muslim gangs.

Since 1990, urban violence has grown five percent annually—since 2000, by ten percent—as the anomie, violence, and disintegration associated with America's inner cities becomes an increasingly familiar European reality. In fact, in 2000, for the first time in history, French criminality, whose ethno-racial character is overwhelmingly non-European, surpassed the U.S. crime rate; and Paris, once the City of Light, became the least secure of the major European cities.

In the face of these threats to the continent's demographic, cultural, and institutional foundations, the media, the academy, and the established "anti-racist" organizations (mostly controlled by Zionists) attempt to silence whoever criticizes such changes, all the while making the term "multiculturalism" emblematic of the mobile postmodern society of optional values and fashionable identities that comes with globalization. Instead, then, of mobilizing the Christian West against such threats, these New Class forces preach cowardice, resignation, escapism, and a self-destructive humanitarianism.

An ethno-masochistic response of this kind has naturally emboldened the more militant members of France's Muslim community, who now call for jihad against the "white cheese." Public authorities, though, persist in distinguishing between violent fundamentalists (who number perhaps 40,000) and the "peace-loving" Muslim community, unable or unwilling to acknowledge Islam's inherent hostility to Europe's secular society. Between orthodox and fundamentalist Islam, Faye, though, claims there is solely a difference in temperament. And even this is increasingly compromised by fundamentalist aggressions. Years before the 9/11 attack on the symbols of U.S. hegemony, this "monstrous offshoot of Judaism" had already begun its third great offensive against the *dar-al-Harb*, targeting Europe as a future Muslim homeland.[5] Buoyed up by U.S.-protected strongholds in Southeast Europe (Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo), U.S. pressure to admit Muslim Turkey to the EU, and large stockpiles of sophisticated arms, Islamicists have already begun organizing for a new conquest.

It is not surprising, then, that Faye interprets the growth of European Islam as the opening salvo in a larger struggle for the continent's future.[6] Faye's militant opposition to Islam does not, however, bear a resemblance to that of President Bush's handlers. The struggle against Islam, he insists, is a struggle to free Europe from a dire threat to existence—not a justification for further Zionist aggression.

What War Will Bring

In the coming cataclysms—likely to involve street battles between rival racial communities, guerrilla skirmishes, mega-terrorism, perhaps even small-scale nuclear exchanges with "dirty bombs," along with conventional-style invasions from neighboring Islamic armies—Faye believes Europe will either perish or experience a rebirth. In any case, the confrontations ahead will create a situation in which the present politically correct delusions are impossible to sustain.

For like every great struggle affecting humans' natural selection, war privileges the elemental and the vital. With it, the subtleties and distractions that sophists and simulators have used to misdirect Europeans cannot but cease to count, as will those minor differences that have historically divided them. Then, as "money and pleasure" cede to the imperatives of "blood and soil," only the traditions, the way of life, and the genetic principles defining them as a people will matter.

The situation the white race finds itself in today may therefore be unconditionally bleak, but in that hour when everything risks being lost, Faye believes a final opportunity for renaissance will present itself.

In this vein, he predicts that the dominant musical theme of the twenty-first century will be neither an orchestral ode to joy nor the doggerel of an urban savage, but rather a solemn military march based on ancient hymns. Europeans on both sides of the Atlantic, he advises, would do well to keep step with its strong, marked rhythm.

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End Notes

1. *L'archéofuturisme* (1998); *Nouveau discours à la nation européenne*, 2nd ed. (1999); *La colonisation de l'Europe* (2000); *Pourquoi nous combattons* (2001). All these works have been published by L'Æncre and can be purchased at the Librairie Nationale, 12 rue de la Sourdière, 75001 Paris, or on the Internet at www.librairienationale.com.

2. See Michael Torigian, *New Right, New Culture: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003).

3. The number of non-Europeans in France is not officially known. The cited figure is the estimate of one of the country's leading demographers. See "L'avenir démographique: Entretien avec Jacques Dupâquier," in *Krisis* 20-21 (November 1997). Another academic (J. P. Gourevitch) claims it is closer to 9 million. Some put the figure as high as 14 million, while the media usually refer to 4, 5, or 6 million. But more alarming than these figures is the fact that one-third of the population under thirty is now of non-European origins and has a birth rate four or five times higher than the European one.

4. Jeremy Rennher, "L'Occident ligoté par l'imposture antiraciste," in *Écrit de Paris* 640 (February 2002). Even the politically correct editor of *Violences en France* (Paris: Seuil, 1999), Michael Wieviorka, acknowledges that the explosion of violence and criminality since 1990 is an outgrowth of Islamic power. Because the French government keeps most data on immigrant crime and racial terror securely under wraps, the little that is known has been surreptitiously leaked by frustrated officials. The publication with the best access to these leaks is the monthly *J'ai tout compris! Lettre de désintoxification*, edited, not coincidentally, by Guillaume Faye.

5. The first, Arab wave of the seventh century brought the Muslims to Poitiers, and the second, Turkish wave of the twelfthth through the seventh centuries led to the destruction of Christian Byzantium and the siege of Vienna. The third wave, in the form of the present colonization, is stealthier in character, but potentially even more catastrophic.

6. Accordingly, the more militant Europeanists now invoke the need for a new *reconquista*. This is especially evident in Philippe Randa's novel *Poitiers demain* (Paris: Denoël, 2000) and the album *Reconquista* by the group Fraction (Heretik Records).

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